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This study examines three different aspects of accounting regulation in Nigeria. The first 
empirical chapter (chapter 2) examines the process of the institutionalisation of IFRS in 
Nigeria and its outcome. Using data from documents, interviews and survey, the chapter 
finds that IFRS is substantively adopted by Nigerian listed firms, as they use it for internal 
reporting.  Furthermore, the institutionalisation process involves three levels of social 
order (i.e., Social, political and economic level; organisational field; and organisational 
level) at which different agents reinforce one another to ensure that institutionalisation of 
IFRS in Nigeria is substantive.  
The second empirical chapter examines whether accounting regulation in the form 
of IFRS adoption and/or enforcement of accounting standards lead(s) to higher 
accounting quality. The effects of these two regulatory mechanisms were assessed on 
three dimensions of accounting quality using fixed-effect regressions for earnings 
management, binary logistic regression for timely loss recognition, and a system dynamic 
panel model for earnings persistence on a sample of non-financial companies listed on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The chapter finds that IFRS adoption significantly 
increases earnings management and reduces earnings persistence, while institutional 
reform, through the setting up of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) to 
enforce and monitor compliance with accounting standards, reduces earnings 
management.  
The third empirical chapter examines the effect of accounting regulation in the 
form of IFRS adoption and enforcement on market liquidity in Nigeria. The chapter 
adopts a longitudinal research design and analyses hand-collected panel data sets from 
semi-structured archives. Three proxies of market liquidity (i.e., bid-ask spread, zero 
returns, and volume) were adopted for the study. Firm-quarter observations of 1,416, 
1,417 and 1,418 were analysed using a random-effect model for bid-ask-spread and a 
fixed-effect regression for both zero returns and volume, respectively. The chapter finds 
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1.1 Motivation for the Study 
The motivation for this study stems from the 2008 Nigerian capital market crisis that 
wiped away investors’ funds to the tune of $13.33 billion and led to the pull out of both 
foreign and local investors from the Nigerian capital market. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
the Securities and Exchange (SEC) report (2009) noted that the unease in the valuation 
of assets, arising from non-transparent reporting by the Nigerian listed firms, precipitated 
the exist of investors. The World Bank/IMF through their Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) (2011) recommended the adoption of IFRS and the 
establishment of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) to improve the 
integrity of the financial statements of listed companies in Nigeria. To facilitate the 
smooth adoption of IFRS and obviate the potential knowledge gap, the report further 
recommends the reform of professional accounting education in the country. It is the 
implications of these bundle of accounting reforms that this study seeks to assess.     
The adoption of IFRS across numerous parts of the world is considered the 
greatest accounting change ever (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). More than one hundred 
countries, developing and developed countries, have adopted IFRS (Bova and Pereira, 
2012). In recent times, several studies to examine various dimensions of issues related to 
this unprecedented accounting change. These issues revolve around three main themes 
which are IFRS adoption and accounting quality, IFRS adoption and capital market 
outcome, and the institutionalisation of IFRS in developing countries given their weak 
accounting infrastructure. This study is divided into three parts; the first part (Chapter 2) 
examines the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria, the second part (Chapter 3) examines 
the impact of IFRS adoption and the enforcement of accounting standards on accounting 
quality in Nigeria, while the third part (Chapter 4) examine the implications of IFRS 
adoption and the enforcement of accounting standards on market liquidity in Nigeria. 
1.1.1 The Institutionalisation of IFRS 
IFRS was advanced by the developed countries through the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). These countries have necessary infrastructures such as 
developed capital markets, strong accounting profession and strong enforcement 
institutions, which aid proper adoption of and compliance with IFRS by companies in 
these countries. These infrastructures are lacking in many developing countries (Chand 




compliance with IFRS is often very low. Arising from these weak accounting 
infrastructures, extant studies (e.g., Irvine, 2008; Albu and Albu, 2011) have discussed 
the failure of firms in the developing countries to comply with IFRS, albeit it has been 
adopted by the countries in which they operate. However, some developing countries, for 
example Nigeria, have implemented reforms such as the establishment of the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria and the strengthening of its accounting profession to 
enhance the adoption of IFRS. The effectiveness of such reforms is yet to be explored in 
extant literature (Nyamori, Abdul-Rahaman and Samkin, 2017). Thus, the objective of 
the second chapter of this study is to examine the process and outcome of the 
institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria. 
Institutionalisation is the process by which a rule or practice (i.e., an institution) 
expected in different social settings is developed and learned (Dillard, Goodman and 
Rigsby, 2004). The ‘rule’ here is IFRS (Wysocki, 2011). Institutionalisation takes place 
at three levels of social order, namely social, political, and economic level; organisational 
field; and organisational level (Dillard et al., 2004). According to DiMaggio (1988), the 
outcome of the institutionalisation process is determined by “the relative power of the 
actors who support, oppose, or otherwise strive to influence it” (p. 13) at the three levels 
of social order.  
The outcome of the institutionalisation process is either a symbolic or a 
substantive adoption of IFRS. IFRS is symbolically adopted when it is not fully embedded 
in organisational processes (e.g., used for internal reporting), while it is substantively 
adopted when it is fully embedded in organisational processes (PwC, 2004). Many studies 
on the institutionalisation of IFRS in the developing countries (e.g., Chand 2005; Chand 
and White, 2007; Chand and Patel, 2008; Irvine, 2008; Albu and Albu, 2012; Albu, Albu 
and Alexander, 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015) find IFRS to be symbolically adopted in the 
developing countries. In many cases, this symbolic adoption is ascribed to the motive for 
adopting IFRS by these countries, which is a symbolic portrayal of an improved reporting 
environment. However, many of these countries lack necessary infrastructures (e.g., weak 
accounting profession and weak or non-existent enforcement institutions) to support IFRS 
implementation.  
Given the improved accounting infrastructures in Nigeria, through the 
establishment of the FRCN and the reform of the professional accountancy education1, 
the objective of this part of the study is to examine the influence of these developments 
                                                             




on the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria and the outcome of the institutionalisation 
process. Using Dillard et al.’s (2004) model of neo-institutional theory, this objective is 
fulfilled by examining the institutionalising agents and the type of isomorphic pressure 
exerted by the agents at the different levels of social order – the social, political, and 
economic level (macro); the organisational field (meso); and the organisational level 
(micro).  
1.1.1.1 Research questions 
The following research questions are answered under this theme: 
i) Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they exert at the 
macro level to institutionalise IFRS? 
ii) Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they exert at the 
meso level to institutionalise IFRS? 
iii) Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they exert at the 
micro level to institutionalise IFRS? 
1.1.1.2 Research method 
To answer the research questions above, a qualitative research approach was adopted. 
Data were gathered from multiple sources to adequately capture the three levels of 
analysis (i.e., three levels of social order). Due to the historical nature of the 
institutionalisation process at the social, political, and economic level, data for this level 
were mainly gathered from documents (see Bowen, 2009). Data for the organisational 
field were gathered through interviews, while data for the organisational level were 
gathered through both interviews and semi-structured questionnaire to cater for the 
multitude of stakeholders at this level. Thematic analysis was used in analysing the data 
gathered. Thematic analysis is used for the study because the study is theory-driven (i.e., 
neo-institutional theory) (Braune and Clarke, 2005) and the theory formed the framework 
within which the data gathered were analysed.  
1.1.1.3 Summary of findings 
IFRS is substantively adopted by the Nigerian listed firms. This outcome is facilitated by 
the creation of the FRCN, the reform of professional accountancy education and other 
institutionalising agents at the three levels of social order. At the macro level, the World 
Bank exerts coercive pressure on the Nigerian government by making IFRS adoption a 
requirement for access to future grants and investments in the country. Coupled with the 




environment, following the capital market crisis in the country in 2008, the FRCN was 
established in 2011.  The FRCN and the ICAN are the institutionalising agents at the 
meso level. The FRCN exerts coercive isomorphic pressures on external auditors and 
directly conducts annual review of companies’ reports to ensure that audited reports 
comply with IFRS. The ICAN exerts normative isomorphic pressure on companies 
through the training of chartered accountants and accounting graduates in line with IFRS. 
At the micro level, the board of directors and internal auditors are the agents responsible 
for institutionalising IFRS by ensuring that IFRS is used for internal reporting. Other 
agents at this level are the cost-benefit of non-compliance with IFRS for internal reporting 
and the pressure exerted by a parent company on a Nigerian subsidiary to ensure that their 
internal reports comply with IFRS alongside other members of the group. 
1.1.2 IFRS, Enforcement and Accounting Quality 
IFRS, according to the IASB, is a high-quality accounting standard that will improve 
accounting quality once adopted by countries. This assertion has been tested by many 
studies in different jurisdictions across the globe (e.g., Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; 
Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2013; Cai, Rahman and Courtenay, 2014; Zeghal, Chtourou and 
Fourati, 2012; Capkun, Collins and Jeanjean, 2016), which has generated a large pool of 
mixed results (Brüggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn, 2013). However, recent arguments by 
Christensen, Lee, Walker and Zeng (2015) show that the enforcement of accounting 
standards rather than the adoption of IFRS is a better explanation for a higher accounting 
quality for mandatory IFRS adopters. Similarly, Capkun et al. (2016) observe that 
amendments made to IFRS in 2005 increased the flexibility of IFRS, thereby making the 
‘high-quality’ accounting standard to reduce accounting quality rather than improve it.  
While cross-country analyses have been criticised for generalising findings 
beyond homogeneous settings, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and De George, Lee and 
Shivakumar (2016) recently called for more single-country studies to unveil new insights. 
Nigeria is one unique setting to examine the true impact (negative or positive) of IFRS. 
This is because the enforcement of accounting standard, through the establishment of the 
FRCN, was made a year before IFRS adoption, which provides the opportunity to separate 
the effect of IFRS on accounting quality from the effect of enforcement on accounting 
quality.  
To this end, the objective of the third chapter of this thesis is to disentangle the 




this objective, three dimensions of accounting quality are examined. These dimensions 
are earnings management, timely loss recognition and earnings persistence.  
1.1.2.1 Research questions 
The following research questions are answered to address the research objective above: 
a) What is the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management following market 
failure in Nigeria? 
b) What is the effect of the establishment of the FRCN to enforce accounting 
standards on earnings management following market failure in Nigeria? 
c) What is the effect of IFRS adoption on timely loss recognition following market 
failure in Nigeria? 
d) What is the effect of the establishment of the FRCN to enforce accounting 
standards on timely loss recognition following market failure in Nigeria? 
e) What is the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings persistence following market 
failure in Nigeria? 
1.1.2.2 Research method 
The hypotheses developed in this part of the study were tested using various multivariate 
regression techniques. Hand-collected panel data were sourced from annual reports of the 
listed Nigerian firms. For the earnings management models, fixed-effect regression was 
used to test the hypotheses. A binary logistic regression model developed by Lang, Raedy 
and Wilson (2005) was used to test the hypotheses related to timely loss recognition, 
while a generalised method of moment model was used in testing the hypothesis related 
to earnings persistence. 
1.1.2.3 Summary of findings 
The study finds that IFRS increases earnings management and reduces timely loss 
recognition and earnings persistence of the Nigerian listed firms. This result implies that 
IFRS reduces accounting quality of the Nigerian listed firms. On the contrary, 
enforcement reduces earnings management and increases timely loss recognition of the 
Nigerian listed firms. Overall, the study finds that although IFRS and enforcement were 
part of the same accounting regulation bundle, aimed at improving accounting quality in 
Nigeria, the two regulatory mechanisms have different effects on accounting quality. The 
finding is robust to alternative accounting quality proxies and several control variables. 
The study employed public accountability model of accounting regulation (Tower, 1993) 




1.1.3 IFRS, Enforcement and Capital Market Outcomes 
The IASB has attached numerous capital market benefits to IFRS adoption. These 
benefits include increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow, lower cost of capital, 
higher market liquidity, and higher value relevance of accounting numbers among others. 
While many studies (Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008; 2013; Florou and Pope, 2012; 
Christensen et al., 2013; Florou and Kosi, 2015) have found a positive relationship 
between IFRS adoption and the aforementioned capital market benefits, they have linked 
these results to the underlying characteristics of the study areas. These characteristics 
include the extent of divergence of a country’s local GAAP2 from IFRS (Florou and Pope, 
2012, Florou and Kosi, 2015), the quality of investor protection and rule of law (Daske et 
al., 2008), and the quality of enforcement mechanisms (Florou and Pope, 2012; 
Christensen et al., 2013). Furthermore, Hail and Leuz (2006) show that cost of capital 
varies from one country to the other based on the degree of enforcement, security 
regulation, and the extent of disclosure. Similarly, Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015) find that 
improvement in the rule of law and a reduction in the level of corruption are the important 
explanatory factors for an increase in FDI in African countries. 
Given the above findings, it can be concluded that the impact of IFRS on capital 
market outcomes needs further exploration in order to ascertain whether the adoption of 
IFRS alone without these supporting infrastructures (enforcement, the rule of law and the 
degree of divergence of GAAP from IFRS) is sufficient to have positive capital market 
outcomes More importantly, understanding the effect of IFRS on capital market requires 
a setting with fewer of these cofounding variables (supporting infrastructure) or where 
their effects can be separated.  
Nigeria is a unique setting for exploring this issue because it has fewer of the 
cofounding variables. Nigeria has a weak rule of law, investor protection is low, and there 
is a low divergence of the Nigerian GAAP from IFRS. These characteristics make it 
possible to largely isolate the effect of IFRS on capital market outcomes from other 
possible explanations. Furthermore, the effect of enforcement on capital market outcome 
can be separated from the effect of IFRS, since the FRCN was established in 2011 while 
IFRS was adopted in 2012.  
The fourth chapter of this study, therefore, explores the impact of IFRS adoption 
and enforcement on market liquidity in Nigeria.  Market liquidity is the choice of capital 
market outcome examined in this study because data is not available for examining the 
                                                             




cost of capital and the value-relevance argument does not have a justifiable theoretical 
underpinning (Christensen et al., 2013).  
1.1.3.1 Research questions 
The following research questions are answered to fulfil the objective of this chapter: 
i) Does IFRS adoption increase the market liquidity of Nigerian listed 
companies? 
ii) Does the establishment of the FRCN to enforce accounting standards increase 
the stock market liquidity of Nigerian listed firms? 
1.1.3.2 Research methods 
Panel data for chapter four of this thesis was hand collected from ‘African markets’3 and 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange archives. Fixed-effect and random-effect regression models 
were run to test the hypotheses of this chapter. Three proxies were adopted as the 
measurements for market liquidity. These proxies are the bid-ask spread, trade volume 
and the proportion of zero daily returns (Chai, Faff and Gharghori, 2010). 
1.1.3.3 Summary of findings 
Both IFRS adoption and enforcement (establishment of the FRCN) were found to 
significantly increase market liquidity of Nigerian listed firms. The findings are robust to 
several control variables, including corporate governance variables. Furthermore, the 
unique setting of Nigeria makes it possible to use the signalling theory to illuminate the 
study. This is so because the two regulatory mechanisms were adopted following the 2008 
market crisis in Nigeria, which was caused by accounting irregularities and opaque 
information environment. Thus, the regulatory mechanisms were attempts to signal to 
both foreign and local investors that the information environment had improved, and 
accounting irregularities have been curtailed.  
1.2 Epistemological and Ontological Considerations 
Epistemology is all about what is considered acceptable knowledge in a particular 
discipline (Bryman, 2012). In social sciences, the argument is often between whether the 
social world can be studied with reference to the principles, techniques, and procedures 
used in the natural science or by adopting a different standpoint.  
Positivism is an epistemological position that assumes the principles and 
procedures in the natural science can be used in studying the social world (Snape and 
                                                             




Spencer, 2003). Positivism assumes that only phenomena that can be confirmed by the 
senses can be genuinely considered knowledge. In positivism, hypotheses are generated 
from a theory, which are tested to prove or disprove the theory (i.e., deductive approach). 
Alternatively, theories can be generated by gathering and analysing data from the field 
(i.e., inductive approach). Furthermore, scientific inquiries must be objective, that is, free 
from the researcher’s influence.  
Interpretivism is the opposite of positivism. It assumes that the social science is 
different from the natural science as its subjects - people and institutions - are different 
from the natural science’s subjects. Interpretivism disregards the existence of a single 
truth that could be uncovered by scientific procedures. In contrast, it aims to “grasp the 
subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman, 2012, p. 30) by interpreting the social 
actions from the actors’ view point. Interpretivism involves three levels of interpretation. 
Firstly, the actors interpret the situation. Secondly, their interpretations are interpreted by 
the researcher while collecting the data. Thirdly, the researcher interprets his findings 
within a theoretical frame, a conceptual frame, and the literature within a discipline. 
Realism is the third epistemological philosophy that balances between positivism 
and interpretivism. According to the realist, like the positivist, there exist a reality that is 
independent of the researcher, which he or she tries to unveil. Realism can be naïve 
realism (i.e., empirical realism) or critical realism (Easton, 2010; Bryman, 2012).  The 
naïve realist espouse that such reality can be readily accessed and that our description of 
reality is reality itself. Critical realists assume that our construction of reality only 
facilitates our understanding of the reality but not reality itself. The crux of critical realism 
is causal explanation (Easton, 2010). Unlike positivism that assumes that the occurrence 
of events in a regular pattern implies causality, and interpretivism that does not attempt 
to discern into causality but merely interprets it (Easton, 2012), critical realists move 
further to explain the causal mechanism(s) of events by paying special attention to the 
context (Bryman, 2012). 
Ontology refers to how social entities and social actors and their relationships are 
perceived. Ontological traditions can either be objectivism or constructionism. 
Objectivism assumes that social entities are independent of social actors. They are 
external realities or facts that can neither be constructed nor influenced by social actors. 
For example, an organisation has a set of rules and codes that individuals working in it 
must abide by. Objectivism assumes that such rules and codes exert influence on the 
workers who do not have influence in the construction of the rules and their application. 




just constructed by social actors but are also constantly being revised by them. Hence, in 
organisations, rules are not independent of social actors but are constructed, interpreted, 
and often revised by them to suit various social contexts. Objectivism is a feature of 
epistemological tradition of positivism while constructionism is a feature of 
interpretivism (Bryman, 2012).  
In this study, both objectivism and interpretivism are adopted. Specifically, 
chapter two uses interpretivism while chapters three and four use positivism. The reasons 
for adopting these two philosophies is that chapter two examines the processes by which 
IFRS has become institutionalised in Nigerian listed firms. This is done by collecting data 
from interviewees based on their interpretations, which is further interpreted by the 
researcher within the theoretical framing of neo-institutional theory. Chapters three and 
four investigate the impact of accounting regulation (IFRS adoption and enforcement) on 
accounting quality and market liquidity respectively in Nigeria. Hypotheses were 
developed to test the public accountability model of accounting regulation and signalling 
theory in chapters three and four, respectively. Thus, the two chapters follow the 
epistemological position of positivism. 
The study adopts multiple theoretical framings since a single theory cannot 
capture all the objectives of the study.   Chapter 2 examine the how IFRS institutionalised, 
the influence of the reform of other accounting infrastructure in the institutionalisation 
process and the outcome of the process. The Dillard et al.’s (2004) model of 
institutionalisation theory is used to illuminate the institutionalisation process. According 
to the theory, organisations face different isomorphic pressure to comply with societal 
expectations at different levels. The overarching norm (institution) is created at the social, 
political and economic level which is then transferred to the organisational field by 
actors/agent. From the organisational field, the norm is further transferred to the 
organisational level at which the outcome of the institutionalisation process is determined. 
The successful institutionalisation of the norm at each level is dependent on the relative 
power/influence of the actors at each level. 
In Chapter 3, the public accountability model of accounting regulation is used to 
theorise the expected impact of IFRS adoption and the enforcement of accounting 
standards on accounting quality. The theoretical faming provides a more nuanced link 
between accounting reform and accounting quality as perceived by multiple stakeholders. 
The theory suggests that the essence of accounting reform is to bring about public 
accountability to all stakeholders that have legitimate interests in an organisation. Based 




standards should improve various dimensions of accounting quality that are relevant to 
different stakeholders. For example, lower earnings management is relevant for 
regulators, the government, investors and creditors. Similarly, timely loss recognition is 
relevant to creditors.    
In Chapter 4, signalling theory is used to argue that after the Nigerian capital 
market crisis, the adoption of IFRS and the establishment of the FRCN, as recommended 
by the World Bank, are used as signals by the Nigerian government to the investors of a 
better reporting regime and more transparent information environment in Nigeria. It is 
expected that the signals will stimulate a positive response, through higher market 
liquidity, from both internal and external investors who had initially renounced trading in 
the Nigerian capital market. 
1.3 Contributions of the Study 
This study makes several contributions to theory and practice. Contrary to the findings 
that the outcome of the institutionalisation of IFRS in most developing countries is 
symbolic, chapter two shows that the establishment of an effective enforcement 
institution with well-developed strategies will ensure substantive adoption of IFRS.  The 
chapter also contributes to theory by showing that the institutionalisation of IFRS follows 
three levels of social order as posited by Dillard et al. (2004). This is the first study as far 
as the researcher knows that uses the Dillard et al.’s (2004) model of institutional theory 
to showcase the institutionalisation of IFRS at three levels of social order. Through this 
theory, the researcher finds that there are important strategies employed by the agent(s) 
at each level of social order to ensure IFRS is substantively adopted at the organisational 
level. Subsequent studies can adopt this rich theoretical framing in IFRS-related studies.  
Chapter three contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, contrary to the 
findings of Kim (2016) that enforcement without IFRS does not improve accounting 
quality, the researcher finds that enforcement and IFRS have different effects on 
accounting quality in Nigeria. Specifically, IFRS reduces accounting quality while 
enforcement increases it. Secondly, contrary to the findings of Nnadi and Soobaroyen 
(2015), the researcher finds that socio-political factors (e.g., rule of law and investor 
protection) do not have to change to have an improvement in accounting quality. The 
establishment of an independent enforcement institution (e.g., the FRCN in Nigeria) is 
sufficient to have improvements in accounting quality. Thirdly, contrary to the findings 
of Cai et al. (2014) that IFRS adoption has an insignificant effect on earnings management 




finds that despite the low divergence of the Nigerian GAAP from IFRS, the latter is found 
to significantly reduce accounting quality. Fourthly, the chapter explores a theoretical link 
– public accountability model of accounting regulation – between accounting regulation 
and accounting quality. This theory predicts that accounting regulation is needed to 
ensure public accountability to all relevant stakeholders. The theory gives a more nuanced 
explanation of why accounting regulation is needed by showing that accounting 
regulation is needed for informational equity and efficiency. This theory can be explored 
by future research in accounting regulation. 
The last empirical chapter also finds that sociopolitical variables like the rule of 
law and investor protection, as argued by Daske et al. (2008) and Nnadi and Soobaroyen 
(2015), may not necessarily improve to have an increase in market liquidity. For a 
developing country with weak accounting standard and enforcement institution, adopting 
IFRS and establishing a capable enforcement institution are important steps to realizing 
improvements in the capital market. Furthermore, contrary to the argument of Christensen 
et al. (2013) that enforcement is the major explanatory variable for increased market 
liquidity in many countries that adopted IFRS, the situation in Nigeria, with opaque 
information environment, is different. IFRS adoption has a significant effect in reducing 
information asymmetry alongside the enforcement by the FRCN. The study uses 
signaling theory to illuminate the impact of IFRS adoption and enforcement on market 
liquidity by exploring the unique nature of the Nigerian setting. IFRS adoption and 
enforcement were signals to the capital market that the Nigerian accounting information 
environment has improved after the 2008 market crisis. This theory creates a more 
nuanced theoretical link among IFRS adoption, enforcement, and market liquidity. This 
theory can be employed in similar contexts to Nigeria, especially after a market crisis, to 
unveil new insights. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, of which three are empirical chapters. The first 
chapter is an introduction to the whole study, charting out its aims and approaches. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are empirical chapters that explore the issues discussed under the 
background to the study. Each of these chapters is structured into sections exploring the 
introduction and problem statement of the chapter, literature review (conceptual and 
empirical review), research methods and data analysis, and conclusion. Chapter 5 
concludes the whole thesis, makes recommendations, and provides future research areas 
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The Institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial reporting practices vary markedly across jurisdictions. Among the factors 
leading to this variation are economic systems, legal systems, taxation systems, and the 
mode of financing (Haller and Walton, 2003; Roberts, Weetman and Gordon, 2008; 
Nobes and Parker, 2016). The development of multinational corporations, the spread of 
trade liberalisation, and most importantly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 have led to 
the call for the use of high-quality accounting standards across developed and developing 
countries (Zeff, 2012).  
A strong financial reporting system is dependent on interconnected socio-political 
and economic infrastructures such as the adequacy of the rule of law, enforcement quality, 
quality of accounting standards, and capital market quality. With the spread of IFRS 
across jurisdictions with different accounting infrastructures (i.e., weak and strong), 
several studies (Chand, 2005; Zeff, 2012; Perera, 2012; Albu, Albu and Alexander, 2014; 
Hopper, Lassou and Soobaroyen, 2017) have questioned whether IFRS is really adopted 
to bring about the acclaimed benefits often ascribed to it by the IASB. Specifically, IFRS 
adoption by developing economies is perceived by several studies to be symbolic, as a 
mere legitimation strategy lacking proper commitment, because they lack necessary 
infrastructures (e.g., enforcement institution and developed capital market) to realise the 
potentials of IFRS (Mir and Rahaman, 2005; Chand, 2005; Carneiro, Rodrigues and 
Craig, 2017). Their adoption of IFRS is often a response to external pressure from the 
World Bank and IMF (Irvine, 2008; Albu and Albu, 2012; Hassan, Rankin and Lu, 2014). 
However, in some developing countries including Nigeria, there have been 
substantial efforts made to build some supporting infrastructures (e.g., the establishment 
of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria and the reform of professional accounting 
education) to ensure that the adoption of IFRS is substantive. While not all supporting 
infrastructures have been overhauled4, it would be interesting to investigate whether the 
reforms made are significant in ensuring substantive adoption of IFRS by Nigerian 
companies. The result of this inquiry is particularly important for policy making, not only 
in Nigeria but also in other developing countries, as a possible model to be adopted as a 
part of a longer-term plan of reforming other supporting infrastructures. 
                                                             




2.1 Statement of the Problem 
The establishment of an enforcement institution and the reform of professional 
accounting bodies in many developing countries involve substantial costs and efforts. For 
example, the World Bank gave a grant of $200,000 to the Bangladeshi Government in 
1999 to enhance the institutional capacity of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh (Mir and Rahaman, 2005). Similarly, in Nigeria, the World Bank gave a grant 
of $485,0005 to reform the institutional capacity of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Nigeria. Listed Nigerian firms and registered professionals that are connected with the 
preparation of financial statements also pay annual subscriptions to the FRCN. 
Furthermore, the staff of the FRCN are public officers that are paid salary and pension by 
the Nigerian government. These costs are enormous and can be channelled to alternative 
productive uses if the purpose for all these reforms are not achieved. Thus, are these 
reforms meeting the purpose for which they have been made (i.e., substantive adoption 
of IFRS)? This is an important question that needs to be answered.  
The reliability of financial statement, as being a true reflection of the summary of 
the day to day business transactions of a firm, is dependent on the reliability of the 
underlying data and structure (e.g., internal control). ‘IFRS-based’ financial statements 
can only be deemed to be IFRS-based if IFRS data forms part of the daily routine of the 
business. This means that IFRS data such as fair value, impairment test of assets, and 
value-in-use are captured by the accounting system, and structures (e.g., effective internal 
control system) are in place to ensure IFRSs are complied with (Wilford, 2016). 
Ultimately, internal reports to the management must reflect IFRS information (PwC, 
2004). If these structures are not in place in a firm, any IFRS-based financial statement 
from such firm will not be reliable. A workaround approach, where IFRS information is 
captured at one point in time (usually at year end), is usually adopted by such firms in 
preparing IFRS-based statements. Whereas such approach shows that IFRS is not 
integrated into the accounting system of the company. The consequence of this is that any 
decision made based on such financial statement may be misleading.  
This study aims to address the issues related to the institutionalisation of IFRS 
across the three levels of social order in Nigeria and examine the outcome of the process. 
The objectives of the study and related research questions are stated below. 
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2.3 Objective of the Study 
The objective of this study is to examine the process of institutionalising IFRS in Nigeria 
across the three levels of social order, and the role played by the establishment of the 
FRCN and the professional accounting education reform. Secondly, the study will also 
examine whether these reforms lead to substantive adoption of IFRS by Nigerian listed 
firms (i.e., whether it is used for internal reporting). These research objectives are 
achieved by answering the following research questions: 
i) Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they exert at the 
macro level to institutionalise IFRS? 
ii) Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they exert at the 
meso level to institutionalise IFRS? 
iii) Is IFRS substantively adopted (used for internal reporting) by Nigerian firms? 
iv) Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they exert at the 
micro level to institutionalise IFRS? 
2.4 Significance of the Study  
This is the first study, as far as the researcher is aware, that investigates whether IFRS is 
substantively adopted (when used for internal reporting) and if so, the processes leading 
to its substantive adoption in a developing country context (i.e., Nigeria).  
Although some recent studies on the institutionalisation of IFRS in developing 
countries have been conducted, much of these studies (e.g., Mir and Rahaman, 2005; 
Irvine, 2008; Albu and Albu, 2012; Albu et al., 2014; Mantzari, Sigalas and Hines, 2017) 
have concentrated on the outcome of institutionalisation rather than the process. The 
process of institutionalisation is a corollary to its outcome, so it is important to examine 
the procedures that lead to the outcome in order to make informed policies. Secondly, 
most studies have focused on the symbolic adoption of IFRS in developing countries, 
while this study focuses on how the reform of accounting infrastructures may lead to 
substantive adoption of IFRS in Nigeria.  
2.5 Contextual Framework 
2.5.1 Accounting development in Nigeria 
The institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria becomes more comprehensible if the historical 
background of accounting practice in Nigeria is explored. Modern accounting in Nigeria 
was a British import through the colonisation of the country. The halt, after more than 
300 years, in slave trade and the subsequent growth in agricultural produce led to the 




informed the need for the modern practice of accounting to cope with the new form of 
trade. In 1905, Charles Ernest Dale, the first qualified accountant (Incorporated 
Accountant6) arrived in Nigeria as the financial commissioner and treasurer to the 
colonial government. While the British government laid down no infrastructure for the 
development and sustainability of modern accounting practices in Nigeria, the agitation 
for self-rule towards 1957 affected the accounting profession as well. The Companies 
Ordinance of 1922 provided that registered companies prepare balance sheets, which 
must be audited by auditors approved by a supervising Minister. Approved auditor status 
was based on the possession of a practicing certificate issued by the professional 
accountancy bodies in the UK or serving in the government audit department for not less 
than 15 years and having passed the intermediate level of the examinations of the UK 
accountancy bodies. Obviously, many Nigerians did not have these opportunities and 
were relegated to performing routine jobs as clerks or some other office duties (Wallace, 
1992).  
The first qualified accountant in Nigeria was Mr Benjamin Bankole Akinpelu 
Osundiya (Wallace 1992). He qualified with the London Corporation of Accountants and 
the Association of Certified Accountants in 1928 and 1929 respectively. However, till his 
death in 1957, he was neither employed as an accountant nor recognised as an approved 
auditor. As at independence in 1960, there were 41 indigenous qualified accountants in 
Nigeria. The composition of their professional bodies is as follows: 
   Cost and Work Accountants      3 
   Municipal Treasurers and Accountants     1 
Certified Accountants     22 
Chartered Accountants    15 
There was a surge in the growth of expatriate firms with the “coming of 
development plans and political independence in the 1950s and 1960s” (Wallace, 1992, 
p. 30), as Nigerians were not recruited as accountants and the qualified accountants 
amongst them were also limited in number.  The expatriate firms initially worked over a 
short cycle with a partner coming to Nigeria for short-term audits. But as businesses grew, 
there was a need to have local offices in Nigeria. The first of such transnational audit 
firms to come to Nigeria was Lewis and Mounsey & Co (LMC) in 1905 (Wallace, 1992). 
LMC was short-lived as the firm mainly served the tin mining companies. Thus, following 
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the decline in tin mining alongside the appointment of supervising agents and internal 
auditors (including chartered accountants) by businesses, there was less need for LMC’s 
expertise. The West African Services offered accounting services (such as bookkeeping 
and internal audit services) to businesses whose owners were not in Nigeria. West African 
Services was acquired by Cassleton Elliot in 1929 following the latter’s appointment as 
the auditor of Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria in 1928. In 1949, Pannell, Crewson 
and Hardy (now Pannell Kerr Forster- PKF) and Midgley, Snelling and Barnes opened 
offices in Nigeria, while Cooper Brothers & Co came in 1953. It is worth mentioning that 
none of these accountancy firms appointed a Nigerian as a partner in their firms up to 
1966. With these “extra territorial” (Wallace, 1992) firms obviously in charge of 
accountancy and audit practices in Nigeria, it will not be inconceivable to say that many 
qualified Nigerian accountants experienced difficulty in getting audit jobs.  
In 1957, Nigerians and expatriates that were members of the ACCA (Associate 
Certified and Corporate Accountants) formed a local branch of the professional 
accountancy body and they gained recognition of the UK body in 1960. But the 
sustainability of the new body suffered from the same little recognition the mother body 
suffered in the UK. Thus, as suggestions were raised to bring all qualified Nigerians under 
one local umbrella body, the ACCA members gladly embraced the idea. In 1959, the 
Association of Accountants of Nigeria was formed to include both qualified Nigerians 
and expatriates across all professional accountancy bodies in existence in the UK. The 
association followed the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
(ICAEW) structure in all ramifications including examinations, codes of conduct for 
members, and the use of the designation ‘Chartered Accountant’ (Wallace, 1990). 
However, this move was non-consensual because expatriates and Nigerians that were 
qualified chartered accountants with ICAEW were unhappy because of the possible 
“dilution of the notion of chartered accountancy which might arise from admission of 
accountants who were not trained as chartered accountants and the prospect of being 
disadvantaged in the Nigerian market for auditing services which permitted easy access 
to non-Nigerian (especially British) chartered accountants” (Wallace, 1992, p. 36). 
Following this opposition, they sought to establish a rival body - the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) - comprising of qualified Nigerians with the ICAEW. 




In 1965, the Nigerian Parliament passed the ICAN Act with relative ease for three 
major reasons. Firstly, the founders7 of ICAN were known for their integrity and 
independence. Secondly, a desire to develop local capacity in sustaining independence, 
and thirdly, the notion that Nigerian accountants were capable of establishing a viable 
accountancy profession.  
The ICAN Act of 1965 gave a number of privileges to the Institute, which led to 
some internal struggles between ICAN and some other accounting bodies that perceived 
such privileges as a basis for ICAN’s monopoly of the accounting profession in Nigeria.  
“Up until the enactment of the ICAN Act, no organisation had the duty of regulating the 
accounting and auditing profession. Under the Companies Ordinance of 1922 anybody 
could act as an auditor to a company” (Uche, 2002, p. 480) except employees of the 
companies. However, the ICAN Act made only ICAN members appointable as auditors 
of companies in Nigeria as well as the control of education, training and certification of 
chartered accountants (Wallace, 1992). As a result of the monopoly of audit assignments 
that ICAN members now enjoy, many other Nigerians decided to join ICAN to enjoy the 
privilege together. However, some Nigerians of other accounting bodies that have no 
recognition by the international accounting bodies were not qualified for the membership 
of ICAN. These unrecognised bodies included the Association of International 
Accountants (AIA); The Society of Company and Commercial Accountants and; the 
British Association of Accountants and Auditors. The Nigeria Society of International 
Accountants (SIA), which comprised of the members of the Association of International 
Accountants of Nigeria, became a major threat to ICAN monopoly since their members 
were not admissible by ICAN. In 1972, the SIA wrote a petition to the Nigerian 
government demanding that the ICAN Act be modified to accept members of the SIA. 
ICAN swiftly responded to the petition arguing that such move would make “accountancy 
qualification obtainable in Nigeria [to] be considered inferior to that of any other country” 
(Anibaba, 1990, p. 150). Again, the plan to join ICAN by the SIA was thwarted by 
ICAN’s rejoinder. After several failed attempts of persuasive efforts to join ICAN or 
make the Nigerian government amend the ICAN Act, the SIA “spearheaded the formation 
of a wider accounting body named the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria 
(ANAN)” in 1979 (Uche, 2002, p. 484). 
ANAN members began a major push for the recognition of their association under 
the guise that the number of chartered accountants produced by ICAN was extremely 
                                                             




below what the country needed for its increasing growth. Although this argument was 
true, ICAN devised several strategies to forestall the recognition of ANAN by the 
Nigerian government. The signing of the ANAN Decree8 (1993) by the then Head of 
State, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, brought an end to ICAN’s monopoly. The 
duties assigned to ANAN are similar to the statutory duties of ICAN. Section 1 of the 
ANAN Act highlights the duties of the body as follows: (a) advancing the science of 
accountancy (in this Act referred to as ‘the Profession’); (b) determining the standards of 
knowledge and skill, to be attained by persons seeking to become registered members of 
the profession and reviewing those standards, from time to time as circumstance may 
require; (c) promoting the highest standard of competence, practice and conduct among 
the members of the profession; (d) securing, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, 
the establishment and maintenance of register of members of the profession and the 
publication, from time to time, of lists of these persons; (e) doing such things as may 
advance and promote the advancement of the profession of accountancy in both the public 
and private sector of the economy; and (f) performing through the Council established 
under section 3 of this Act, the functions conferred on it by this Act”. 
Despite the statutory duties of ANAN being similar to the statutory duties of 
ICAN, the hegemony over the Nigerian accounting profession is still maintained by 
ICAN. ICAN has enjoyed international recognition as the major accounting professional 
body in Nigeria9. Furthermore, only ICAN members can audit listed companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). 
2.5.2 The Nigerian Accounting Standards Board  
The NASB was established by ICAN in 1982 and became a Federal Government 
parastatal in 199210. The NASB was charged with setting and monitoring compliance 
with accounting standards in Nigeria.  The board of the NASB comprised: 
i. A chairman who shall be a professional accountant with considerable 
professional experience in accounting practice. 
ii. Two representatives each of the following: Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria; Association of National Accountants of Nigeria;  
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iii. A representative each of the following: Federal Ministry Commerce; 
Federal Ministry of Finance; Central Bank of Nigeria; Corporate Affairs 
Commission; Federal Inland Revenue Service; Nigerian Deposit 
Insurance Corporation; Securities and Exchange Commission; Accountant 
General of the Federation; Auditor General for the Federation; Chartered 
Institute of Taxation of Nigeria; Nigerian Accounting Association; 
Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and 
Agriculture; and  
iv. The Executive Secretary of the Board 
Accountancy profession in Nigeria is based on the British system.  For this reason, 
Nigerian Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS), as issued by the NASB, is just an 
abridged version of IASs. Table 2.1 depicts the Nigerian SASs and their IAS equivalence. 
Table 2.1 Nigerian Statement of Accounting Standards before Full IFRS Adoption 
Statement of Accounting Standards 
(SAS) 
Equivalent International Accounting 
Standards (IAS, now IFRS) 
SAS 1: Disclosures of Accounting Policies IAS 1: Disclosure of Accounting Policies  
SAS 2: Information to be Disclosed in 
Financial Statements. 
IAS 5: Information to be Disclosed in 
Financial Statements. 
SAS 3: Accounting for Property, Plant and 
Equipment 
IAS 16: Accounting for Property, Plant 
and Equipment 
SAS 4: Stocks IAS 2: Valuation and Presentation of 
Inventories in the Context of Historical 
Cost System. 
SAS 5: Construction Contracts IAS 11: Accounting for Construction 
Contracts 
SAS 6: Extra Ordinary Items and Prior 
Year Adjustments 
IAS 8: Unusual and Prior Period Items and 
Changes in Accounting Policies 
SAS 7: On Foreign Currency Conversions 
and Translations 
IAS 21: Accounting for the Effects of 
Change in Foreign Exchange Rates. 
SAS 8: Accounting for Employees’ 
Retirement Benefits 
IAS 19: Employee Benefits 
IAS 26: Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefits Plan 
SAS 9: Accounting for Depreciation IAS 4: Depreciation Accounting 
IAS 25: Accounting for Investments 
SAS 10: Accounting for Banks and Non-
Bank Financial Institutions (Part I) 
IAS 30: Disclosures in the Financial 
Statements of Banks and Similar 
Financial Institutions 
SAS 11: On Leases IAS 17: Accounting for Leases 




SAS 13: Accounting for Investments  IAS 25: Accounting for Investments 
SAS 14: Accounting in the Petroleum 
Industry: Upstream Activities 
No equivalent IAS 
SAS 15: Accounting by Banks and Non-
Bank Financial Institutions (Part II) 
SAS 30: Disclosures in the Financial 
Statements of Banks and Similar 
Institutions 
SAS 16: Accounting for Insurance 
Business 
No equivalent IAS 
SAS 17: Accounting in the Petroleum 
Industry (Down Stream Activities) 
No equivalent IAS 
SAS 18: Statement of Cash flows IAS 7: Cash Flow Statements 
SAS 19: Accounting for Taxes IAS 12 (Revised): Income Taxes  
SAS 20: Abridged Financial Statements  No equivalent IAS 
SAS 21: Earnings Per Share IAS 33: Earnings Per Share 
SAS 22: Research and Development Costs IAS 38: Intangible Assets 
SAS 23: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities 
& Contingent Assets 
IAS 37: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities 
& Contingent Assets 
SAS 24: Segment Reporting IAS 14: Segment Reporting 
SAS 25: Telecommunications Activities No equivalent IAS 
SAS 26: Business Combinations IFRS 3: Business Combinations 
SAS 27: Consolidated and Separate 
Financial Statements 
IAS 27 (Revised): Consolidated and 
Separate Financial Statements 
SAS 28: Investments in Associates IAS 28 (Revised): Investments in 
Associates 
SAS 29: Interests in Joint Ventures IAS 31: Interests in Joint Ventures  
SAS 30: Interim Financial Reporting IAS 34: Interim Financial Reporting 
Source: NASB (2009) 
2.5.3 Accounting reform in Nigeria and relevant stakeholders  
The Nigerian capital market (i.e. the Nigerian Stock Exchange) plunged into crisis in 
2008, leading to the erosion of investors fund to the tune of N2 trillion (approximately, 
13.33 billion). The World Bank/IMF recommended the adoption of IFRS and the 
establishment of the FRCN to improve the financial statement of the Nigerian listed firms 
and resuscitate investors’ confidence. They also recommended the reform of professional 
accounting education in Nigeria, particularly the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria. Unlike in many developing countries the move by the World Bank to reform 
accounting has met with stern opposition (e.g. Mir and Rahaman, 2005; Albu and Albu, 
2012; Albu et al., 2014). In Nigeria, accounting reform by the World Bank seemed to 




accounting reform. All the key stakeholders have maintained their usual role in the 
reform. 
The Nigerian government has been in control of the NASB, which has been a 
parastatal of the government since has been 1992. Similarly, the FRCN was established 
as a parastatal of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment. Accounting reform is 
not the first reform encouraged by the World Bank in Nigeria. In the past, the Nigerian 
government has been receptive to economic reforms advocated by the World Bank, such 
as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 and the due process in public 
procurement introduced in 2001. Hence accounting reform was not resisted by the 
Nigerian government.  
The World Bank also recognised the hegemony of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria, whose members have the sole authority to certify listed 
companies’ accounts. Hence, the reform of accounting education was tailored towards 
the ICAN’s training of chartered accountants. Furthermore, the structure of the defunct 
NASB was retained in the newly established FRCN. There was no meddling with the 
composition of its board which was a fusion of all relevant stakeholders. Also, the 
Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS) that was issued by the NASB borrowed 
significantly from the IASs. The expected knowledge gap upon the adoption of IFRS 
would not be wide.   
Collectively, it is expected that the preservation of the existing accounting 
regulatory structures will encourage a less repulse to the World Bank’s advocated 
accounting reform in Nigeria.  
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
2.6.1 Differences in Accounting Practices across Jurisdictions 
Accounting is an ‘economic language’ (Haller and Walton, 2003, p.1) that evolves from 
the needs of the immediate environment in which it is spoken. Thus, accounting is often 
adapted to meet specific local purposes of the people and institutions ‘speaking’ it. 
Essentially, the language of accounting in a country will not usually be understood in 
another country11 as the two are rooted in different cultures. More so, recipients of 
accounting information in the two countries are different.  
 
                                                             
















                 
Source: adapted from Haller &Walton (2003) 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, different socio-political, economic, and cultural 
environment lead to differences in financial reporting objectives, which translate to 
different accounting principles. These different principles in turn translate to different 
accounting practices. 
A number of socio-political, economic, and cultural characteristics account for 
various accounting practices across different geographical boundaries. The tax system of 
a country influences accounting practices of the country. There are three categories of tax 
systems according to Roberts et al. (2008), namely; tax rules are entirely separated from 
accounting rules, accounting rules are used for tax purposes, and tax rules are used for 
accounting purposes. A typical example of the first category is the UK, where 
depreciation charge in the financial accounts is based on different methods12 and has no 
effect on taxation (Nobes and Parker, 2016). For tax purposes, the capital allowance, 
which is a predetermined uniform rate, is a substitute for accounting depreciation and is 
governed by tax rules. On the contrary, in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Austria, and 
Japan, tax rules are used for financial reporting (Nobes and Parker, 2016; Roberts et al., 
2008), as tax authorities are one of the key accounting information users. Consequently, 
assets are more rapidly depreciated, and companies are perceived as highly-geared in such 
tax-oriented jurisdictions (Haller and Walton, 2003). Where financial reporting rules are 
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used for tax purposes, as done in most developing commonwealth countries (Roberts et 
al., 2008), financial accounts in these jurisdictions are adjusted to arrive at taxable profits. 
For example, depreciation is added back to net profits in Nigeria before calculating capital 
allowances. 
Common law and code law countries differ in their accounting practices. In 
common law countries, accounting rules are designed to cater for the interest of 
shareholders who own the companies, which are managed by different individuals 
(managers). Truth and fairness is emphasised in these jurisdictions because business 
owners need to have accurate information about their businesses. Thus, more disclosure 
to shareholders and potential investors is a major consideration in these jurisdictions 
(Roberts et al., 2008). More so, accounting rules are often set by independent bodies from 
the government. On the contrary, in code law countries, the government develops detailed 
rules for accounting practices as part of the overall commercial regulation. However, 
disclosures by companies in code law countries are less detailed, as accounting objectives 
are dominated by the prudence principle (Haller and Walton, 2003).  
Companies’ finances may be raised from banks or the capital market. In the case 
of the former, the major consumers of accounting information are the banks themselves. 
For example, in Japan, where a ‘main bank system’ (Sheard, 1989) operates, the main 
bank is a key shareholder and also a lender to Japanese firms. In such jurisdictions, 
accounting conservatism is a desirable objective of financial reporting, since the intent of 
financial reporting is to calculate distributable profits to business owners without 
jeopardising the interest of other stakeholders of the company, especially the creditors 
(Walton et al., 2003). In the case of family-owned companies, transparency is less of a 
concern because the shareholders are largely composed of family members so there is 
lower information asymmetry. There is a tendency of less disclosures by such firms in 
their financial statements. A company whose shares are listed on the stock exchange, on 
the other hand, has a large pool of owners who are interested in knowing about the affairs 
of the firm. Such companies make more disclosures to get the public informed about their 
status (e.g., United States, Canada and Australia) (Walton, et al., 2003). 
In a capitalist economy, where economic variables like prices, output, demand 
and supply are determined by market forces with varying degrees of government 
interference, profit determination and disclosure are important objectives of financial 
reporting (Roberts et al., 2008). On the contrary, in a centrally planned economy (e.g., 
China in 1980s), where economic variables are determined by a central authority, 




Hence, physical units rather than profits are the major foci of accounting (Robert et al., 
2008).  
Industrial structure of a country is another cause of differences in accounting 
practices across jurisdictions. Developing countries that are dependent on agriculture are 
more interested in how best to account for farm produces13, while countries where 
multinational companies are dominant are more interested in foreign currency 
translations. In hyperinflationary economies, such as Zimbabwe, inflation accounting is 
a major concern (Roberts et al., 2008). Similarly, in Japan and Korea where keiretsu and 
chaebol14, respectively, are in operation, group accounting may have no significance 
(Nobes, 2014). 
Culture is a significant determinant of variations in accounting practices (Ding, 
Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2005). According to Nobes and Parker (2006, p. 25) “culture 
includes a set of societal values that drives institutional form and practice”. Several 
empirical evidence confirms this hypothesis. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find 
that the proportion of Malaysian directors, by race, on the board affects the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by Malaysian companies. Similarly, Tsakumis (2007) find that 
Greek accountants, as compared to US accountants, are more secretive regarding 
information disclosure. Ding et al. (2005) find uncertainty avoidance and individualism 
to be positively related to the extent of divergence in accounting principles across 52 
countries. 
The development of multinational corporations, the spread of trade liberalisation, 
and most importantly the Asian financial crisis of 1997, have led to the call for the use of 
high-quality accounting standards across developed and developing countries (Zeff, 
2012). However, many events took place before the eventual development and adoption 
of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The next section discusses 
these events. 
2.6.2 Evolution of IFRS 
The current adoption of IFRS by more than 100 countries is not a sudden event without 
its antecedents. Many events unfolded before IFRS became widely accepted across the 
globe, as the global language of accounting. This section discusses the antecedents to 
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IASC’s creation, the challenges faced by the IASC and its achievements, and the 
development of the IASB.  
2.6.2.1 Antecedents to the creation of IASC and the development of IAS/IFRS 
Prior to the call for the unification of accounting practices across a multitude of 
geographic boundaries, each country individually developed its own rules that 
benchmarked its accounting practices. Often, these rules were based on the individual 
country’s needs and characteristics or culture. For example, while the US and Canada use 
historical cost in valuing assets, Australia and New Zealand favour the revaluation model, 
while Japan’s accounting practice was rather driven by income tax. A majority of the 
developing countries simply adopted the practices of their formal colonial masters (Zeff, 
2012). However, the spread of international trade and foreign direct investments in the 
1950s, and the increase in cross-border merger and acquisitions in the 1960s, which gave 
birth to multinational firms, created a rethink about the diversity of accounting practices, 
as multinational firms in different jurisdictions would have to prepare different financial 
reports in accordance with the accounting rules of each country they operate in. Sequel to 
these events, Henry Benson, a senior partner of Cooper Brothers & Co (later Coopers and 
Lybrand, and then PricewaterhouseCoopers) and the president of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in 1966, formed the Accountants 
International Study Group (AISG) with the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Ireland. The AISG issued 20 booklets that compared accounting practices 
across the UK, the US, and Canada in order to unveil the diversity of accounting across 
jurisdictions and the need for harmonisation to cater for the new business structures 
(Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). 
In 1973, Benson, with other accounting bodies’ delegations around the globe15, 
established the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to promote the 
harmonisation of accounting practices and forestall “Germany’s tax-oriented approach” 
(Zeff, 2012, p.808) that was gaining prominence among European Economic Community 
(EEC now EU) countries (Hopwood, 1994). Delegates were operating on a part-time 
basis, attending IASC’s board meetings three to four times in a year. Delegates signed an 
agreement to influence their national standards setting bodies to adopt IASC standards. 
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The first three standards issued by IASC were on inventories, accounting policies 
disclosure, and consolidated financial statements. Quite a number of IASs had free 
choices16 and this, among other issues, created challenges for the standards.  
IASC received a boost in the 1980s, as some major companies adopted IAS for 
their financial statements’ presentation. For example, Exxon and General Electric in the 
US, 100 listed firms in Canada, Sasebo Heavy Industries Co. in Japan in 1985, and South 
African Breweries in 1984. Furthermore, the number of delegates increased with the 
joining of Nigeria, South Africa, Italy, and Taiwan, with more than 40 delegates by 1987.  
In 1987, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)17 
tendered to the IASC that it would endorse IASs for its members’ use if the following 
changes were made to existing standards already issued by IASC: elimination of 
accounting choices, ensure the IASs are sufficiently detailed, and ensure that the IASs 
contain adequate disclosure requirements (IOSCO, 1988, p.8). 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, the German GAAP began to lose credibility due to the 
occurrence of some events. German multinationals had outgrown the traditional universal 
bank financing of companies in Germany. The universal banks sat on the board of the 
companies as a major shareholder and rendered all necessary loan financing. At this time, 
German companies did not need to rely on the stock market. However, as the financing 
needs of the multinationals grew, coupled with the merger of the East and West Germany, 
which created new clients that the banks needed to cater for, the financing needs of 
companies outgrew the banks’ capacity. Following this development, Daimler-Benz 
AG18 enlisted on the New York Stock Exchange to raise capital. The Exchange rule 
required the company to present its consolidated profits based on the US GAAP. On 
reconciling its German GAAP-based account to the US GAAP, its profit of DM0.6 billion 
under the German GAAP translated to DM1.8 billion loss under the US GAAP. This 
event showcased the fact that the US GAAP presented the economic situation of a 
company better than the German GAAP.   
The ability of Deutshe Telekom in raising $13 billion worth of equity from its IPO 
in 1996 further exacerbated the need for more capital market-focused accounting 
standards rather than the German GAAP that favoured conservative accounting, as a 
requirement for loan financing from the universal banks.  
                                                             
16 For example, IAS 2 (inventory) allowed FIFO, LIFO, weighted average and base stock method. 
17 IOSCO is a confederation of regulators of securities exchanges across the globe established in 1983. 




These two events, coupled with the growing interest in the creation of a viable 
European capital market, induced the need for the adoption of the IAS. The alternative – 
US GAAP – to IAS was not called for because it is an American-based standard and it is 
overly voluminous and too detailed (Zeff, 2012). 
2.6.2.2 Challenges faced by the IASC 
The first challenge, probably, faced by the IASC was that many of its delegates were 
unable to influence their country’s accounting standard setting bodies, as they were 
majorly from accounting professional institutions. Furthermore, the IASs could not 
address the diversity in its board. Board members from Anglo-American countries 
believed IASs were inferior to their standards, and for other countries, IASs failed to 
address the tax orientation of their accounting system.  
The desire for the worldwide acceptance of IAS was further crippled by the 
unexpected demands tendered by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) to the IASC. The initial promise by the IOSCO of recommending 
IAS to its members upon IASC’s fulfilment of aforementioned conditions was not met , 
as IOSCO demanded further improvements to the IASs. In 1993, when the revised ten 
standards already issued by IASC were submitted to IOSCO, the latter, although satisfied 
with IASC’s progress, demanded for further improvements and for new standards that 
address issues germane to intangible assets, earnings per share, interim reporting, 
employee benefits, financial instrument, and discontinued operations. The IASC agreed 
with these demands and promised to get back to IOSCO by 1999. 
A new task for the IASC was to address the expectations of SEC regarding the 
quality of the IASs. In 1996, the SEC publicly pronounced the characteristics it expects 
the IASs to have: 
i) The standards must be comprehensive and based on the generally accepted 
principles of accounting; 
ii) They must be high-quality standards geared toward improving comparability 
and transparency, and must provide for full disclosure; and 
iii) There must be rigorous interpretation and application. 
2.6.2.3 Achievements of IASC in the development of IFRS 
By the year 2000, the IOSCO endorsed the use of IASs by member regulators, which 
significantly enhanced the IASC’s position across the globe. Furthermore, in the same 




using the IAS by 2005. The Commission argues that the objective of the pronouncement 
is that “the policy should ensure that securities can be traded on the EU and international 
financial markets on the basis of a single set of financial reporting standards” (EU 
Financial Reporting Strategy, para. 7). In 2002, the IAS Regulation was approved by the 
European Parliament.  
The Norwalk Agreement was an MoU signed by the SEC and the IASB (IASC 
became IASB in the year 2000) to reduce the extent of divergence between the IASs and 
the US GAAP. The agreement, which was achieved in 2007, also included a settlement 
that foreign companies listed in the US can file their financial statements using the IFRS 
without filing a reconciliation with the US GAAP (Arnold, 2012). In May 2008, the 
AICPA designated the IASB as an alternative accounting standard setting body on which 
its members can rely on for conducting audit. As such, private US companies not listed 
on the stock exchange could adopt IFRS for the preparation of their financial statements 
(Zeff, 2012). 
Following the adoption of IFRS by companies in the EU from 2005, many 
countries took a similar step to fully adopt IFRS or converge substantially with some 
tweaks. For example, the SIX Swiss Exchange permitted companies on its main board to 
adopt the IFRS or the US GAAP for financial reporting; Japan, in 2009, allowed listed 
companies with international operations to begin using IFRS from 2010; and China has 
moved substantially towards full convergence. While many developing countries have 
also fully or partly adopted or converged with IFRS, the spread of IFRS to these countries 
took a different dimension from those of the developed world. Some of the issues that led 
to these developing countries to adopt the IFRS are considered next section. 
Table 2.2 summarises the milestones in the IASC’s journey towards developing 
the International Financial Reporting Standards.  
Table 2:2 Milestones in the Development of IFRS  
Year Achievements 
1966 Accountants International Study Group (AISG) was 
formed. 
1973 International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). 
1975 The first IAS on the disclosure of accounting policies was 
issued. 
Between 1975-1987 25 additional standards were issued. 
1987 IOSCO promised the endorsement of IASs. 





1996 The U.S. SEC published its expectations, with regard to 
quality, of IASC’s standards. 
2000 The Norwalk Agreement was signed, IOSCO endorsed 
IASs and the European Commission requested member 
states to comply with IASs by 2005. 
2001 IASC became IASB 
2002 The IAS Regulation was approved by the European 
Parliament.  
2003 IASB issued the first IFRS on First-time Adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards. 
2005 Member states of the EU adopted IFRS. 
2007  Foreign companies listed in the U.S. were allowed not to 
file a reconciliation with the U.S. GAAP.  
2008 AICPA designated the IASB as an alternative accounting 
standard setting body on which its members can rely on 
for conducting audit.  
2009 Japan allowed listed companies with international 
operations to begin using IFRS effective 2010. China 
moved substantially towards full convergence. 
Source: Author’s summary 
2.6.3 IFRS adoption by Developing Countries 
The adoption of IFRS by developing countries, like their developed counterparts, was a 
gradual process, dating back to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Beginning in 
Thailand, it spreads to Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, through contagion. In 
August 1997, Indonesia had its own share and by October of the same year, the Hong 
Kong stock market crashed, making the Dow Jones Industrial Average record its worst 
point loss in history. This led to the suspension of trading on the US stock market (Arnold, 
2012). By November, the crisis proliferated to Korea and by August 1998, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average records its second worst loss in history following Russia’s default on 
its debt. In September 1998, the crisis spread to Latin America and the US hedge fund 
and long-term capital portfolio collapsed, while the EU and the US stock market plunged. 
To curb the spate of the crisis and future reoccurrence, the finance ministers and 
the central bank governors of the G-719 met on October 1998 to deliberate on how to 
ensure stability in the international financial system. There were three models suggested 
by economist, analysts, and finance ministers (Arnold, 2012) in the wake of the East 
Asian crisis. The first model emphasized the placement of constraints on capital flight by 
governments or “placing constraints on cross-border financial speculation” (Arnold, 
                                                             




2012, p. 364). Malaysia adopted this method during the East Asian financial crisis in 
1998. The second model proposed the establishment of stronger international institutions 
(e.g., a body of international regulators) that can ensure the stability of the international 
financial system (Kaufman, 1998; Eatwell and Taylor, 2000) and the creation of Asian 
Monetary Fund advocated by Japan (Lipscy, 2003). The third model advocated the 
restructuring of financial infrastructures in emerging economies to align them with 
international best practices. Exponents of the third model blamed the Asian crisis on the 
emerging economies’ lack of transparency and poor governance structures.  The G-7 
chose the third model, as it is less radical and does not go against financial liberalization, 
which has always been advocated by the ‘western countries’. 
In February 1999, the G-7 established the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to work 
on the way forward with the third model. The FSF drafted 43 standards in September 
1998, initially without the inclusion of accounting standards, but was later increased to 
64, inclusive of the accounting standards. From the 64 standards, 1220 (now 14) standards 
(accounting standards inclusive) designated as essential to healthy international financial 
system were culled. Earlier, the FSF had directed the IOSCO, International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Arnold, 2012) to conduct a review of the IASs. Subsequently, the FSF charged the IMF 
and the World Bank with ensuring that the emerging economies follow these international 
accounting and auditing standards. Therefore, the two institutions monitor emerging 
economies’ compliance by comparing their accounting standards with the IASs. The 
results of the exercise are then published in the Reports on Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC), Accounting and Auditing. Often the reports recommend and urge the 
developing countries to adopt the IAS and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 
(Zeff, 2012). More than 80 of this exercise across developing countries are said to have 
been conducted (Zeff, 2012). 
 
                                                             
20 These standards are: Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies, Code 
of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency; Special Data Dissemination Standard; Enhanced General Data 
Dissemination Systems; IFRS, ISA, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights, Insurance Core Principles, Standards, Guidance and Assessment Methodology; Core 
Principles of Effective Banking Supervision; Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation; FATF 
Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism; Recommendations 
for Securities Settlements Systems and Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems; 
IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems; Principles for Financial Market 





2.6.3.1 Factors affecting IFRS adoption by developing countries 
The development of IFRS is no doubt rooted in the Anglo-American orientation of 
accounting. With its fair-value model preconditioned on the existence of a robust capital 
market, the spread of IFRS to developing countries, characterised by less active capital 
market, is bound to face and pose many challenges, which ultimately may deter its aim 
of harmonisation (i.e., reducing cross-country differences in accounting, Choi, Frost and 
Meek, 2002). Moreover, ‘substantive’ adoption of IFRS is dependent on various 
accounting infrastructures, which are often weak or non-existent in developing countries 
(Chand and White, 2007). Given these problems, there have been different patterns of 
(Chand and Patel, 2008) and motivations for (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003) the adoption of 
IFRS across developing countries. Developing countries are not essentially influenced by 
the desire to be more transparent, as envisaged by the international community. 
Chand and Patel (2008) explain that despite the declaration by Papua New Guinea 
Accounting Standards Board to have adopted IFRS in its entirety, compliance with the 
standards is still very low due to some reasons. Firstly, the adoption of IFRS was to 
portray a more transparent image of the country after suffering a downturn in its economy 
due to high level of corruption. Secondly, the country does not have any proper 
accounting standards, so IFRS was an easy and cheap option. Thirdly, except for the staff 
of the Big 4 audit firms, staff of local audit firms do not have adequate knowledge of 
IFRS.  
In Fiji, the Fiji Institute of Accountants selectively adopted IFRS in 2002 and 
deferred the adoption of more complex standards or standards deemed not to be relevant 
to Fiji to a later date. Although enforcement by an independent regulator is non-existent, 
Fiji’s compliance with its IFRS-based accounting standards is deemed satisfactory 
(Chand and Patel, 2008). This is largely due to the fact that Fiji’s standards have always 
been based on IAS, its pool of accounting staff are trained based on IFRS, and the large 
companies in the country are audited by the big 4 audit firms.  
Romania presents a case of a clash between accounting culture and external 
influence on IFRS adoption. Romania had been using the French accounting model that 
emphasised tax-oriented accounting and creditor protection coupled with low 
transparency. Romania agreed to the World Bank’s pressure to adopt IFRS in 1997/1998 
in order to attract foreign investment (Albu, Albu and Alexander, 2014) but did not 
change its existing accounting model (Albu, Albu, Bunea, Calu and Girbina, 2011). The 




with sophisticated capital market, highly investor-oriented, and have complex business 
structures, which are all alien to the Romanian environment.  
In Bangladesh, resistance from rival professional accountancy bodies and the 
weakness of enforcement institutions crippled a substantive adoption of IFRS. The 
Government of Bangladesh received $200,000 from the World Bank for the development 
of accounting and auditing standards in Bangladesh. Subsequently, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission empowered the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh 
(ICAB) to adopt IAS without involving any of the members of the Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB). The ICMAB revolted by non-
compliance, while the ICAB was rather weak to enforce the IAS due to conflicts of 
interest, as they audit the same accounts they have prepared (Mir and Rahaman, 2005). 
Furthermore, Nurunnabi (2015) opine that corruption is an inhibiting factor against IAS 
adoption in Bangladesh.  
While recording an improvement in disclosures following IFRS adoption in 
Turkey, Misirlioğlu, Tucker and Yukselturk (2013) find that the level of compliance with 
IFRS is still constrained by Turkey’s tax-oriented accounting model, lack of enforcement, 
inadequate corporate governance structure, and weak management information systems.  
According to Perumpal, Evans, Agarwal and Amenkhienan (2009), Indian 
accounting standards still exhibit a large departure from IFRS despite the declaration by 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to comply with it, beginning July 2007. 
This is due to both political and social factors (Perumpal et al., 2009). 
The UAE in a similar vein has responded to the global pressure to adopt IFRS. 
Motivated by the desire to increase FDIs into the country, the government embarked on 
several institutional reforms21, the adoption of IFRS inclusive (Irvine, 2008). The growth 
of international businesses in the country and the normative isomorphic pressures from 
the big 4 accountancy firms that have operated in the country for decades inevitably led 
to the country’s adoption of IFRS. Following the same trend with other developing 
countries, the implementation of IFRS has been rather selective. IFRS is only mandatory 
for companies listed on the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX now 
NASDAQ Dubai). Companies not listed on the DIFX and non-banking companies were 
not required to use IFRS as at 2008, but all companies have recently been required to 
comply with IFRS from July 2016. However, Irvine (2008) argue that “the culture of 
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secrecy common in countries that have not previously been required to report financial 
information to a regulatory body” will likely forestall the implementation of IFRS (p. 
137).  
Another interesting case is that of Iraq, a centrally planned economy, whereby 
accounting largely serves the central planning system. The Iraqi Board of Accounting and 
Auditing Standards, established in 1988, issued 14 standards that were in consonance 
with the IAS yet significantly different. Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
US CPA was commissioned to set the stage for a liberal economy in Iraq in 2004 (Hassan, 
Rankin and Lu, 2014). Among other reforms was the introduction of IFRS that was made 
mandatory for all listed firms. However, given the country’s culture, which was rooted in 
code law and the underdevelopment of its accounting profession and capital market, the 
implementation of IFRS is yet unachievable. 
Peng and Bewley (2010) find that the Chinese GAAP departs from the 
requirement of IFRS for non-financial long-term assets because of the peculiar 
characteristics of China’s environment. In the same vein, Baker, Biondi and Zhang (2010) 
argue that the conflicting logic of satisfying global capital market by the IASB and of 
“industrial reorganisation” (p. 107) by China creates a disharmony between IFRS and 
Chinese GAAP. For example, China recognises two methods of consolidation while the 
IASB only recognises the acquisition method.  
Carneiro et al. (2017) find that full adoption of IFRS by the 13 countries that 
compose the Group of Latin American Accounting Standards Setters (GLASS) will be 
difficult, as many of these countries still supplement IFRS with local standards for 
“micro-entities and cooperatives” (p. 1). The reasons they adduce for this difficulty in 
fully adopting IFRS by these countries include the lack of well-trained accountants, 
inadequate enforcement mechanisms, tax-oriented accounting systems, and the 
peculiarity of banks and insurance companies. 
The pressure from the World Bank, IMF, the big 4 accountancy firms, and 
multinational corporations are the major factors influencing developing countries’ 
adoption of IFRS (Hopper et al., 2017). Nonetheless other motivating factors that 
influence the adoption and implementation of IFRS have been identified in the literature. 
Bova and Perera (2012) find that while Kenya lacks the necessary resources to enforce 
compliance with IFRS, public firms listed on the stock exchange rather than private firms 
comply with IFRS requirements. They attribute this to the existence of foreign ownership 




According to Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) the literacy level of a country, 
alignment with Anglo-American culture, and the existence of capital markets are 
important factors pushing developing countries to adopt IFRS. They argue that literacy 
level influences the sophistication of accounting profession, which underpins the 
competence and expertise needed to apply IFRS. IFRS is an Anglo-American standard 
and communication in IASB is through English, thus, it is easier for developing countries 
with Anglo-American background to interpret and understand IFRS. Furthermore, most 
developing countries have relied on their former colonial masters for accounting 
standards though, often tweaked to fit local needs.   
2.6.4 Institutionalisation of IFRS at the Organisational Level 
IFRSs are institutions (i.e., rules) (Wysocki, 2011). Their institutionalisation refers to the 
degree of their embeddedness in an organisation. IFRS may be substantively or 
symbolically institutionalised. According to PwC (2004) “the best strategy for providing 
information of auditable quality is to fully integrate IFRS into the company’s everyday 
systems and processes, so that IFRS information is generated as part of normal business 
routines” (p. 9). IFRS is considered to be substantively adopted when the organisations’ 
systems and processes are adapted to generate IFRS information. According to PwC 
(2004), embedding IFRS into the organisations systems and processes involve seven 
critical steps. These steps are depicted in Figure below: 
Figure 2.2 Steps in Embedding IFRS into Organisational Processes
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) 
From Figure 2.2, it becomes obvious that substantive adoption of IFRS is way 
beyond publishing financial statements that are IFRS-compliant. It entails the adaption of 
IT systems and processes to generate IFRS data22; the use of IFRS in budgeting and in 
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data. 
Assess the high level business impact
Decide on accounting policies
Identify new data
Adapt systems
Put processes in place
Enhance internal controls




internal reporting to the management; and the enhancement of an organisation’s internal 
control to ensure reliability of generated IFRS data. Research into substantive adoption 
of IFRS that examine these internal details of firms are very scanty yet understanding 
these internal mechanisms facilitates any causal inference made regarding the effect of 
IFRS adoption on accounting quality and capital market outcomes.  
For example, Wilford (2016) posits that internal controls are used to check and 
balance the rules and regulations embedded in accounting standards. In fact, Wilford 
(2016) opines that higher internal control quality translates to higher financial reporting 
quality. Thus, he argues that different accounting standards will need different internal 
control measures to regulate it.  Given this argument, it is expected that internal control 
used by Nigerian listed firms prior to the adoption of IFRS must have changed sequel to 
IFRS adoption in order for the adoption to be substantive.  
Similarly, Kaplan, Krishnan, Padman and Peters (1998) argue that the essence of 
accounting information system is to capture and process economic events and assess their 
impact on the financial position of a firm. Hence, the quality of information captured 
affects the quality of financial reports generated from the system. Regarding IFRS, if the 
data captured and processed by the accounting information system of Nigerian listed 
firms are not IFRS data, then the financial statements generated cannot be said to be a 
reliable IFRS-based financial statement.  
On the other hand, a symbolic adoption of IFRS occurs when IFRS is not 
integrated into organisational systems and processes. This is referred to as decoupling. 
According to Dillard et al. (2004), decoupling occurs when a practice (in this case, IFRS 
adoption) is not embedded into the “managerial and operational processes” (p. 509) of an 
organisation. The survey of European companies by PwC (2004) shows that 
‘workaround’ or ‘short-term’ (p. 21) measures are adopted in producing IFRS financial 
statements. These workaround solutions imply that the primary source of information for 
producing IFRS financial statements will not be IFRS-compliant. Thus, in such an 
instance, financial statements produced subsequent to IFRS adoption in a country cannot 
be considered IFRS-compliant financial statements. This would mean that accounting 
quality metrics calculated from such supposed IFRS financial statement are merely a 
reflection of the GAAP of the country. Any inference from such financial statements will 
thus be misleading and untrue. 
The symbolic or substantive adoption of IFRS are the outcomes of the 




institutionalisation process, that lead these outcomes. These factors are considered in the 
next section. 
2.6.4.1 Determinants of the Institutionalisation of IFRS 
The degree of the embeddedness of IFRS into an organisation’s systems and processes is 
dependent on a number of factors. Some of these determinants have been identified in the 
extant literature and are discussed below. 
Firstly, IFRS adoption comes with attendant costs to organisations. These costs 
include the cost of training staff, IT upgrade cost, enhancement of internal controls cost, 
and audit cost (PwC, 2004). When these costs are perceived to be greater than the benefits, 
IFRS adoption may be decoupled. Albu and Albu (2012), in their study on Romania, 
found that one of the reasons for the noncompliance of most Romanian companies with 
IFRS, as required by law, was that they perceived the cost of compliance to be more than 
the benefits.  
Secondly, IFRS adoption without strict enforcement leads to symbolic adoption 
of IFRS (Christensen et al., 2013; Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali, 2011; Nurunnabi, 2014; Kim 
2016). Furthermore, regulatory authorities charged with enforcing IFRS must have well-
trained personnel with sufficient experience in enforcement and monitoring (Albu and 
Albu, 2012). Apart from institutionalising IFRS in a country, strict accounting regulation 
on its own improves accounting quality (Yeoh, 2005; Hasan, Karim and Quayes, 2008).  
Thirdly, the extent of a country’s national GAAP’s departure from IFRS and its 
economic philosophy determine the extent of the institutionalisation of IFRS in an 
organisation’s systems and processes. Albu and Albu (2012) show that in Romania, an 
ex-communist society, IFRS was not substantively adopted because of the extent of 
departure of IFRS (principle-based) from Romania’s national GAAP (rule-based). 
Fourthly, the incentives that are peculiar to individual organisations are 
contributory factors to the institutionalisation of IFRS in an organisation. These 
incentives include the desire by a company to enlist on a foreign exchange for sourcing 
capital, and when a company is a subsidiary of a multinational firm that reports based on 
IFRS (Carneiro et al., 2017). 
2.7 Neo-institutional Theory 
Neo-institutionalism is a branch of institutional theory that views organisational 
structures and practices from a wider social, political, and economic context. The theory 
is a system-based theory (Deegan, 2002), which holds that organisational structures and 




Meyer and Rowan, 1977). There are norms, values, and beliefs that abound in 
organisations’ immediate environment, which tend to shape social expectations about 
organisational behaviour. Thus, organisations align their structure and practices with 
social expectations in order to seek legitimacy. “Organisations are socially constituted 
and are subject of institutional processes” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 508).  
Legitimacy is described by Lindblom (1994) as “a condition or status which exists 
when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of the larger social 
system of which the entity is a part. When disparity, actual or potential, exists between 
the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy” (p. 2). When the value 
system of an entity is not in consonance with the societal value system, a legitimacy gap 
arises (Alrazi, de Villers and Van Staden, 2015), which threatens the existence of the 
organisation.  








Source: Adapted from Dillard et al. (2004) 
Wickramsinghe and Alawattage (2007) consider institutions as “socio-political 
and cultural practices which produce legitimacy (meaning and rules) for the conduct of 
organisations” (p.432). Institutions are established orders that are composed of “rule-
bounded and standardised social practices” (Dillard et al., 2004). The process by which 
these institutions are learned and developed is called institutionalisation (Dillard et al., 
2004). Institutional theory has usually focused on the outcome of institutionalisation. 
However, Dillard et al.’s (2004) model depicts institutionalisation as a three-step process 
involving a societal level of social, political, and economic system, which determines 
what is institutionalised at the second level. The second level is the organisational field, 
comprising of different organisations that “constitute a recognised area of institutional 
life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other 
organisations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 










p.148). The organisational field subsequently determines what is institutionalised at each 
individual organisation (the third level). This process is depicted in the Figure 2.3. 
An important aspect of Dillard et al.’s (2004) model is that the overarching 
societal norms or institutionalised practices are established at the social, political, and 
economic level. The norms or institutionalised practices are transferred to the 
organisational field by an agent or actor. From the organisational field, the 
institutionalised practices are further transferred to the organisational level by agents. 
These agents or actors are those responsible for the institutionalisation of norms or 
practices at each level of the institutionalisation process.  
According to Dillard et al. (2004), organisations embrace institutionalised 
practices through a process called isomorphism. Isomorphism is a term that explains the 
institutionalisation process from three main angles (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It 
describes how organisations become homogenised as a result of facing the same 
environmental pressure (isomorphic pressure). Since all organisations will only survive 
when they align their value system with that of the society (i.e., legitimacy), responding 
to the same environmental pressure will likely bring about the same outcome. Hence, they 
tend to resemble one another in structure and practice. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) opine 
that responding to isomorphic pressures by organisations does not necessarily bring about 
efficiency in organisational practices rather, it is a legitimating action. Isomorphic 
pressure, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), comes from three sources: coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphism. 
Coercive isomorphism occurs when organisations are being forced or persuaded 
to adopt some practices by individuals, groups, or institutions the organisation depends 
on for survival or rather by way of cultural expectations from the society in which the 
organisation operates. For example, government regulations or directives (e.g., 
accounting standards, stock exchange listing requirements), which an organisation must 
follow. Mimetic isomorphism arises as a result of uncertainty. Poor understanding of 
organisational technologies, ambiguity in organisational goals and organisational 
problems that have “ambiguous causes and unclear solutions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, p. 151) may make an organisation imitate another organisation’s model. Such 
modelling may be intentional or unintentional. Normative isomorphism arises as a result 
of professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Professionals belonging to an 
association tend to define their work procedures and structures such that individual 
members of the association work with the same procedures and structures in different 




this is the code of ethics and conduct of a professional body like ACCA, which guide 
each member of the professional body to behave in a defined way in accordance with the 
code. 
There are two possible outcomes, albeit to a varying degree, from the 
institutionalisation process. An organisation may substantively adopt a practice or 
symbolically adopt it. A symbolic adoption implies that the organisation seeks to only 
maintain an appearance of having adopted a practice without necessarily making use of 
it in the internal working of the organisation. If the organisation adopts it to maintain 
appearance and makes use of it in the organisation, such adoption is said to be substantive. 
A symbolic adoption of practices is termed decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
“Decoupling is a situation where formal organisational structure or practice is separate 
and distinct from actual organisational practice” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509). 
2.7.1 Studies on IFRS based on institutional theory 
There are a number of studies that have adopted institutional theory in theorising IFRS-
related issues. Irvine (2008) uses coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism from 
institutional theory to explain the adoption of IFRS by the United Arab Emirates. The 
study of Judge, Li and Pinsker (2010) equally adopts institutional theory in explaining 
country-level adoption of IFRS. Crawford, Ferguson, Helliar and Power (2014) use 
institutional theory to explore an arrangement that sought to challenge the standard setting 
power of IASB by the EU around IFRS 8 adoption. 
Rodrigues and Craig (2007) triangulate Hegalian dialectics with institutional 
theory’s notion of decoupling and isomorphism, and Foucault’s concept of power-
knowledge to theorise the processes, effect, and possible direction of national accounting 
standards’ convergence with IFRS.  
Albu et al. (2011) used a combination of institutional theory and structuration 
theory in explaining IFRS implementation in Romania. Similarly, Albu et al. (2014) 
examine organisational responses to IFRS adoption in Romania, a code law country, 
using a triangulation of institutional theory with Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to 
institutional pressures. 
Kossentini and Ben Othman (2014) combined institutional theory and economic 
network theory to understand the various factors that determine the adoption of IFRS by 
emerging economies. Hassan (2008) used institutional theory and Habermas theory in 




Carneiro et al. (2017) adopt institutional theory in situating their argument that 
conflicting institutional logics have prevented a full adoption of IFRS by members of the 
Group of Latin American Accounting Standards Setters (GLASS). Mantzari et al. (2017) 
triangulate institutional theory with hegemony to examine the factors that prompt non-
listed firms to adopt IFRS in Greece. 
This study adds to this body of literature by adopting Dillard et al.’s (2004) model 
of institutional theory to theorise the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria. Although 
previous studies like Abu et al. (2011) have adopted Dillard et al.’s (2004) framework, 
the stepwise institutionalisation process has been largely ignored. This study fills this 
theoretical void. This process is particularly necessary in order to gain a rich 
understanding of the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria.  
The theoretical model, based on Dillard et al.’s (2004) institutional theory, is 
depicted in Figure 2.4, which shows the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria at the 
macro, meso, and micro levels. The first level describes the institutionalisation of IFRS 
at the social, political, and economic level (i.e., how IFRS became adopted by Nigeria), 
while the second level addresses the institutionalisation of IFRS in the organisational field 
(comprising of all listed companies) by four agents, namely the FRCN, the ICAN/ANAN, 
external auditors and the Nigerian Universities Commission (NUC). The third level 
describes the institutionalisation of IFRS at the organisational level by different actors, 
including the FRCN, board of directors, internal auditors, and other factors. 
At the first level, institutionalisation involves the acceptance by the Nigerian 
government to reform accounting infrastructure. The developed economies, through the 
agency of the World Bank and IMF, push the Nigerian government to adopt IFRS, as a 
high-quality accounting standard, establish the FRCN, and reform the accounting 
profession in Nigeria. Similarly, because of the global competition for attracting FDI by 
developing countries, the Nigerian government faces a mimetic isomorphic pressure to 
adopt IFRS and create the FRCN as required by the World Bank. The persuasion to 
reform ICAN was through monetary support, while making the adoption of IFRS and the 
establishment of FRCN conditions for accessing foreign investments and grants (coercive 



































Key: FRCN: Financial Reporting Council; SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission; NSE: Nigeria 
Stock Exchange; ICAN: Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria; ANAN: Association of National 
Accountants of Nigeria; NUC: Nigeria Universities Commission; CFO: Chief Finance Officer. 
From the macro level, the institutionalisation of IFRS (for external reporting) is 
passed down to the organisational field in three complementary ways. Firstly, the FRCN 
exerts coercive isomorphic pressures on listed firms to ensure substantive adoption 
World Bank and IMF 
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through annual review of their financial statements. Secondly, the ICAN23 made its 
syllabus IFRS-compliant and creates different avenues for existing members to upgrade 
their knowledge from Nigerian SAS to IFRS. This creates a normative isomorphic 
pressure, as newly recruited chartered accountants are bound to work with IFRS rather 
than the Nigerian SAS. Thirdly, higher educational institutions exert normative 
isomorphism on companies in a similar way as ICAN does, through their IFRS-trained 
accounting graduates who go on to work in companies. External auditors exert coercive 
isomorphic pressures on companies to ensure that their external reports comply with 
IFRS. 
From the organisational field (meso level), the institutionalisation of IFRS (for 
internal reporting) is further transferred to each individual company (micro level) by 
multiple agents. The FRCN ensures that internal reports of companies are IFRS-
compliant through quarterly review. The board of directors and the external auditors also 
facilitate the use of IFRS since the financial reports are signed in their names. Other 
factors, including parent companies’ influence on their Nigerian subsidiaries and the cost-
benefit of substantive adoption exert isomorphic pressures on individual companies. At 
this point, the individual companies may substantively adopt the IFRS or decouple it from 
their normal operation. 
2.8 Research Methods and Data Analysis 
2.8.1 Research Design 
This study employs the case study research design. The case study research design entails 
an in-depth analysis of a phenomenon within a certain context, and often results in a rich 
analysis of complex problems. In a case study, the case must be the focus of analysis 
(Bryman, 2012; De Massis and Kotlar, 2014). A case can be a location, people, or process 
(De Massis and Kotlar, 2014). Miles and Huberman (1994) define a unit of analysis as “a 
phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (p. 25). The unit of analysis 
of a study can be multiple where the phenomenon of interest occurs at multiple levels. In 
this study, the unit of analysis is multiple because institutionalisation of IFRS occurs at 
three levels of social order, based on Dillard et al.’s (2004) model, namely the macro 
level; the meso level; and the micro level. 
A case study design is divided into three, namely exploratory case study, 
explanatory case study, and descriptive case study. Exploratory case study is adopted 
                                                             
23 Most private firms employ chartered accountants in Nigeria. Thus, the influence of ANAN members on 




where the intent of the research is to understand how a phenomenon occurs. Explanatory 
case study entails answering a why question, while descriptive case study is appropriate 
when the intent is to establish the conviction that a research phenomenon is important 
(De Massis and Kotlar, 2014). This study addresses how IFRS is institutionalised in 
Nigeria at the three levels of social order and the outcome of this process. Hence, the type 
of case study adopted in this study is exploratory.   
Nigeria is chosen for this study because there is no study as far as the researcher 
is aware that has examined how IFRS is institutionalised across the three levels of social 
order. Due to the recent accounting infrastructure reform in Nigeria, this setting offers a 
good opportunity for examining the institutionalisation of IFRS and the impact of the 
accounting infrastructure reform in the institutionalisation process. 
2.8.2 Data gathering 
Case study will often involve collection of data from multiple sources to ensure data 
credibility (Patton, 1990 cited in Braun and Clarke, 2006). Based on this notion, the 
researcher triangulates data from multiple sources in carrying out this study. Specifically, 
interviews were conducted, documents were analysed, and semi-structured questionnaire 
and unstructured questionnaire were sent out to respondents (see Table 2.4). In order to 
gain a fairly generalizable result24, the sampling of the interviewees as well as the 
respondents to the questionnaire is heterogeneous (Robinson, 2014). Interviewees25 
include financial controllers, internal auditors, and accountants from different companies 
and industries, and senior auditors from different audit firms. To gain access to the 
interviewees, the researcher contacted a friend who has been in practice for more than 
seven years, who gave the contact details of the interviewees. The interviewees were 
initially contacted via phone and email for familiarity with the intent of the study and 
fixing a date for the interview.  
A semi-structured interview was conducted with the aid of an interview protocol 
(see Appendix I). The themes and subthemes identified in Figure 2.5 were used to develop 
the questions. “The semi-structured interview involves prepared questions guided by the 
identified themes in a consistent and systematic manner interposed with probes designed 
                                                             
24 According to De Massis and Kotlar (2014) generalisation in case study is not the same as statistical 
generalisation which is made to a study population. Rather, analytical generalisation is made “from 
empirical observation to theory” (p. 27).   
25 The researcher made several attempts to contact key officials of the FRCN. However, there was no 
response from the organisation. The researcher further attempted to contact the Secretary of the Council 
through his close friend, unfortunately, this attempt coincided with the period the Secretary was dismissed 




to elicit more elaborate responses” (Qu and Dumay, 2011, p. 246). The same interview 
guide was used for all the interviewees. However, given the flexibility afforded by the 
semi-structured interview, different responses were elicited. An unstructured 
questionnaire was also sent out to one of the interviewees who was not available for an 
oral interview (see Table 2.3, S/N 5).  
Table 2.3 Interview Details 





































































































































                                                             
26 The initial phone recording during the first part of the interview was not saved by the recording app. 




Table 2.4 Questionnaire Respondents’ Profiles 







1 Financial Accountant Property Plc ACA 
Construction/Real 
Estate 
2. Financial Controller One Bank Plc ACA 
Financial 
Services 






4 Chief Finance Officer Capital Plc ACA, CISA 
Financial 
Services 














Insurance Plc M.Sc., ACCA 
Financial 
Services 
8 Head of Finance  Loans Plc ACA 
Financial 
Services 





10 Head of Internal Audit CO Plc MBA, ACA 
Financial 
Services 








Head of Finance and 
Accounts 















Oil and Gas 
16 




ACA Oil and Gas 




18 Deputy Manager Printing Plc ACA Services 
19 Chief Finance Officer Fast Food Plc M.Sc., ACA Services 
20 
Head of Internal 
Control and Audit 




A total of 159 copies of semi-structured questionnaires with self-addressed 
envelopes were sent out to the listed companies that provided their addresses in their 
annual reports or on their websites. The questionnaire items (see Appendix II) were 
developed from the subthemes in Figure 2.5 and were dispatched via the Nigerian Postal 
Service. Many of the companies do not have valid email addresses, which limited the 
follow-up process. However, a reminder was sent out to some of these companies, but 
many did not respond to the reminder. Due to this difficulty, only 20 copies of these 
questionnaires were returned which equals approximately 13% response rate. The 
respondents to the questionnaire are Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), accountants, and 
auditors in different firms in different industries. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 depict the interview 
details and questionnaire respondents’ profile, respectively.  
Due to the historical27 nature of the attempt by the World Bank, through the 
ROSC, to persuade the Nigerian government to create an enforcement mechanism and 
reform the accounting profession, the only available source of information were the 
ROSCs (2004; 2011). Issues that have historical configurations are best examined through 
documents (Bowen, 2009). Furthermore, these are the only documents, as far as the 
researcher is aware, that contain most of the details of the influence of the World Bank 
on the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria. Other documents analysed are the FRCN 
regulatory decision on StanbicIBTC and the World Bank document on Capacity 
Strengthening of ICAN to Support National and Regional Accountancy Development.  
2.8.3 Thematic analysis 
This study adopts thematic analysis for analysing the data collected. Thematic analysis is 
a process of identifying, analysing, and conveying repeated patterns of meaning in a data 
set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Such repeated patterns of meanings are called themes. 
According to Bryman (2012), “a theme is a category identified by the researcher, that 
relates to the research questions, builds on codes identified in the transcript or document 
and provides the researcher with a basis to have a theoretical understanding of the data” 
(p. 580). Themes are higher-order patterns of meanings compared to codes; 
notwithstanding, themes are generated from codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). “Codes are 
the smallest units of analysis that capture interesting features of the data (potentially) 
relevant to the research question” (Clarke and Braun, 2017, p. 257).   
                                                             
27 This attempt began with the conduct of the assessment of Nigeria’s compliance with the international 




Thematic analysis is flexible and does not necessarily have to be underpinned by 
any ontological background. It is suitable for both large and small qualitative data sets 
and can be used for both data-driven (inductive) and theory-driven (deductive) analyses 
(Clarke and Braun, 2017). Thematic analysis is essentially embedded in all qualitative 
research method as all qualitative approaches involve “thematising meanings” (Holloway 
and Todres, 2003, p. 347).  
While there is no standard stepwise procedure for engaging in thematic analysis, 
Braun and Clarke (2006) recommend some guidelines, which have been adopted by the 
researcher in this study. The guidelines are in no way static rules, and as argued by Braun 
and Clarke (2006), they are recursive. These guidelines are as follows: 
i. Data familiarisation through reading and re-reading of the data 
ii. Initial coding 
iii. Collation of codes under initial themes 
iv. Generating a thematic map of the analysis 
v. Reviewing themes for overlaps and relevance by defining and refining 
themes.  
vi. Writing the report 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006), the analysis itself is based on some initial 
decisions about how to proceed. Firstly, a theme does not necessarily have to be of 
frequent occurrence in the dataset but rather a theme is chosen for capturing important 
insights into the research questions. This latter argument is adopted in this study. 
Secondly, this study adopts a semantic rather than a latent approach in identifying themes. 
Semantic approach identifies themes based on the explicit meaning of the data. “Ideally, 
the analytic process involves a progression from description, where the data have simply 
been organized to show patterns in semantic content and summarized, to interpretation, 
where there is an attempt to theorize the significance of the patterns and their broader 
meanings and implications” (Paton 1990, cited in Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 84). In the 
latent approach, beyond the explicit meaning of data, the underlying conceptualizations, 
assumptions, and ideas are explored. Thirdly, a decision relating to undertaking a rich 
description of the entire data set (mostly in exploratory research) or a detailed account of 
some themes and subthemes will have to be made. As the study has some specific research 
questions to answer, a detailed account of themes and subthemes is made. Finally, 
thematic analysis may be inductive or deductive. In inductive approach, thematic analysis 




preconceived analytical or coding frame. Deductive approach on the other hand tries to 
fit the data into a researcher’s theoretical or analytic framework. Hence, a detailed 
analysis of the dataset that fit into the theory is made rather than a complete description 
of the data set. In this study, a ‘theoretical thematic analysis’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 
84), following the deductive approach, is used since the intent of the researcher is to 
answer research questions within the ambit of Dillard et al.’s (2004) model of institutional 
theory.  
Figure 2.5 presents the themes and subthemes developed by the researcher and 
used in analysing the data. Initial codes from which the below themes and subthemes 
were developed from include isomorphic pressure, agents, enforcement, and other factors. 









2.8.4 Data analysis 
Based on thematic analysis, the data analysis is organised in accordance with the 
subthemes developed in Figure 2.5. However, at the end of the analysis of each subtheme, 
a summary of the findings in relation to the research question that is answered under the 




Institutionalisation of IFRS 
(levels) 
Drivers of institutionalisation 
(agents &factors) 
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Research Question 1: Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they 
exert at the macro level to institutionalise IFRS? 
2.8.4.1 Institutionalisation at the social, political, and economic level (macro level) 
The institutionalisation at the macro level involves the push by the World Bank and IMF 
to ensure that the Nigerian government reforms accounting infrastructure of the country. 
Like many developing countries, Nigeria desires to attract foreign investment, grants and 
loans from different parts of the world and international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF. Since the World Bank and IMF push for the adoption of 
international best practices (including IFRS) in different spheres, under the pretext of 
strengthening the financial architecture of developing countries (Zeff, 2012; Hopper, 
Lassou and Soobaroyen, 2017), and as a condition for awarding loans and grants, Nigeria 
needs to hearken to their demands. According to the World Bank and IMF, it was the 
weakness in the developing countries’ financial architecture that triggered the Asian 
financial crisis. According to the ROSC (2004): 
Nigeria is making efforts to attract foreign investments into the 
economy. Foreign direct investments in Nigeria exceeded US$1 billion 
in 2002. International investors require comparable financial 
information from countries competing for foreign investments. This 
requires that Nigerian corporate sector comply with globally acceptable 
standards and codes (p. 1).   
Nigeria’s accounting infrastructure is weak in its essence and is further weakened 
by corruption (ROSC, 2004). This gave the World Bank and IMF more impetus to 
persuade Nigeria to adopt international best practices as stated in the report:   
A number of banks exploiting loopholes in Nigerian accounting and 
auditing standards, weak capacity of the regulatory bodies and weak 
enforcement, employed creative accounting to boost their balance 
sheets. These weaknesses in financial reporting, auditing and 
accounting contributed to Nigeria’s banking sector crisis. Given the 
magnitude of the costs of the crisis (between N1.5 - N2 trillion), 
government is focused on improving it (ROSC, 2011, p. 1). 
With this coercive isomorphic pressure – the push by the World Bank – coupled 
with the recent failure of accounting infrastructures in Nigeria and the desire by the 
Nigerian government to attract foreign investment (mimetic isomorphic pressure), 
international best practices became institutionalised at the macro level (Dillard et al., 
2004).  Particularly to make Nigeria more attractive to foreign investors, following the 
2008 capital market crisis, the Nigerian government had to succumb to the persuasion of 
the World Bank and IMF. This is perhaps the reason why the Nigerian government 




commitment to the adoption of these international best practices. According to the ROSC 
(2011): 
The Government of Nigeria requested the World Bank in 2010 to 
conduct a second ROSC review. This ROSC review was conducted to 
assess the status of implementation of the 2004 ROSC Country Action 
Plan and identify ways to strengthen the institutional framework 
underpinning accounting and auditing practices and improve financial 
reporting in Nigeria (ROSC, 2011, p. 1). 
The desire by the Nigerian government to attract FDI is a form of mimetic 
isomorphic pressure, as it follows a similar pattern of IFRS adoption by developing 
countries that adopted IFRS earlier on (see Irvine, 2008; Albu and Albu, 2012; Albu et 
al., 2014).  
The World Bank/IMF recommended many reforms in the accounting 
infrastructures of the country, including accounting and auditing standards, regulatory 
authority, accounting education, and professional accountancy training. 
With focus on updating the country’s statutory framework reporting 
and strengthening capacity of accounting and auditing regulatory 
bodies, the Companies and Allied Matters Act should be amended. 
Priority should be given to implementing IFRS, International Standards 
on Auditing (ISA), and International Standard on Quality Control 
(ISQC) as mandatory requirements. The two professional accountancy 
bodies in Nigeria, ICAN and ANAN, should serve both private and 
public sectors of the economy and enter into twinning arrangements 
with the leading IFAC-member bodies (ROSC, 2011, p.1). 
A major recommendation by the World Bank in its attempt to institutionalise IFRS 
in Nigeria was the establishment of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, which 
should have the backing of the law and is capable of monitoring the use of IFRS by 
Nigerian companies. 
Government should take immediate steps for ensuring that the FRCN 
Bill, which is under consideration of the National Assembly of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, is passed into law. This law will lead to 
the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework of 
corporate financial reporting in Nigeria. The Financial Reporting 
Council will be responsible for issuing, monitoring, and enforcing 
accounting and auditing standards. Additional focus of the Financial 
Reporting Council will be on corporate governance, actuarial standards, 
and valuation standards (ROSC, 2011, p. 21). 
To complement the efforts of the FRCN, the World Bank further recommended 
the strengthening of the capacity of other enforcement agencies that regulate companies 




Commission (NAICOM), the Nigeria Stock Exchange and the Corporate Affairs 
Commission through the recruitment of IFRS-trained staff.  
Immediate steps should be taken to prepare a team of IFRS experts at 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. These experts will be able to 
effectively carry out activities at the Commission, in collaboration with 
NASB/FRCN, with regard to ensuring IFRS compliance by the quoted 
companies. The quoted companies in Nigeria will be required to follow 
IFRS when it goes into effect on January 1, 2012. Similar IFRS 
technical capacity building is necessary in NAICOM, Nigeria Stock 
Exchange, Federal Inland Revenue Service, and Corporate Affairs 
Commission (ROSC, 2011, p. 26). 
In addition, the World Bank recommended the alignment of ICAN and ANAN’s 
training with the requirements of IFAC and it even provided financial support for the 
improvement of ICAN syllabus to create a platform for the training of professional 
accountants that have proper knowledge of IFRS.  
ICAN needs to further strengthen its institutional capacity with the 
assistance of a twinning partner (a strong IFAC-member body) and 
make progress to further meet the SMO [IFAC Statement of 
Membership Obligations] requirements. This phase of capacity 
building should be based on experience in Nigeria and elsewhere, and 
in particular focused on the following: (a) Completing the improvement 
of the accountancy education system in accordance with the 
International Education Standards issued in August 2009 as well as 
subsequent versions; (b) Adopting ISQC 1, which became effective mid 
December 2009, and establishing ongoing mechanisms for adopting 
new and revised versions of ISQC; and (c) Observing results of the self-
assessment by ICAN under the IFAC compliance program and its 
action plan, which was approved in May 2009 (ROSC , 2011, p. 25). 
ANAN would need to put in place institutional arrangements for 
fulfilling IFAC membership requirements, focusing on various areas 
including strengthening accountancy education requirements, 
establishing mechanisms for adopting the requirements of the IESBA 
[International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants] Code of Ethics 
on an ongoing manner, assisting with the implementation of accounting 
and ethics standards, and strengthening the investigation and 
disciplinary mechanisms. A twinning arrangement needs to be 
developed with a strong IFAC member body with a mission and vision 
similar to that of ANAN. At the beginning of implementing the 
twinning program, the ANAN Council should work with the twinning 
partner to develop a strategic plan, within the framework of its enabling 
act. The strategic plan will guide and drive ANAN activities and 
priorities for a specified period. The strategic plan will also help to 
ensure that key ANAN leaders are following the same course. This will 
serve as the guidepost for the whole organization, including Council, 
Committees, and staff, whose activities and priorities should support 




Finally, to create a holistic reinforcement of accounting infrastructures, the World 
Bank recommended the incorporation of IFRS into Nigerian universities’ accounting 
curricula including the practical applications of IFRS. 
University-level accounting curricula should be reviewed to ensure a 
consistent approach is followed in Nigeria’s universities. Particular 
focus should be given to include the practical application of IFRS and 
ISA, ethics, communication skills, and professional judgment to best 
prepare accountants (rather than bookkeepers) for careers in the 
corporate sector (ROSC, 2011, p. 27). 
The Nigerian government, following the coercive isomorphic pressure from the 
World Bank as discussed above and the mimetic isomorphic pressure of attracting FDIs, 
established the FRCN in 2011. The FRCN exerts a coercive isomorphic pressure on listed 
firms while ICAN exerts a normative isomorphic pressure on listed firms. The 
government of Nigeria obtained an International Development Fund of $485,000 from 
the World Bank for strengthening the institutional capacity of ICAN. According to the 
World Bank procurement notice28  
The Government of Nigeria obtained an International Development 
Fund (IDF) grant from the World Bank (WB) in October 2010 to assist 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) to strengthen 
its capacity to support national and regional accountancy development. 
This form of monetary persuasion is also a coercive isomorphic pressure 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Accordingly, ICAN syllabus has been completely 
overhauled and tailored towards IFRS and Nigerian universities have been teaching IFRS 
to students. ICAN would not resist such push for the overhaul of the accounting 
professional education because it will make international accounting bodies more 
receptive to its members. This is a form of mimetic isomorphic pressure on the part of 
ICAN. As a result of this move, ICAN has been able to sign a pathway agreement and 
MoU with professional bodies like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales (ICAEW) and the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. These 
agreements give ICAN members recognition beyond the borders of Nigeria. In a similar 
vein, ANAN equally exhibited mimetic isomorphism in a similar way to ICAN. The 
ROSC (2011) recommended the help of a twinning partner (a strong IFAC member) that 
would assist ANAN in the process of obtaining IFAC membership. 
In this regard, ANAN would need to put in place institutional arrangements 
for fulfilling IFAC membership requirements, focusing on various areas 
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including strengthening accountancy education requirements, establishing 
mechanisms for adopting the requirements of the IESBA Code of Ethics on 
an ongoing manner, assisting with the implementation of accounting and 
ethics standards, and strengthening the investigation and disciplinary 
mechanisms. A twinning arrangement needs to be developed with a strong 
IFAC member body with a mission and vision similar to that of ANAN 
(ROSC, 2011, p. 25).  
  
Due to this procedure, ANAN was admitted into IFAC membership in 2014 
and now has a mutual recognition with the CPA Ireland. Although the World Bank 
recommended improvements to both ICAN and ANAN, it maintained the status 
quo (ICAN’s hegemony) with regard to auditing listed companies in Nigeria as 
enshrined in the CAMA (2004) (as amended). 
In summary, it can be noted that the institutionalisation of IFRS at the macro level 
is concerned about the reform of accounting infrastructures. The institutionalising agents 
at the macro level are the World Bank and IMF. They exert coercive and mimetic 
isomorphic pressure on the Nigerian government to create the FRCN and strengthen 
ICAN’s capacity, respectively. The Nigerian government yields to this pressure by 
undertaking the requested reforms. Through the two reforms, the institutionalisation of 
IFRS is transferred to the organisational field.  
In summary, the World Bank and the IMF are the agents through which IFRS 
became institutionalised at the macro level. The creation of the FRCN and the 
strengthening of ICAN’s capacity are the media through which the institutionalisation of 
IFRS is transferred to the organisational field (meso level). The meso level is considered 
in the next section. 
Research Question 2: Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they 
exert at the meso level to institutionalise IFRS? 
2.7.4.2 Institutionalisation at the organisational field (meso level) 
The institutionalisation of IFRS at the meso level is concerned about ensuring that the 
audited financial statements are prepared using IFRS. The major institutionalising agents 
at the organisational field are the FRCN, ICAN (through their members), external auditors 
and the accounting graduates of Nigerian universities. These agents and the way they 
institutionalise IFRS at the organisational field are discussed below.  
a) The role of the Financial Reporting Council (coercive isomorphism) 
As discussed in the last section, the FRCN was established by the Nigerian government 




accounting infrastructures as a prerequisite for getting grants. The FRCN institutionalises 
IFRS by reviewing the compliance of annual accounts of listed firms with IFRS. The 
listed firms are required to submit a copy to the FRCN and SEC. All the questionnaire 
respondents (see Table 2.5) indicate that they submit their annual accounts to the FRCN 
for review, while some hint further that not just the final accounts but the interim and 
quarterly reports are also submitted to the FRCN. Non-compliance is duly sanctioned as 
most of the questionnaire respondents stated. Sanctions include fine/penalties, withdrawal 
and restatement of account, and suspension of FRCN membership, which implies that the 
parties involved cannot prepare or attest to financial statements until they are reinstated. 
One of the interviewees expressed the regulation by the FRCN this way: 
“For all listed companies, they are expected to file their statements as 
they file their annual reports with the Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It is a must to 
file with FRCN and the filing has deadlines as well. The accounts filed 
with them will be reviewed by the FRCN. There were some situations 
where the FRCN reviewed some of the financial statements and then 
they came up with errors. There is a penalty for any type of error 
discovered and these errors are called type I and type II error, so the 
penalty depends on the kind of error. There are even situations whereby 
in the process of reviewing some of the financial statements, they 
discovered an error, the director and the auditor that signed the account 
were fined to the extent that the auditor was asked not to sign any 
account in his life again, likewise all the directors. So those are the ways 
they regulate the preparation of the financial statement” (Audit 
Supervisor). 
An example of these sanctions is reflected in the recent regulatory sanction made 
by the FRCN on Stanbic IBTC (a Nigerian member of Standard Bank Group in South 
Africa) that was involved in financial statements manipulations and non-compliance with 
FRCN rules. Firstly, a withdrawal and restatement of the questionable accounts were 
ordered: 
The Directors of Stanbic IBTC are hereby directed to withdraw the 
Financial Statements of Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc for years ended 31st 
December 2013 and 2014 and restate them in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 64 (2) of the Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria Act No. 6, 2011 and Regulation 21 of the Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria – Guidelines/ Regulations for Inspection and 
Monitoring of Entities, 2014 (FRCN, 2015) 
Secondly, the directors were suspended and were further barred from signing any 
accounts: 
The FRCN number of the following persons who attested to the 
misleading Statements of Financial Position of Stanbic IBTC Holdings 




until the investigation as to the extent of their negligence in the 
concealment, accounting irregularities and poor disclosures in the said 
financial statements is completed in accordance with Section 62 of the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act No. 6, 2011. Accordingly, 
they are not allowed to vouch the integrity of any financial statements 
issued in Nigeria (FRCN, 2015). 
The persons are: 
i. Atedo N. A. Peterside FRCN/2013/CIBN/00000001069; 
ii. Sola David-Borha FRCN/2013/CIBN/00000001070; 
iii. Arthur Oginga FRCN/2013/IODN/00000003181; and 
iv. Dr. Daru Owei FRCN/2014/NIM/00000006666. 
Thirdly, the audit partner that signed the accounts was equally suspended: 
Accordingly, the FRCN number of Ayodele H. Othihiwa 
(FRCN/2012/ICAN/00000000425) the Engagement Partner of the audit 
of Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc for years ended 31st December 2013 and 
2014, is hereby suspended until the investigation as to the extent of the 
negligence of KPMG Professional services is ascertained (FRCN, 
2015). 
Often, when errors or inconsistencies are discovered by the FRCN, there is usually 
a follow-up call to the preparers of accounts to clarify issues. Until then, sanctions are not 
levied, as mentioned by one of the interviewees:   
“If I may use my example, while I was in [company A], I’ve been called 
twice to come and explain certain disclosures that I put in the financials 
by the FRCN. Right now, that I am even on leave, I have a query from 
FRCN on 2015 financials that we submitted, which I have to answer 
before the end of this month. They pick and review, I don’t know if they 
cover all companies but at least I have seen the one with [company A]. 
I have the one with my company that I am currently in now. I want to 
believe that they do for all companies that submit their financials to 
them” (Financial Controller II).  
In fact, in the Stanbic IBTC case related above, the FRCN had several meetings 
and correspondences with both the company’s management and KPMG representatives 
before levying the sanctions (FRCN, 2015). 
Apart from the review of the financial statements, the FRCN engages with 
financial statements’ stakeholders on matters related to IFRS to facilitate their 
understanding and clarify issues and requirements, as explained by a financial controller: 
We do industry engagement, they are having one this coming Thursday 
and Friday, where all the industries’ chief accountants and Chief 
Financial Officers will sit together with FRCN members and engage 
their affairs. So, from this too that I know and very sure of, they [FRCN] 





The above analysis shows that the FRCN plays an important role in ensuring that 
companies’ financial statements comply with IFRS. Thus, the FRCN exerts a coercive 
isomorphic pressure on listed firms through their quarterly and annual review of financial 
statements.  
b) The role of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (normative isomorphism) 
ICAN normatively institutionalises IFRS within the organisational field (meso level) by 
training existing and potential chartered accountants in Nigeria based on IFRS. Through 
the twinning arrangement between ICAEW and ICAN, facilitated by the World Bank, 
ICAN updated its syllabus strictly in accordance with IFRS (Keeling and Lamdin, 2013). 
The updated syllabus became examinable from 2014 onwards. However, such syllabus 
update was only relevant and applicable to the potential chartered accountants from 2014. 
In order to bridge this knowledge gap among existing chartered accountants and enhance 
their ability to prepare IFRS-based financial statements immediately after the IFRS 
adoption in 2012, ICAN devised some strategies such as incorporating IFRS training into 
members’ Mandatory Continuing Professional Education (MCPE). Some of the 
interviewees noted:  
“I am aware that for the first three years, IFRS courses were mandatory 
apart from MCPE training for all already qualified professional 
accountants. While doing the training, they changed the courses, 
changed the subjects and fully adopted IFRS, jettisoning the local 
standards and made IFRS a core subject as well as some other ACCA 
subjects a part of ICAN subjects. So, that was the first thing they did. 
Also, they equipped audit firms under them in terms of training the 
partners. Those who were qualified were the ones reviewing the audit 
work, certifying the work of their staff. [ICAN] engaged all of them and 
now asked them to come for a special training. This was targeted at 
firms, not professionals” (Financial Controller I). 
“What happened then was that there was an IFRS training even before 
the syllabus was changed. When the IFRS transition started, there was 
a course called IFRS diploma which the board [of ACCA] instituted for 
those that were already chartered. You can go and do the diploma in 
IFRS that will basically teach you what IFRS is all about. You don’t 
expect someone that has been chartered for like 10 years ago to go and 
restart ICAN again, so what they do is just to do a diploma in IFRS and 
you are good to go. That was what most companies did then, they sent 
their best hands to do the diploma in IFRS, so that is why if you see 
some ‘old school’ ACAs, you will see ACA and Dip. IFRS at least for 
those that are still in practice. I was speaking to a financial controller, 
and he was like if he wants to recruit anybody now, it is either someone 
that qualifies after 2014 or somebody that was qualified before then and 




gap between the old ACA and the new one. So, the old ACA tries to fill 
the gap with that diploma in IFRS” (Senior Associate I).  
Subsequently and to date, ICAN updates its members through the MCPE on recent 
developments in IFRS and other contemporary accounting issues as explained by the 
following interviewees: 
“They [ICAN] organise MCPE, for those that are chartered already. 
They have to have at least 30-hour mandatory education every year just 
to keep you abreast, because accounting is a evolving profession, 
changing every time, so you have to be up to date” (Senior Associate). 
“They [ICAN] usually organise training for existing members on IFRS 
so they would invite trainers when there is any development in IFRS. 
Apart from that, there is the regular MCPE, members are expected to 
attend it at least twice in a year.  So, in the process, there are lots of 
courses listed for that particular program. Part of the program is the 
training of members on IFRS. So that is a way ICAN ensures that 
members are kept abreast of any development” (Audit Supervisor).  
The above analysis shows that ICAN exerts a normative isomorphic pressure on 
the Nigerian companies to comply with IFRS for external reporting, through educating 
new members and updating of existing members to prepare companies’ annual reports in 
line with IFRS. Beside the FRCN and ICAN, other agents are also involved in ensuring 
the institutionalisation of IFRS at the organisational field.  
c) The Role of the NUC through accounting education (normative isomorphism) 
The Nigerian Universities Commissions (NUC) has the responsibility for ensuring quality 
control of courses in Nigerian universities through their accreditation. Likewise, the 
ICAN accredits accounting courses in tertiary institutions for determining exemptions for 
students. Both institutions, by requiring that accounting syllabi comply with IFRS, ensure 
that accounting students who pass through the education systems to various organisations 
have only the knowledge of IFRS.  
The survey results (see Table 2.5) are however not unanimous regarding this. Only 
50% of the questionnaire respondents agree that accounting graduates are well equipped 
with IFRS training. The experiences across companies seem to be different regarding this 
issue as well. As one of the big 4 auditors put it: 
“Nigerian [accounting] graduates are not well grounded in IFRS as 





When questioned about the capabilities of accounting graduates, some of the 
respondents expressed that the reason for the knowledge gap is because only the basics 
of IFRS have been introduced in the Nigerian universities’ syllabi and much is still left 
out. Some of the interviewees commented as follows: 
“Honestly, I have not seen a significant change in the syllabus we use, 
the syllabus still remains the same, so it is like there is no much change. 
Of course, they introduced it but just at the preliminary level that you 
may not even know what you are doing at that level. But based on my 
experience so far with some of them, I do not really think they have that 
knowledge. But if they start ICAN, I think at that level, they get more 
knowledge of IFRS” (Audit Supervisor). 
“Yes, they do, but they are not in-depth. Even though you have been 
hearing about it [IFRS] and I ask you a question and you say yes, you 
have, but can you interpret this with what you know? They will not give 
you that understanding” (Financial Controller II).  
In most cases companies train their staff in-house or send them to outside training 
programmes in IFRS as indicated by the majority of the questionnaire respondents (see 
Table 2.5). Some of the interviewees state: 
“Some of the newly recruited work under qualified persons and I tell 
them to give them on-the-job training and pass this knowledge to them” 
(Financial Controller II).  
“Auditors in the audit firms have on-the-job training” (Senior Associate 
II) 
“Let me speak for my firm now, we recruit anybody, whether you are 
accounting graduates or not, so what we do is that they undergo a 
training for like one and half month…… so aside all the theoretical 
knowledge they get in their first one and a half month, [they also get] 
on-the-job training” (Senior Associate I). 
The analysis above shows that accounting graduates that are trained in IFRS can 
exert normative isomorphic pressure on Nigerian companies that hire them, since these 
graduates will prepare accounts based on IFRS. Furthermore, these graduates are trained 
on the job. Thus, both the university training and on-the-job training ensures that external 
reports of companies prepared by these graduates are IFRS-based.  
(d) The role of the external auditors (coercive isomorphism) 
The FRCN ensures that the auditors enforce the adoption of IFRS for companies’ external 
reports by making them a responsibility of those signing the accounts i.e., the board of 




This is in contrast to the requirement in the past where only audit partners sign in the 
name of their audit firm and hence, any errors therein were a responsibility of the audit 
firm and not the audit partner. An audit supervisor presents this development as follows: 
“Those that are going to be responsible for the signing of the financial 
statements of the company are expected to be members of the Council 
and someone with professional knowledge……..More so [for auditors], 
if you are not in any accounting professional body, you cannot sign a 
financial statement. As an auditor, it means that you are responsible for 
your opinion in that financial statement, so that means that as a 
professional, whatever you do, you are going to be accountable for that 
financial statement. That will give the financial statements more quality 
and make it more reliable for financial statements users” (Audit 
Supervisor). 
Consequently, all the questionnaire respondents (see Table 2.5) agree that when 
their external reports do not comply with IFRS, the auditors will qualify their reports.  
Furthermore, an audit supervisor explains how auditors approach matters of 
noncompliance with IFRS as follows: 
“If the auditor identifies any issue with the account, he or she relates it 
with the board. It is now left with the auditor to clear it before the 
account is filed. That is why if the auditor is not comfortable with 
anything or explanations of issues identified in the course of the audit, 
they may decide to qualify their opinion if it is a significant issue. But 
in a situation whereby the auditor did not qualify the financial 
statement, what it means is that the auditor is okay with the financial 
statement and whatever happens to the financial statement, the auditor 
will be responsible for it” (Audit Supervisor). 
In most cases, auditors will avoid qualifying their reports, but would ensure that 
their client’s financial statements are IFRS-compliant as indicated by the following: 
“Where management has made a significant judgement, where we don’t 
agree, we reach a compromise. The arguments always come in 
especially for disclosure purposes, the financial statement is not always 
an issue, because most of them know what is expected. It is only the 
disclosure that is always the headache. So, some clients will not want 
to disclose some information, and we auditors will be like no, IFRS says 
that you must actually do this and all that, that is where the back and 
forth always come in” (Senior Associate I). 
The analysis above shows that external auditors exert coercive isomorphic 
pressure on Nigerian firms to make them use IFRS in preparing their audited financial 
statements. If they do not comply with IFRS, the external auditors will qualify their 
reports as affirmed by the interviewees.  
The next section looks at the institutionalisation of IFRS at the micro level. It is 




institutionalisation process is determined. The above analysis shows that the FRCN, 
ICAN, NUC, and external auditors ensure that IFRS is used for external reporting. 
However, it is necessary to find out whether the coercive and normative isomorphic 
pressures exerted by these agents at the meso level ensure that IFRS is used for internal 
reporting (substantive adoption) by the Nigerian firms. 
Table 2.5 Summary of Responses to the Questionnaire 
Questionnaire Items YES NO 
Internal and external reports comply with IFRS 
Internal reports 84% 16% 
External reports 100% __ 
External auditors qualify reports when they do not comply with IFRS 
Internal reports 71% 29% 
External reports 100% __ 
The FRCN requires that both the internal and external reports comply with IFRS 
Internal reports 67% 33% 
External reports 100% __ 
Adequate knowledge of IFRS 
ICAN members have adequate knowledge of IFRS 100% __ 
Accounting graduates have adequate knowledge of IFRS 83% 17% 
Cost/benefits of IFRS adoption 
Cost of IFRS adoption outweighs its benefits 83.33% 16.67% 
 
Research Question 3: Is IFRS substantively adopted (used for internal reporting) by 
Nigerian firms? 
2.7.4.3 Institutionalisation at the organisational level (micro level) 
The institutionalisation at the micro level is concerned about whether IFRS is used for 
internal reporting (PwC, 2004), which is tantamount to it forming part of the day to day 
activities of the business (substantive adoption). The majority of the respondents to the 
questionnaire (see Table 2.5) agree that their internal reports comply with IFRS. In a 
similar vein, most of the interviewees agree with this submission. However, the extent to 
which companies use IFRS for internal reports vary. One of the big 4 auditors noted that 





“For example, financial instrument (e.g., available for sale) and foreign 
exchange transactions that are subject to daily fluctuations are captured 
by the accounting system but not necessarily reflected in internal 
reports” (Senior Associate II).  
In a similar vein, the difference between internal and external reports may be in 
the presentation because internal reports are not required to follow any rule. Management 
chooses any format they desire for presentation as mentioned by the following: 
“Internal reports comply with IFRS but not the same format with 
external reporting. The fundamentals are the same, but the formats are 
different. Both internal and external reports are extracted from the same 
list of balances” (Financial Controller I). 
“At the end of the month, we will prepare the IFRS financials and we 
compare the figures with the internal one. We highlight the differences 
and we explain why the differences, but the bottom line will not change. 
For external report, I may classify a cost as part of my cost of sales 
whereas in my internal reporting, these costs that are classified as my 
cost of sale may be classified as operating cost so that at the end of the 
day, your profit after tax will always be the same because that would 
have considered all the information before profit before tax. It depends 
on where you put your item, you may put ‘A’ up in internal while in 
external you put ‘A’ down, but at the end of the day, it will be the same 
thing, so it will not affect it” (Financial Controller II). 
It can be inferred from the above that Nigerian firms use IFRS for internal 
reporting. Thus, they have substantively adopted IFRS. Beside the agents exerting 
isomorphic pressures at the organisational field, there are other agents or factors that exert 
pressure on Nigerian firms at the organisational level so that internal reports are prepared 
based on IFRS. This question is answered next. 
Research Question 4: Who are the agents and what type of isomorphic pressure do they 
exert at the micro level to institutionalise IFRS? 
(a) Enforcement by the FRCN, SEC, Boards of Directors and internal auditors 
The SEC does not expressly require that internal reports of companies comply with IFRS, 
but through quarterly and interim reports submitted to it by companies, it enforces 
compliance with IFRS. As noted by some of the respondents to the questionnaire, 
quarterly and interim reports are scrutinised by the SEC for compliance with IFRS. Some 
of the auditors explain this process as follows: 
“IFRS is expected to be used for both internal and external reporting, 
because for listed companies, they are expected to file their quarterly 
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) so for this 




IFRS. That means for both internal and external reporting, their books 
are supposed to be in line with IFRS” (Audit Supervisor).  
 
“……it also makes their report timely as they have deadline for 
submission. Due to the fact that they are expected to file their report in 
line with IFRS on quarterly basis, they have to do that every quarter, 
this therefore prompts them to report internally using IFRS” (Audit 
Supervisor). 
As the directors and the CFOs are responsible and liable for the quarterly, interim, 
and final reports of the firms, they ensure that these reports are error-free in compliance 
with IFRS. Thus, they set the accounting processes and controls to capture the day to day 
IFRS transactions (Senior Associate II). An audit supervisor expresses this assertion as 
follows: 
“Since the financial statement is the sole responsibility of the 
management and the entire board, therefore, if there is anything wrong 
with the financial statement, the board will be held responsible for the 
preparation of that account” (Audit Supervisor). 
Internal auditors perform the function of ensuring that management controls are 
working. Included in these controls is that data should be captured in line with prevailing 
accounting standards. Thus, while performing their duties, they ensure that IFRS is used, 
thereby institutionalising it: 
“Anytime I am auditing a particular aspect of financial accounting, 
checking for controls over financial reports, I check for compliance 
[with relevant standards]. For example, if I am auditing inventory, I 
need to check [the] IFRS that relates to inventory. If I am auditing fixed 
assets, I need to check IFRS on PPE [property, plant, and equipment]” 
(Internal Auditor I) 
The above analysis shows that the SEC exerts a coercive isomorphic pressure on 
the Board of directors of Nigerian listed firms through the requirements of submission of 
quarterly reports. This effort is enhanced by the internal auditors who check the 
compliance of internal reports with IFRS.    
(b) Costs/benefits of using IFRS for internal reporting 
Based on the requirement to submit quarterly reports that are IFRS-compliant to the SEC, 
it becomes cost inefficient to prepare internal reports using the SAS and thereafter 
converting them on a quarterly basis for submission to the SEC. Hence, the cost of this 





“It will be illogical for them to prepare internal reports on a monthly 
basis not using IFRS and now have to convert that on a quarterly basis 
[for submission to the SEC]. Logically for them in terms of cost, 
manpower and consultancy, it is reasonable for them to prepare internal 
reports based on IFRS” (Audit Senior). 
“It is because they need to structure their financial statement to make it 
easier for them, as there will not be the need for extra cost of converting 
from local GAAP to IFRS. So, if their reporting has been prepared using 
IFRS format, there will not be the need to incur additional cost of 
converting” (Audit Supervisor). 
“Duplication of efforts for conversion [makes companies use IFRS for 
internal reporting]” (Director, advisory services). 
It can be deduced from the above analysis that the cost of converting internal 
reports that are prepared based on SAS to IFRS is another factor that makes Nigerian 
companies substantively adopt IFRS (i.e., use IFRS for internal reporting). 
(c) Parent companies’ influence 
Some of the Nigerian companies are a member of a multinational group of companies, 
whose account have to be harmonised into one report at the end of the year. To ease this 
process, all the subsidiaries will often prepare management reports, which are sent to the 
headquarters for consolidation. These reports have to be based on a common language 
which is, in this case, IFRS. Thus, subsidiaries of such groups in Nigeria have been 
preparing two accounts, one based on the IAS and the other on Nigerian GAAP, before 
IFRS was made compulsory in Nigeria. Using IFRS for internal reporting and external 
reporting is therefore a cost and effort reduction for the Nigerian subsidiaries, as 
explained by the following interviewees:  
“Just for simplicity sake, [my company] is a multinational company. In 
order to avoid the translation at the end of the day, that is why we use 
IFRS for internal reporting. By the time you want to consolidate with 
other countries, you still have to translate” (Plant Financial Controller). 
“We also have clients that have their parent companies in Europe and 
those one will actually require them to prepare monthly management 
accounts which most likely will be strictly IFRS” (Audit Senior). 
“[My company] is a member of [Group Plc], which is a large 
multinational company, and we are required to submit our management 
report to the group. Because of the fact that we need to compare our 
figures with another country, for us to be on the same page, everybody 





Because some Nigerian subsidiaries of multinational companies need to submit 
management (internal) reports to their parent company for consolidation, they need to 
prepare it with the same accounting standards as the parent company. This exerts a 
coercive isomorphic pressure on them to use IFRS for internal reporting.  
2.9 Discussion of Findings and Conclusion 
The institutionalisation of IFRS takes place across three levels of social order (Dillard et 
al., 2004). At the macro level, the overarching norm or rule (i.e., IFRS) is established and 
transferred to the meso level through institutionalising agents. From the meso level, the 
rule is further transferred to the micro level by institutionalising agents at the preceding 
level.  It is at the organisational level that the final outcome of the institutionalisation 
process is determined. This study shows that the World Bank exerted a coercive 
isomorphic pressure on the Nigerian government to establish the FRCN and on ICAN to 
strengthen its capacity. Thus, the World Bank is the institutionalising agent at macro 
level. 
Through the FRCN and the ICAN, the notion of IFRS adoption is transferred to 
the Nigerian companies. Furthermore, the accounting graduates and external auditors aid 
this institutionalisation of IFRS at the meso level by exerting normative and coercive 
isomorphic pressures on Nigerian firms, respectively. The FRCN directly monitors the 
compliance of companies’ audited reports with IFRS through annual review of accounts. 
Through equipping of students and members with IFRS knowledge, ICAN exerts a 
normative isomorphic pressure on companies so that their audited financial statements 
comply with IFRS. Since external auditors are required to sign audited accounts in their 
names by the FRCN, they are personally responsible for any errors (including 
noncompliance with IFRS) found in the reports. Due to this requirement, they also ensure 
that external reports are in compliance with IFRS. Finally, accounting graduates use the 
IFRS training they acquire from the university and on the job to prepare IFRS-compliant 
financial statements. 
The institutionalisation of IFRS at the micro level is ensured by the board of 
directors who have the responsibility of preparing quarterly reports to the SEC, as 
mandated by the FRCN. The internal auditors, as mandated by the management, also 
checks the accounting system’s compliance with IFRS. Other factors leading to the use 
of IFRS for internal reporting are the higher cost of translating quarterly report at the end 
of the year and the requirement by the parent companies of Nigerian subsidiaries that the 




Unlike the previous studies (Mir and Rahaman, 2005; Chand, 2005; Irvine, 2008; 
Albu and Albu, 2012; Albu et al., 2014; Hassan, Rankin and Lu, 2014; Nurunnabi, 2015; 
Carneiro et al., 2017) where IFRS is shown as being symbolically adopted, IFRS is 
substantively adopted by the Nigerian listed firms as evidenced by their use of it for 
internal reporting and its embeddedness in their accounting systems.  This study 
emphasizes that institutionalisation of IFRS is a process rather than an outcome (Dillard 
et al., 2004). The Nigerian government, influenced by the World Bank, is committed to 
ensuring substantive adoption of IFRS and hence, created and strengthened existing 
institutions – FRCN, SEC, ICAN and NUC – to drive substantive adoption. These 
institutions equally created mechanisms such as quarterly and annual review of financial 
statements that make it difficult for companies to circumvent using IFRS for external 
reporting without using it for internal reporting. Further, compelled by ancillary factors 
like the cost of conversion and pressure from parent companies, the Nigerian listed 
companies ultimately use IFRS for internal reporting. 
This study is the first study, as far as the researcher is aware, that investigates the 
process through which IFRS becomes embedded into organisational processes, using 
Dillard et al.’s (2004) model of neo-institutional theory and more importantly, in a 
developing country often characterised by inadequate infrastructure to enforce accounting 
reforms. Another important contribution of this study is that where macroeconomic 
factors such as the rule of law and investor protection are weak, a strong enforcement and 
restructuring of specific accounting infrastructure like the accounting profession, can 
drive a substantive adoption of IFRS.  
The results of this study are important for the findings of the next empirical 
chapters. The results show that the FRCN has put in place necessary procedures to ensure 
that financial reports of Nigerian firms are less prone to accounting irregularities and 
IFRS is substantively adopted. The next chapter examines the implications of IFRS 
adoption and the creation of the FRCN on accounting quality in Nigeria. 
This study, as in case study research, is limited by its inability to make 
generalisation regarding substantive adoption of IFRS across all Nigerian firms, 
especially due to the inability of the researcher to get all the responses to the mail 
questionnaire. However, the data triangulation adopted (i.e., document analysis, surveys, 
and interviews) provides good insights into the process and outcome of 







The Effects of Financial Reporting Regulation on Accounting Quality: 
The Case of Nigeria 
3.1 Background to the Study 
Financial reporting regulations, in recent times, have been spurred by market failures and 
a variety of corporate scandals (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). The accounting manipulation 
by Enron and WorldCom, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the financial crisis of 
2008 are notable examples. Countries have responded to these scandals and crises by 
creating different forms of regulations or stiffening existing regulations. For example, the 
SOX Act was introduced in the US following Enron and WorldCom accounting fraud. 
However, the costs and benefits of these regulations remain a subject of empirical 
investigation (Li, 2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). Establishing the cost and benefits of 
IFRS adoption is important for policy making with respect to regulating or not regulating 
financial reporting (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).  
Financial reporting regulation is defined as the creation of a single authority, 
charged with the creation of reporting rules, the interpretation and monitoring of 
compliance with these rules, and the imposition of penalties for non-compliance (Leuz 
and Wysocki, 2016). Financial reporting regulation in recent times has taken the form of 
IFRS adoption and concurrent enforcement, as a part of the global push to adopt 
International Financial Reporting Standards (Ball, 2016). Several cross-country studies 
(e.g., Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; Zeghal, Chtourou and Fourati, 2012; Ahmed, 
Neel and Wang, 2013; Cai et al., 2014; Capkun, Collins and Jeanjean, 2016) have tried 
to examine the benefits of IFRS adoption, but the results are highly-mixed. Following 
these mixed results, recent studies (Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2013; Kim, 2016) argue 
that simply adopting IFRS does not lead to benefits in terms of higher accounting quality. 
Adoption should be coupled with enforcement and other institutional reforms, as 
accounting quality is a function of different accounting infrastructures29 such as the level 
of investor protection and corporate governance (Leuz, Dhanajay and Wysocki, 2003). 
Accounting practices, notwithstanding the global harmonisation of accounting 
standards, still vary across countries (Bradshaw and Miller, 2008; Hellman, Gray, Morris 
and Haller, 2015). Consequently, cross-country studies on IFRS adoption have been 
criticised of generalising findings beyond homogeneous settings (Li, 2010). In fact, 
                                                             





accounting practices still differ across countries and firms despite using uniform 
accounting standards (Ball et al., 2003; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Daske et al., 2013; 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006).  Thus, the effect of accounting regulation is not 
homogenous across countries. Based on this, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and DeGeorge et 
al. (2016) called for the study of accounting regulation in various country contexts to 
unveil new insights. Since mandatory IFRS adopters are compelled to adopt IFRS, the 
effectiveness of such regulation (i.e., IFRS adoption) is dependent on the political and 
economic institutions that incentivise managers and auditors to prepare high-quality 
financial statements (Li, 2010). Christensen et al. (2013) argue that the higher accounting 
quality often ascribed to IFRS adoption may actually suffer from the effects of cofounding 
variables, since IFRS adoption is complemented with some other reforms to aid a smooth 
implementation of IFRS. Thus, this poses the question of whether it is IFRS alone that 
leads to better accounting quality or other institutional reforms. The answer to this 
question is best explored where IFRS is not implemented concurrently with other reforms 
or where their possible mixed impact can be disentangled. However, most past studies 
suffer from this identification problem (Christensen et al., 2013; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016). 
Aside relatively few studies examining the impact of IFRS cum enforcement on 
accounting quality, Nigeria provides an interesting context for studying this phenomenon. 
Firstly, IFRS adoption and enforcement in Nigeria was a response to market failures 
arising from various accounting manipulations and not merely a part of globalization as 
in other settings (Ball, 2016). Thus, unlike in other countries that consider the effect of 
IFRS without a clear-cut decline in accounting quality prior to IFRS adoption, Nigeria 
provides an avenue to really ascertain whether IFRS is effective in enhancing accounting 
quality or not. Secondly, enforcement of IFRS through the establishment of the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) was made a year before the adoption of IFRS. 
Therefore, the effect of enforcement can be separated from IFRS adoption, which has 
been the major flaw of prior studies (Christensen, Lee, Walker & Zeng, 2015; 
Christensen, Hail, Luzi & Leuz, 2016. Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). Thirdly, Nigeria has 
fewer cofounding variables (e.g., good corporate governance system and adequate 
investor protection) that can bias results. Following the market failure, the creation of the 
FRCN and the adoption of IFRS were the major reforms targeted at curbing future market 






3.2 Statement of the Problem 
The adoption of IFRS is continually increasing around the globe (Ball, 2016). Out of 
48,000 listed firms on major stock exchanges, 25,000 have adopted IFRS, albeit to some 
varying degrees (IFRS Foundation, 2016). The arguments surrounding the consequences 
of IFRS adoption is yet unsettled. The IASB argues that IFRS adoption leads to higher 
accounting quality. Accounting quality does not have a definition, but it is usually 
measured with earnings management, accounting conservatism, and earnings persistence. 
One stream of empirical studies reveals that IFRS leads to higher accounting quality 
(Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Chen, Tang and Lin, 
2010; Chua, Cheng and Gould, 2010). On the contrary, many studies equally show that 
IFRS reduces or does not improve accounting quality (Kabir, Laswad and Islam, 2010; 
Ernstberger, Stich and Vogler, 2012; Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2013; Camean, Campa and 
Pettinicchio, 2014; Bryce, Ali and Mather, 2015; Liu and Sun, 2015; Andre, Filip and 
Paugam, 2015 and Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2015).  
IFRS adoption has many attendant costs, such as the cost of IT restructuring, audit 
cost, internal control reorganisation, staff training (see PwC, 2004; Albu and Albu, 2012; 
Bova and Pereira, 2012; Christensen et al., 2015), and opportunity cost arising from 
substituting local standards that embody local needs and culture for international standard 
that does not take care of local needs and culture. However, the benefits of IFRS (in terms 
of higher accounting quality) on the other hand, is not yet confirmed.  
Whilst the ability of IFRS to improve accounting quality is not yet known, Nigeria 
adopted IFRS in 2012 to improve accounting quality, which hitherto had been 
undermined by various accounting manipulations of Nigerian companies (ROSC, 2004; 
2011). The accounting manipulation culminated into the Nigerian banking crisis in 
2008/2009 which led to an unprecedented loss of invested fund to the tune of N1.5 trillion 
to N2 trillion (approximately $13.4billion). Besides IFRS adoption, Nigeria also created 
the FRCN in 2011 with the responsibility to develop and monitor compliance with 
accounting standards, sanction non-compliance, and develop codes of corporate 
governance. As these two major reforms were geared towards improving the quality of 
financial reporting in Nigeria, whether such intent has been met or not is an important 
research question. 
Moreover, the effect of IFRS adoption cum enforcement is still an ongoing 
research endeavour. There has been an argument that IFRS adoption adds little (if any) 
improvement to accounting quality and it is the enforcement of accounting standards, 




enforcement alone does not lead to improved accounting quality except it is strengthened 
with IFRS adoption. Thus, the empirical results of the effect of IFRS and enforcement on 
accounting quality is still mixed and needs further exploration. 
3.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions    
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of accounting regulation, through 
IFRS adoption and the establishment of FRCN, on accounting quality in Nigeria. 
Specifically, the objective is to disentangle the impact of IFRS adoption from that of 
enforcement by the FRCN. Accounting quality is proxied by earnings management, 
timely loss recognition, and earnings persistence. To achieve this main objective, the 
following research questions are answered: 
f) What is the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management following market 
failure in Nigeria? 
g) What is the effect of the establishment of the FRCN on earnings management 
following market failure in Nigeria? 
h) What is the effect of IFRS adoption on timely loss recognition following market 
failure in Nigeria? 
i) What is the effect of the establishment of the FRCN on timely loss recognition 
following market failure in Nigeria? 
j) What is the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings persistence following market 
failure in Nigeria? 
3.4 Significance of the Study 
A recent study by Capkun et al. (2016) reveals that the 2005 amendments made to IFRS 
provide more flexibility in accounting choices, which may reduce accounting quality 
through increased earnings management. However, IFRS adoption is still claimed by the 
World Bank to improve accounting quality, such that it is recommended as a measure to 
deter accounting manipulations, as in the case of Nigeria (ROSC, 2004; 2011). It is 
important to know whether IFRS adoption really improves accounting quality in order to 
make necessary policies that deter accounting manipulations and consequently prevent 
market failures. It is equally important to understand which of the accounting regulatory 
measures (i.e., IFRS or enforcement or both) really or significantly improves accounting 
quality to properly make the right policies with respect to accounting reforms. 
The extent of divergence of a country’s national GAAP from IFRS has been 




and Fourati, 2012; Cai et al., 2014). As Nigeria’s Statements of Accounting Standards 
represented 50% of IFRS (ROSC, 2011), whether this argument holds or does not hold 
can be verified by this study in the Nigerian context. Thus, countries whose national 
GAAP have little divergence from IFRS can gain insights from the result of this study 
when making decisions on whether or not to adopt IFRS.   
3.5 Literature Review  
3.5.1 Contextual Framework 
A sound financial reporting architecture is necessary for ensuring macroeconomic 
stability. As accounting information are used by the investing public for investing 
decisions, an unfaithful presentation of a company’s financial details can lead to a loss of 
investment of the investors, who may have relied on such reports. Furthermore, the 
increasing demand for cross-border financing and supply of cross-border investments 
have raised the need to reassure, especially foreign investors, that the accounting 
architecture of a country is adequate to guard against loss of investments. IFRS has often 
been propagated as a trustworthy high-quality financial reporting standard that should 
ensure investors’ confidence.  
The process of IFRS adoption in Nigeria started with the preparation of the first 
Report on Observance of Standards and Codes: Accounting and Auditing (ROSC) 
conducted jointly by the World Bank and IMF in Nigeria in 2004.The ROSC was one of 
the twelve mechanisms developed jointly by the World bank and IMF Boards of 
Executive following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The ROSC review has four major 
objectives, namely determining the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional 
infrastructure that support financial reporting and auditing practices of a country; 
comparing a country’s local accounting and auditing standards with international 
standards (IFRS and ISA); assessing the level of compliance with existing national 
standards; and assessing the effectiveness of enforcement structures and institutions in 
ensuring compliance with local standards. The ROSC (2004) report revealed that 
although the Nigerian Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS), issued by the Nigerian 
Accounting Standards Board (NASB) was based on IAS/IFRS, there was still a wide 
departure from IAS/IFRS in terms of disclosure requirements, scope, and detail. The 
ROSC (2004) also considered the SASs as relatively less stringent compared to IFRS in 
terms of disclosure requirements. In the subsequent ROSC (2011)30, it was found that the 
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SAS as at 2011, covered about 50% of the existing IAS/IFRS. Another key finding of the 
ROSC (2011) was a very weak enforcement mechanisms of financial reporting by the 
regulatory institutions in Nigeria.  
The regulatory institutions that underpin the financial reporting architecture in 
Nigeria are numerous. Their duties and failures as uncovered by ROSC (2004; 2011) are 
discussed next. 
3.5.1.1 Financial reporting regulatory institutions in Nigeria 
The Nigerian Accounting Standards Board was created in 1982 as an initiative of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (NASB, 2009). The NASB was responsible 
for setting accounting standards in Nigeria (Statements of Accounting Standards – SAS) 
as well as ensuring compliance with the accounting standards set. The Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (1990) requires companies to comply with the accounting 
standards issued by the NASB. The minimum disclosure requirements and the mode of 
preparation and presentation of financial statements are also specified by the CAMA 
(1990). Despite the NASB being statutorily empowered to monitor compliance with 
accounting standards in 2003 through the NASB Act (2003), the ROSC (2004) found the 
NASB to be incapable of fulfilling its duties due to lack of both human and material 
resources. Thus, the NASB’s monitoring of compliance with the SASs was seriously 
undermined. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established by Decree No 
71 of 1979 with the responsibility of protecting investors’ interest against unwholesome 
practices of capital market participants. It is also charged with regulating the capital 
market through the Investment and Securities Act (1999) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rules of 1999. The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) was established by the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange Act (1961) as a registered company limited by guarantee31. The 
NSE is regulated by the SEC and licensed under the Investment and Securities Act (1999). 
The NSE supports the SEC in the supervision of Nigerian listed firms. The CAMA (1990) 
requires that listed companies submit a copy of their audited financial statements to the 
NSE and the SEC within 3 months following their accounting year-end (ROSC, 2004). 
However, the ROSC (2004) noted that the “SEC enforcement is weak and administrative 
sanctions and civil penalties are not adequate to deter noncompliance” (p. 9). The ROSC 
(2011) also found that financial statements submitted to the NSE were not appraised for 
compliance with accounting standards and disclosure requirements. 





The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) replaced the Companies Registry 
which was established by the repealed Companies Act of 1968 (Okike, 2007). The CAC 
inter alia is responsible for companies’ registration and the administration of CAMA 
(1990). The registrar of the CAC is empowered by the CAMA (1990) to ensure that the 
presentation and disclosure requirements of financial statements as required by CAMA 
(1990) are complied with. Although listed and non-listed public and private firms are 
expected to file audited financial statements with the CAC within 42 days following the 
company’s completion of Annual General Meeting (AGM) (ROSC, 2011), the ROSC 
(2004) found that many companies were not filing their audited financial statement with 
CAC, as required by CAMA (1990) and financial statements of non-listed firms were not 
available. This weakness in enforcement was accentuated by lack of proper record-
keeping and corruption (ROSC, 2004). 
Based on the above weaknesses in the regulatory institutions and the Nigerian 
SASs, the ROSC (2004) initially recommended a convergence of SAS with IFRS and the 
creation of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) to replace the NASB. The 
ROSC (2011) later recommended the full adoption of IFRS and timely establishment of 
the FRCN. 
The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) was established by the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act No. 6 of 2011. The FRCN is a parastatal of 
the Federal Government of Nigeria under the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and 
Investment. It is charged with developing accounting standards and monitoring 
compliance with the standards as well as developing ancillary institutions that reinforce 
its standards setting and compliance monitoring duties, such as developing corporate 
governance code and setting standards for audit, actuarial practices, and valuation. The 
Council operates through seven32 directorates in carrying out its duties. The FRCN 
declared a mandatory adoption of IFRS by all listed companies on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange from 1st January 2012. 
Prior to the creation of the FRCN and the adoption of IFRS in Nigeria, accounting 
practices in the country were ridden with errors and frauds. Particularly, the ROSC (2011) 
found that many companies did not properly disclose revenues. There was the tendency 
to overstate or understate revenue in order to manage accounting earnings. Similarly, full 
liabilities for employee benefits were not recognised on accrual basis. Leases were often 
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misclassified to improve the liability side of the statement of financial position, thus, 
portraying the borrowing capacity of the companies as favourable. Non-disclosure of 
information related to impairment test, impairment review and impairment adjustments 
was a commonplace. Information regarding provision, contingent assets and liabilities 
were not disclosed, which may imply arbitrary use of these items to hide the true 
performance of the companies. In the banking sector, the banks exploited the lax 
regulatory structure to inflate their balance sheet values. Banks gave margin loans to their 
customers to purchase their shares on credit. As stock prices fell, many customers 
defaulted, which led to a surge in the non-performing loans from 5% in 2008 to 60% in 
2009. Consequently, the whole Nigerian capital market was in shambles as a result of lax 
regulation and improper financial reporting (SEC, 2009). 
With the adoption of IFRS and the establishment of FRCN to enforce accounting 
standards (SAS and later, IFRS), the accounting quality of the Nigerian listed firms is 
expected to improve. However, whether these regulatory mechanisms lead to 
improvements in accounting quality in Nigeria is an empirical question.  
3.5.1.2 Enforcement of accounting standards, the NASB and the FRCN 
The FRCN is essentially a reorganization of the NASB with redefined authorities and 
monitoring procedures. The governing board of the FRCN comprises of several 
institutions33 in order to capture the interest of all relevant stakeholders. Prior to its 
establishment, the ROSC (2011) observes that the NASB already stepped up its 
regulatory efforts:  
The NASB writes to companies requesting their financial statements for 
review. The review is conducted using checklists developed for each SAS. 
Issues of noncompliance are conveyed to the company with a request that the 
auditor accompanies the company to the inspection meeting. The NASB has 
improved upon its monitoring and enforcement function thus becoming 
prominent in the discharge of this responsibility. Arising from its monitoring, 
some companies and their auditors have been sanctioned for manipulating 
accounting principles. (p. 15). 
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It can be inferred from this that there was improved enforcement of accounting 
standards (SASs) in Nigeria prior to the adoption of IFRS in 2012. This improvement was 
subsequently consolidated with the establishment of the FRCN. The case of FRCN’s 
sanction of Alliance and General Insurance and Alliance Ltd. and General Life Assurance 
plc proves this argument. In reviewing the 2010 SAS-based audited financial statements 
of the two entities by the FRCN, several errors in the accounts were noted. These included 
non-consolidation of subsidiaries, several accounting irregularities, and non-disclosure of 
tax liabilities. Furthermore, the corporate governance of the firm was found to be opaque 
and worrisome, the approach to changing external auditors was improper, and auditors 
were given confusing assignments. Following these findings, the FRCN suspended the 
management and requested the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) to appoint 
an external auditor to conduct a substantive audit of the company. The companies were 
also instructed to publish in at least two widely read national newspapers that they have 
published misleading financial information to regulatory authorities. 
The FRCN further ensures that companies comply with accounting standards by 
conducting quarterly and annual review of accounts and imposes sanctions for any errors 
found. The FRCN also requests the directors and external auditors to sign company 
reports in their own names. By this requirement, the directors and auditors are liable for 
any errors or noncompliance with accounting standards found in their audited reports. 
The recent case of Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc confirms the enormity of noncompliance 
with these requirements.  
Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc is a Nigerian subsidiary of Standard Bank Group with 
head office in South Africa. Following the review of the financial statements of the entity 
for the years 2013 and 2014 coupled with the complaints lodged against the firm by non-
controlling shareholders, several material accounting irregularities emanated. Among 
these irregularities were: the concealment of material related party transactions with the 
parent company, outrageous inflation of audit fees, noncompliance with IFRS with 
respect to tax disclosure, and the concealment of several other expenses. Reacting to these 
revelations, the FRCN directed the board of directors to withdraw the financial 
statements. Furthermore, it suspended the directors and audit partner that signed the 
accounts and a second partner review of the audit approach and quality control of Stanbic 
IBTC’s auditor (KPMG Professional Services) was requested. 
Figure 3.1 shows the enforcement period for both the SAS and IFRS. Although, 
the NASB strengthened its enforcement in 2010, this study argues that the effective period 




more powers and resources (ROSC, 2011). Although the enforcement in 2010 will 
reinforce the enforcement in 2011, the FRCN will be more thorough in its enforcement 
in 2011 due to the ‘attention-based view’34 (Marra and Mazzola, 2014). The FRCN will 
concentrate its attention towards improving the credibility of financial reports in its first 
year for two main reasons. Firstly, improving the credibility of the financial reports is the 
sole reason for reorganizing the NASB into the FRCN. Secondly, the procedures it takes 
in its first year determines how seriously the Nigerian firms would take it. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, a sensitivity analysis of the effective date of 
enforcement is conducted in section 3.9. 












Figure 3.2 illustrates the demand for accounting reform and the expected outcome 
on accounting quality. The inability of the forces of demand and supply in ensuring a 
high-quality financial reporting together with weak enforcement by the NASB caused the 
Nigerian stock market to plunge into crisis in 2008/2009 (market failure). Consequently, 
internal and external stakeholders pushed for accounting regulation. As a result of the 
push, the Nigerian government established the FRCN to enforce accounting standards in 
2011. In 2012, IFRS was adopted in Nigeria and was mandatory for all listed firms in 
Nigeria. The FRCN enforces accounting standards and checks the accuracy of financial 
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reports against accounting manipulations. Through these two instruments, accounting 
quality of Nigerian listed firms is expected to improve through the reduction in earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition, and higher earnings persistence. 
Figure 3.2 The Demand for Accounting Reform and Expected Outcome on 
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3.5.2 Theoretical framework: public accountability model of accounting regulation 
This study employs the public accountability model of accounting regulation to theorize 
the effect of the adoption of IFRS and the establishment of FRCN on accounting quality 
in Nigeria. The public accountability model of accounting regulation is a merger of the 
accountability paradigm and the public interest variant of regulatory theory (Tower, 
1993). Regulatory theory has two variants: the public interest theory and the capture 
theory (Posner, 1974). According to the public interest theory, regulation “is supplied in 
response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market 
practices” (Posner, 1974, p. 337). Capture theory on the other hand, argues that regulation 
is designed for the benefits of some powerful interest groups (Stigler, 1971).  
In the realm of accounting, the argument for regulation, based on the public 
interest variant, often ensues from the assumption that there is unequal possession of 
information (information asymmetry) among investors (Beaver, 1989). To protect the less 
informed, accounting regulation is instituted. This explanation, according to Lev (1988), 
is an “unconvincing motivation” (p. 3) for accounting regulation. Instead, he proposes 
that accounting regulation is motivated by the need to ensure “equality of opportunity - 
an equal access to information relevant for asset valuation. Or in the more familiar 
parlance – a state of symmetric distribution of information across investors” (p. 3).  
Inequity in opportunities has social consequences (e.g., higher bid-ask-spread, 
higher transaction cost, and lower trade volume in the capital market) to the informed 
investors, the uninformed investors, and the society at large (Lev, 1988). These social 
consequences arise from the protective strategies adopted by less-informed investors 
when trading with informed sellers. For example, to protect themselves from informed 
investors, uninformed investors may invest in well-diversified portfolio for a long-term; 
or prohibit insiders like managers, through legal or contractual arrangements, from 
buying the shares of their own firms; or in extreme cases withdraw from trading in a 
specific security or from the market entirely. 
Tower (1993) combines the principle of ‘informational equity’ from Lev’s (1988) 
refinement of public interest variant of regulatory theory with the accountability 
paradigm. Tower (1993) posits that accounting regulation is needed to maintain public 
accountability of firms. Public accountability in this sense implies rendering account of 
an organization’s activities to stakeholders that possess legitimate interest in the 
organization. “Accounting regulation is viewed as an instrument of accountability in that 
it can affect the nature of corporate information reported” (Tower, 1993, p. 71). 
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Source: Adapted from Tower (1993) 
Figure 3.3 shows the three elements of the public accountability model of 
accounting regulation: production (fiduciary duty to report to all relevant stakeholders), 
public accountability (informational equity and efficiency), and regulation. The 
regulatory institution (FRCN) has to be composed of several stakeholders (wide 
democratic representation) (see footnote 33). In performing its duty, the FRCN takes 
input from all stakeholders and consider ‘management preferences’ by looking at the cost-
benefit of a particular regulatory strategy to the listed companies. Regarding the 
preferences of the management, the regulatory body needs to take cognizance of the 
frequency of the reports by the management (e.g., preparation of quarterly reports) and 
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FRCN, having been composed of several stakeholders, took into consideration the 
interests of both external and internal stakeholders. This led it to adopt the IFRS and 
stipulate monitoring procedures for ensuring compliance with accounting standards (SAS 
and later, IFRS) (i.e., rules governing preparation).  The outcome of this process is that 
public accountability is ensured, as evidenced by sufficient production of information 
(informational efficiency) through IFRS-informed higher disclosures and equal access of 
all stakeholders to information (informational equity), which is guaranteed by the FRCN 
monitoring procedures. This outcome also ensures that the information produced by 
Nigerian listed firms meet various needs of financial statement users. For example, the 
information should be useful to lenders in assessing firms’ conservatism (i.e., timely loss 
recognition) (Watts, 2003) and investors in assessing firms’ earnings management 
behavior and the persistence of their earnings. Consequently, accounting regulation 
should reduce earnings management practices, improve timely loss recognition, and 
earnings persistence of Nigerian listed firms. 
3.6 Accounting Quality Proxies 
Accounting quality does not have a definition, it is only measured by some proxies 
(Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). The proxies of accounting quality in this study are: 
earnings management, accounting conservatism, and earnings persistence. Figure 3.3 













The accounting quality measures in Figure 3.4 are considered in detail in the next section. 
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3.6.1 Earnings Management 
According to Sevin and Schroeder (2005), earnings management is an attempt by the 
management of an organisation to influence reported income in the short-term. Earnings 
management could arise for various reasons, including an attempt to influence stock 
market evaluation of the firm, influence management compensation, and guard against 
violation of debt contracts. Earnings management can be of various types; these include 
big bath and cookie jar reserve, classification shifting, accrual earnings management 
(AEM) and real earnings management (REM). The various types of earnings management 
are discussed next. Figure 3.5 summarises the factors affecting each type of EM. 















































Big bath and cookie jar 
Classification shifting 
Accrual and Real EM 
Factors affecting classification shifting 
 Financial distress 
 Meeting earnings forecast 
 Constraints on using accrual and real EM 
 Investor protection 
 Analyst following 
Factors affecting AEM and REM 
 Political connection 
 AEM & REM as substitutes/complements 
 Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 Investor protection and analyst coverage 
 Takeover protection 
 Stock repurchase and employee stock options 
 Product market competition 
 Overinvestment by management 
 Family ownership 
 CEO overconfidence 
 Other CEO-related factors 
 Gender diversity on board 
 Board and audit committee 
 External auditor 
 Dispersion and diversification 
 Corporate social responsibility 
 Credit rating 
 Fiscal support 
 Share reform 
 Non-controlling interest, shareholders activism & 
venture capitalist 
 R&D expenditure 
 Causal reasoning 
 Meeting dividend thresholds 
 Comparability of reports 
 Leverage 
 Political competition in the public sector 
 Culture and religion 
 Decentralisation of investment decisions 
 Cash flow volatility 
 IFRS adoption and enforcement 
 
Factors affecting big bath/cookie jar 
 Change of CEO 




Figure 3.5 shows the different types of earnings management discussed in the 
preceding sections alongside the factors affecting them. AEM and REM are the most 
assessed by the literature. The last two factors affecting AEM and REM are enforcement 
and IFRS adoption. These two factors are explored in section 3.7 since this study is 
focused on them. 
3.6.1.1 Big bath and cookie jar reserves 
The big bath involves the write-off of large discretionary expenses by the management of 
firms with declining profits in order to further reduce their profits (Jordan and Clark, 
2004). The notion is that the company and its management are not proportionately 
punished for these big write-offs from profits. Thus, rather than spreading the “big bath’ 
to the future, it is absorbed by the current year’s profits. The literature that highlight the 
determinants of big bath are discussed next. 
Bornemann, Kick, Pfingsten and Schertler (2015) argue that incoming CEOs may 
take a big bath in their first year through discretionary expenses so as to blame the outgone 
CEO for any bad performance. They may further reduce performance benchmarks, which 
together with the big bath, help improve future performance. Using 7,097 firm-year 
observations of 691 savings banks, they find a positive association between CEO turnover 
and ‘big bath’. In Malaysia, Majid (2015) find controlling outside shareholders to be 
negatively related to big bath based on 1,911 firm-year observations. 
According to Levitt (1998), cookie jar reserves occur with the use of unrealistic 
assumptions to estimate liabilities such as warranty costs and possible sales returns that 
give rise to overstated values in good times, but subsequently reverse in bad times to 
cushion profits. Duh, Lee and Lin (2009) examine the use of impairment loss reversal to 
create cookie jar by Taiwanese firms. Using a sample of 55 firms that reversed their 
impairment losses alongside 55 control firms, they find the recognition of impairment 
losses to be associated with future reversal if such reversal would avoid decline in 
earnings. This was especially pronounced among firms with high debt ratio. 
3.6.1.2 Classification shifting 
Classification shifting is the misclassification of items within the income statement while 
income remains unchanged (e.g., shifting recurring expenses to non-recurring expenses) 
(Abernathy et al., 2014). The intent of classification shifting is to increase the core35 
earnings of a firm, which are major inputs into valuation decisions by stakeholders. 
                                                             




Moreover, it is based on the core earnings that managers are compensated, thus increasing 
it will aid in assessing managers as high performers.   
A number of factors facilitate the use of shifting classification by firms. These 
factors include: 
(i) Financial distress 
Nagar and Sen (2016) investigate the use of classification shifting by Indian firms. They 
observe that managers shift operating expenses to income-decreasing special items as 
well as net income increasing special items to operating income.  They conclude that these 
shifting classification techniques by Indian firms are seriously influenced by financial 
distress. Similarly, in Korea, Baik, Cho, Choi and Lee (2016) examine the use of 
classification shifting in the statement of cash flows following IFRS adoption. Using 
3,130 Korean firms, they find that firms with high bank ownership, high interest payments 
and financially distressed banks shift interest payments from operating cash flows to 
financing cash flows. 
(ii) Meeting earnings forecast 
McVay (2006) conducts a study on the use of classification shifting as an earnings 
management tool to meet analysts’ earnings forecast in the US. He finds that managers 
opportunistically shift core expenses to non-recurring special items in the income 
statement to meet analysts’ forecast, based on 76,901 firm-year observations. 
Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (2009) investigate the use of income-increasing 
accruals and classification shifting by managers to meet analysts’ expectations in the UK 
from 1994 to 2002. In their result, they find no evidence of use of income increasing 
accrual by UK firms to meet analysts’ forecasts. However, the shifting of small core 
expenses by larger firms to non-recurring expenses to meet analyst forecast exist. Barua, 
Lin and Sbaraglia (2010) investigate the use of classification shifting through 
discontinued operation. Using 79,643 firm-year observations, they conclude that 
managers shift income-decreasing core expenses to discontinued operation to increase 
core earnings and to meet or beat analysts’ forecast. 
Similarly, Haw, Ho and Li (2011) examine the use of classification shifting by 
managers in the East Asia within external and internal governance framework. With 3,992 
firm-year observations from 2001-2004, they find that managers opportunistically shift 
core expenses to non-recurring special items to overstate current earnings. This intensifies 
when the aim is to meet earnings forecast. In Japan, Shirato and Nagata (2012) investigate 




Japanese GAAP allows managers to have a higher discretion in classifying expenses 
under core and non-core expenses, thus, observing a strong tendency of shifting 
classification and that the tendency is higher when it is aimed at meeting analysts’ 
forecasts. 
(iii) Constraints on using accrual and real earnings management 
Abernathy, Beyer and Rapley (2014) investigate the use of classification shifting by 
managers when there are constraints on using accrual earnings management or real 
earnings management. Based on 33,619 firm-years, they conclude that managers resort 
to account classification when REM is constrained by poor financial position, high 
institutional ownership, and when the firm has low market share in the industry. Managers 
also resort to account classification when AEM is constrained by low flexibility in the 
accounting system. Fan, Barua, Cready and Thomas (2010) extend the findings of Mc 
Vay (2006) and used core earnings expectation model. They observe the existence of 
classification shifting and this intensifies when managers are constrained in using accrual 
to manipulate earnings. 
(iv) Investor protection and the number of analysts following 
Behn, Gotti, Herrmann and Kang (2013) extend classification shifting research to an 
international context. They investigate the influence of the level of investor protection in 
a country and the number of financial analysts following on classification shifting. With 
6,540 observations from 40 countries from 1998-2008, they find classification shifting in 
both weak and strong investor protection countries. Furthermore, financial analysts’ 
following was found to curtail classification shifting majorly in weak investor protection 
countries. 
3.6.1.3 Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
Accrual Earnings Management (AEM) occurs when managers defer revenue into the 
future through the use of accrual or borrow revenue from the future to increase current 
period earnings through the use of accrual (Abernathy et al., 2014). Accrual earnings 
management involves the masking of the economic performance of a firm through the 
manipulation of accounting methods and estimates (Dechow and Skinner, 2000), for 
example, bad debt estimates and change of depreciation methods (Chen, Huang and Fan, 
2012). Accrual earnings management can be constrained by tighter accounting 
regulations (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). To confirm this assertion, Cohen, Dye and 




introduction of SOX while real earnings management was on the decline. However, post-
SOX evidence showed a reverse case. 
Real Earnings Management (REM), on the other hand, is the manipulation of real 
economic activities (Abernathy et al., 2014) of a firm in terms of timing and structuring 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). Examples of real earnings 
management include overproduction of stock to reduce cost of goods sold, which 
consequently increases profit; reducing expenses on research and development (R&D) so 
as to increase profit in the short-term; short-term price discount offered to customers to 
which they may reasonably expect to continue in the near future thus, reducing future 
earnings. Earlier evidence of real earnings management was found in the reduction of 
R&D expenditure by the management (Bushee 1998; Dechow and Sloan, 1991). 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence for the manipulation of real activities using 
COMPUSTAT data from 1987 to 2001. The main proxies used were price discount to 
boost temporary sales, overproduction to reduce the cost of goods sold, and reduction in 
R&D expenditure.  Empirical evidence, however, show that R&D expenditure can be 
manipulated for accrual as well as real earnings management. Markarian, Pozza and 
Prencipe (2008) examine the capitalisation of R&D cost as an earnings management tool 
in Italy. Using 83 firm-year observations from 2001-2003, they find that companies use 
R&D capitalisation for earnings smoothing purposes. Similarly, Tahinakis (2014) 
investigate the cut in R&D expenditure as a real earnings management technique in the 
Eurozone. Using 1,468 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2013, they find that 
Eurozone firms reduced R&D expenditure to manage earnings. 
Real earnings management is costlier than accrual earnings management, as the 
former erodes future economic values of the firm (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005) 
due to value-adding economic activities being discountenanced to avoid short-term 
decline in profits. Engaging in REM, however, holds some benefits for firms or managers 
(if it is opportunistic). For example, real earnings management is more difficult to 
discover by auditors or regulatory authorities (Graham et al.., 2005; Badertscher, 2011; 
Gunny, 2010). 
In most cases, managers are assumed to engage in earnings management to 
optimize their personal gains. On the contrary, Gunny (2010) argues, using 
COMPUSTAT data from 1988 to 2001, that real earnings management is not 
opportunistic but allows firms to meet current earnings benchmark, which leads to better 
performance in the future. The study of Taylor and Xu (2010) supports this conclusion 




performance of US firms. Using 18,267 firm-year observations from 1988 to 2003, they 
find that engagement in real earnings management does not lead to significant 
underperformance of firms. 
Most earnings management studies have focused on real and accrual earnings 
management consequently leading to a large pool of factors that influence real and accrual 
earnings management. These factors are discussed below. 
(i) Political connection 
Braam, Nandy, Weitzel and Lodh (2015) investigate the trade-off between real earnings 
management and accrual earnings management practices of politically connected firms. 
The idea stems from their theorization that politically connected firms prefer higher 
secrecy, and the masking-potentials of political favours of real earnings management. 
Using a panel data set of 5,493 listed firms in 30 countries, they find politically connected 
firms to have higher potentials of substituting real earnings management practices for 
accrual earnings management. Furthermore, based on 11,116 firm-year observations, Chi, 
Liao and Chen (2016) find that firms with politically connected CEOs engage in lower 
accrual earnings management but higher real earnings management than firms with non-
connected CEOs. Similarly, Li, Wang, Wu and Xiao (2016) find that tax-induced earnings 
management for firms with political connections bear a positive relationship with 
earnings management in China based on 3,581 firm year observations.  
(ii) AEM and REM as substitutes or complements 
AEM could bear a positive relationship with REM when they are complementary, or a 
negative relationship when they are substitute, depending on their relative cost and 
benefits. Chen, Huang and Fan (2012) investigate whether accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management are substitutes (as argued for by Barton, 2001; Zang, 2007) 
or complements (as argued for by Mizik and Jacobson, 2007; 2008; Matsuura, 2008) in 
Taiwan. Using 9,829 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2010, they find that Taiwanese 
listed firms strategically employ both accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management as complementary ways of managing earnings.  
Zang (2012) also investigates whether firms substitute real earnings management 
for accrual earnings management or vice versa. Using 6,500 firm-year observations from 
1987-2008 in the US, he finds that management substitute one form of earnings 
management strategy for the other based on their relative costs. Particularly, institutional 
ownership constrains AEM, thus, causing management to opt for REM. Furthermore, 




AEM. Chi, Lisic and Pevsner (2011) examine the use of real earnings management as a 
substitute when higher quality auditors constrain the use of accrual earnings management. 
They find that auditor expertise is associated with higher real earnings management for 
firms that meet earnings benchmarks or are just marginally above it. Furthermore, they 
find a positive relationship between audit tenure and real earnings management. 
(iii) Seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
Seasoned equity offerings are calls made by firms for subscription for their shares after 
their initial public offers. In other words, it is the subsequent issue of a firm’s share capital 
out of the authorised share capital not yet held by the public. Teoh, Welch and Wang 
(1998) investigate the use of discretionary accruals by 1,248 firms on COMPUSTAT 
prior to seasoned equity issue. They find that firms use discretionary accrual to inflate 
earnings prior to the issue, resulting in poor subsequent stock returns and net income. 
Rangan (1998) find a similar result in his examination of 230 companies on 
COMPUSTAT between 1987 and 1990. Similarly, DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 
(2004) examine 10,232 offers with 324 lawsuits. They find that seasoned equity issuers 
engage in opportunistic manipulation of earnings, which exposes them to litigations.   
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) investigate the engagement of seasoned equity 
offering firms in real earnings management and its implication for their 
underperformance afterwards. Using a sample of 1,511 offerings in the US from 1987 to 
2006, they find that SEO firms engage in real earnings management and their subsequent 
underperformance is more informed by real activities management than accrual reversal. 
Thus, their findings support the findings of Ragan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998). They 
equally find the use of AEM or REM around SEO to be informed by the management’s 
ability to use AEM.  
Guthrie and Sokolowsky (2010), based on a sample of 301 firms, find that firms 
manage earnings around seasoned equity offerings only in the presence of large block 
shareholders but not in their absence. Furthermore, Zhou and Elder (2004) find Big 4 
auditors and industry specialist auditors to constrain earnings management for SEO firms 
using a sample of 2,453 seasoned equity offerings. 
(iv) Investor protection and analyst coverage 
Countries across the globe have laws and regulations that protect the rights of majority 
and minority investors. When such measures are perceived as inadequate, such countries 
are said to have weak investor protection, and when they are perceived as adequate, such 




protection determines earnings management since this has a bearing on the consequences 
of engaging in earnings management36. Thus, Enomoto, Kimura and Yamaguchi (2015) 
examine the effect of investors’ protection on the use of accrual or real earnings 
management by firms across 38 countries. Using 222,513 firm-year observations from 
1991 to 2010, they find that managers operating in countries with stronger investor 
protection opt for real earnings management instead of accrual earnings management. 
They further find that REM is constrained by the number of analyst following. Similarly, 
Zhang, Uchida and Bu (2014) find a negative relationship between legal protection in 
China and earnings management. Francis, Hasan and Li (2016) find that the strength of a 
country’s legal-system is positively associated with real earnings management but 
negatively associated with discretionary accrual. They reached this conclusion using 
245,180 firm-year observations. Sun and Liu (2016) investigate whether analyst coverage 
constrains real earnings management. Using 9,086 firm-year observations from 1996–
2006, they find that analyst coverage does not constrain real earnings management, but it 
constrains accrual earnings management.  
Due to pressure effect, managers’ desire to meet consistent analyst expectation 
errors lead to earnings management. The study by Zhou and Wu (2016) find a support for 
this hypothesis in China using 170,864 forecast records. 
(v) Takeover protection 
Takeover is the purchase of a firm (target) by another firm (acquirer). This could be done 
through friendly means or hostile means. A friendly takeover involves the acquirer 
negotiating with the target’s board, which may agree to the takeover if it feels it is 
beneficial to the shareholders. A hostile takeover on the other hand is a takeover by the 
acquirer without management’s consent. It could be done through tender offer, where the 
acquirer publicly announces a price above the firm’s market price; or through proxy fight, 
where the acquirer tries to woo a simple majority of the target’s shareholders; or through 
creeping tender offer, where the acquirer purchases enough of the target’s stock at the 
open market in a bid to change the target’s management.  
Takeover protection can be done through staggered board elections or poison pill 
(a dividend of warrants to purchase stock) or a combination of both. The relationship 
between takeover protection and earnings management is unclear, as it is supported by 
two theories. These are entrenchment theory and alignment theory (Zhao and Chen, 
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2012). Entrenchment effect holds that when boards are protected from removal by 
shareholders, they have the tendency to manipulate earnings at the expense of the long-
term interest of shareholders. Alignment effect, however, argues that takeover protection 
aligns the interest of managers with the long-term interest of the firm. Based on this 
premise, Ge and Kim (2014) examine the effect of board governance and takeover 
protection on real earnings management post-SOX. They find that higher board 
monitoring is associated with increased real earnings management while takeover 
protection subverts managerial incentives for real earnings management. Zang (2012) 
arrives at a similar conclusion that SOX leads to decline in AEM, which may make firms 
engage in REM. 
Zhao and Chen (2008) examine the effect of takeover protection (measured by 
staggered board election) on accrual earnings management. Using data from 1995–2002, 
they find that takeover protection is associated with lower accrual earnings management, 
thus, supporting the alignment effect. 
Zhao, Chen, Zhang and Davis (2012) examine whether real earnings management 
towards meeting earnings target is associated with takeover protection. Using 7,966 firm-
year observations from 1995-2008, they find that less protected firms are associated with 
higher real activities manipulation, while more protected firms are associated with lower 
real earnings management. Furthermore, they find that real activities manipulation to 
meet earnings target is associated with higher future performance. 
(vi) Stocks repurchase and employee stock option 
Firms may often buyback some of their outstanding shares when they perceive their 
shares to be undervalued. Since firms’ outstanding shares are used for investment metrics 
such as market capitalisation and earnings per share computation, stock repurchases are 
often employed to manage earnings. Based on this argument, Bens, Nagar, and Wong 
(2002) find that executives divert resources from real investment to repurchase their stock 
so as to check the dilutive effect of employee stock options on earnings. Similarly, Bens, 
Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2003) investigate whether the intention of management’s 
stock repurchase was driven by earnings management. Using 500 US firms on S&P rating 
from 1996 to 1999, they find that executives increase their stock repurchase to offset the 
dilutive effect of employee stock options on the one hand, on the other hand, they find 
that US corporate executives increase their stock repurchase when they sense that their 





(vii) Product market competition 
More competitive firms are perceived to be efficient. Thus, in a competitive market, the 
amount by which the market value of stock of efficient firms exceeds that of inefficient 
firms is considered a ‘premium’. Based on this premise, Markarian and Santalo (2014) 
argue that such price differential incentivises the inefficient firms to manage earnings so 
as to appear efficient. Using 70,000 observations from 1989 to 2011, they find a positive 
relationship between competition and both real and accrual earnings management. They 
conclude that this finding is stronger for low performing firms in a competitive market. 
Similarly, Datta, Datta and Singh (2013) argue that the pricing power of a firm affects its 
earnings management potentials. Firstly, firms with weak power are unable to pass on 
cost shocks to customers, hence, they engage in higher earnings management to meet 
market expectations than firms with strong pricing power. Based on this argument, using 
43,628 firm-year observations, they find that firms with weak pricing power engage in 
more discretionary accruals. Mitra, Hossain and Jain (2013) also find a negative 
relationship between a firm’s power to differentiate its product and earnings management. 
Furthermore, Liao and Lin (2016) find a negative relationship between the level 
of market competition in an industry and earnings management based on 3,346 
repurchase announcements. They observe that managers engage in downward accrual 
earnings management to reduce their firm’s share price before a repurchase. Laksmana 
and Yang (2014) examine the effect of product market competition on both accrual and 
real earnings management. Based on 19,462 US firms from 1988 to 2007, they find both 
income-increasing discretionary accrual and income-increasing real earnings 
management to be prevalent among low competition industries than high competition 
industries. Based on this, they submitted that the market consequences of missing 
earnings benchmark are more severe for firms in low competition industries. Liao and 
Lin (2016) extend these studies by considering the relationship between product market 
competition and earnings management around ‘open-market repurchases announcement’ 
(p. 187). Based on 1,321 observations from 1988 to 2007, they find that repurchasing 
firms in competitive industries are associated with less income decreasing accrual and 
real earnings management. 
(viii) Overinvestment by Managers 
When a manager overinvests in prior periods, it creates an expectation in stakeholders of 
higher future returns arising from prior periods’ investments. However, since the future 




stakeholders’ expectations. Based on this assertion, Meo (2014) investigates the effect of 
managers’ overinvestment on earnings management in the US. Using 10,809 firm-year 
observations from 1992 to 2011, he finds managers’ overinvestment in prior periods to 
be related to earnings management in future periods. In a further analysis, he established 
that concealing such inefficient investment decisions through earnings management is 
associated with long-tenure CEOs. 
(ix) Family ownership 
Family ownership affects earnings management from two main theoretical viewpoints- 
agency argument and stewardship argument. From the agency perspective, Prencipe, 
Markarian and Pozza (2008) argue that the close tie between the board and the controlling 
family as well as the orientation of the controlling family to continue to control the firm, 
perhaps into perpetuity, make family firms less susceptible to short-term manipulation of 
earnings for capital market purposes. From the stewardship perspective, family members’ 
relationship with lenders coupled with their desire to continually control the firm makes 
family-owned firms engage in earnings management to avoid debt covenant violation.  
Based on this premise, they examine earnings management by family-owned businesses 
in Italy. Using 129 firm-year observations from Milan Stock Exchange, they find that 
family-owned firms engage in earnings management through R&D cost capitalization but 
engage less in income smoothing. 
Wang (2006) examines the effect of family ownership on earnings quality. Using 
S&P 500 firms, he finds family-owned firms to be associated with lower abnormal 
accrual. Similarly, Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007) investigate the earnings 
management behaviour of family-owned firms in the US. Since family-owned firms are 
less reliant on the capital market, they are said to face only type II agency problem 
(separation of ownership and control between family members and minority interest). 
Using Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms from 1998-2002, they find that family-owned 
firms engage less in accrual earnings management than non-family owned firms. 
Achleitner, Gunther, Kaserer and Siciliano (2014) investigate how family firms 
use real earnings management and accrual earnings management in Germany based on 
socio-emotional wealth theory. Using a sample of 402 listed family firms and 436 listed 
non-family firms, they find that family firms avoid the use of real earnings management 
so that the value of the family business is not eroded in the future. This is in a bid to have 




engage in income decreasing accrual earnings management to retain their value within 
the firm. 
Ding, Qu and Zhuang (2011) investigate the earnings quality of publicly listed 
family-owned firms in China. Using a sample of 1,542 observations from 2003 - 2006, 
they find that family-owned firms exhibit higher discretionary accrual. They attributed 
the findings to the low investor protection in China, which allows controlling family 
members to expropriate minority shareholders. Similarly, Razzaque, Ali and Mather 
(2014) investigate the use of real earnings management by family-owned firms in 
Bangladesh, an environment with less investors’ protection. Using 691 firm-year 
observations from 2006 to 2011, they find that family-owned firms engage more in real 
earnings management than non-family owned firms. As this is in contrast to Achleitner 
et al.’s (2014) result, they explain that this may be due to institutional differences.  
Bertin and Itturiaga (2014), using a sample of 3,559 listed firms in the UK, 
Canada, US, Spain, Italy and France, find that the higher the challenge to the control of 
family shareholders, the lesser the degree of earnings management. 
(x) CEO overconfidence  
Overconfidence is the tendency of individuals to overestimate their knowledge, abilities 
and the precision of their information, which creates an expectation of unrealistic outcome 
(Bhandari and Deaves, 2006). Based on this notion, Hsieh, Bedard and Johnstone (2014) 
argue that overconfident CEOs may discountenance regulatory restrictions (in this case, 
SOX) and set unrealistic targets, which they may try to meet through earnings 
management. Using 5,319 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2009, they find that CEO 
overconfidence is associated with both accrual and real earnings management. In Taiwan, 
Li and Hung (2013) examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on earnings 
management with family ownership as a moderating variable. Using 6,661 firm-year 
observations from 2001-2009, they find that managerial overconfidence is positively 
associated with earnings management and family ownership negatively moderates this 
relationship.  
Furthermore, Schrand and Zechman (2012) examine the effect of overconfidence 
on earnings management in the US. They compare 36 misreporting firms according to 
SEC with a matched sample. They find that managerial over confidence creates optimistic 
bias, which sets such management on a ‘slippery slope’ of subsequent misreporting to 
continually meet earnings target. This study is complemented by the research of Hribar 




optimistic bias and consequently earnings management. Using a sample of 640 firms 
listed on the Fortune 500 from 2000 to 2007, they find that managerial overconfidence 
creates optimistic bias in voluntary management forecast which leads to increased 
likelihood of missing forecasts and hence, resulting in earnings management. 
(xi) Other CEO related factors 
Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata (2012) argue that forced CEO turnover is an indication of 
board disciplinary action against CEOs engaging in accounting manipulations before it 
leads to costly market actions. They find a positive relationship between forced CEO 
turnover and earnings management, using a sample of 1,895 CEO turnovers. Choi, Kwak 
and Choe (2014) extend the empirical support for the effect of CEO turnover on earnings 
management. Using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers with a control sample of 806 non-
turnovers, they find that CEOs that are dismissed are associated with higher earnings 
management, while incoming CEOs (from within the firm), following such dismissal, are 
associated with lower real and accrual earnings management. On the other hand, where a 
CEO peacefully departs from the firm, the replacing CEO from outside the firm engages 
in upward management of earnings.  
Social ties are informal relationships between individuals or groups arising from 
prior or present employment, education, and other activities (e.g. club membership). 
Krishnan, Raman, Yang and Yu (2012) investigate the influence of social ties between 
CEO/CFO and the other board members on earnings management in the US. They argue 
that the oversight function of the board is weakened in the presence of social ties, as 
independence could be jeopardised. Using a sample of 1,300 firms from 2000-2007, they 
find that a social tie between CEO/CFO and other board members is positively related to 
earnings management. Similarly, Hwang and Kim (2012) investigate the impact of social 
ties between CEOs and audit committee members on earnings management. Using 954 
firm-year observations from 1996 to 2005, they find a significant positive relationship 
between CEOs’ connection with audit committees and discretionary accrual. 
The origin of a CEO is another determinant of earnings management. The 
argument arises partly from the decision horizon hypothesis (Dechow and Sloan, 1991), 
which holds that top managers who perceive their tenure as limited may not act in the 
best interest of the firm. It is assumed that outside CEOs have less survival expectation 
(Allgood and Farrell, 2003) caused by hostility from inside managers and the lack of 
knowledge of the firm, which may result in low performance of the outside CEO. There 




CEO, which may be unrealistic. Thus, the outside CEO is under pressure to show his/her 
worth by achieving high profit. When this is coupled with the horizon problem, it may 
lead the outside CEO to engage in earnings management at the earlier stage of their 
tenure. Against this background, Kuang, Qin and Wielhouwer (2014) investigate how the 
origin of CEOs impacts on their earnings management behaviour. That is, whether 
CEOs/CFOs from within the firm engage more in earnings management than those from 
outside the firm, especially at the early stage of their tenure. Using 5,607 CEO-year 
observations from1992-2008, they find that outside CEO are associated with income-
increasing accrual at the early stage of their career. However, the difference between 
outside and inside CEOs’ earnings management practices evens out after the short-run. 
Regarding CEO tenure, Ali and Zhang (2015) investigate the association between 
CEO tenure and accrual earnings management. They argue that earnings reported by 
CEOs at the early stage of their service has a great significance on the market’s 
assessment of their ability as new CEOs, and as such, CEOs tend to manage earnings to 
meet this expectation. Using 20,206 firm-year observations from 1992–2010, they find 
that CEOs at the early years of their career tend to overstate earnings than at the later 
years. After controlling for early years’ overstatement of earnings, they find that CEOs 
overstate earnings towards the end of their tenure, thus confirming the horizon problem. 
Chen, Luo, Tang and Tong (2015) also conducted a study on whether interim 
CEOs engage in earnings management in the hope that good performance achieved by 
managing earnings will elevate them to a permanent position. Using 145 interim CEO 
succession events in the US from 2004-2008, they find that interim CEOs are more likely 
to engage in income-increasing discretionary accruals and that this likelihood of engaging 
in earnings management raises the likelihood of being promoted as permanent CEOs. 
Arguing that the debt component of executive compensation affects earnings 
management tendencies of management, Dhole, Manchiraju, Suk (2016) examine the 
impact of CEO inside debt37 on earnings management. Using 4,845 firm-year 
observations, they find that CEO inside debt reduces accrual and real earnings 
management. 
(xii) Gender diversity in the board 
Arun, Almahrog and Aribi (2015) investigate the influence of board diversity on earnings 
management in the UK. Using 1,217 firm-year observations from 2005-2011, they find 
boards with higher females and boards with independent female directors to be less 
                                                             




associated with discretionary earnings management. The idea of the research stems from 
the fact that females are less aggressive, more ethical and risk averse. Thus, they are more 
unlikely to engage in earnings management. They also exhibit more monitoring and better 
communication to investors (Adams, Gray, and Nowland, 2010). Similarly, Srinidhi, Gul 
and Tsui (2011) studied the impact of diversity on earnings quality of US firms. Using 
2,480 firm-year observations from 2001-2007, they find firms with female directors to be 
associated with less discretionary accruals. Kyaw, Olugbode and Petracci (2015) 
investigate the effect of gender diversity of companies’ board on the degree of earnings 
management. Using a sample of 970 companies from all European countries from 2002 
to 2013, they find that gender diversity in the board is associated with lower earnings 
management. 
On the contrary, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) examine the association between 
gender diversity in audit committee and earnings management. Using 320 firms from the 
S&P Small Cap 600 in 2003, they find the presence of female director in audit committee 
to be associated with income-decreasing discretionary accrual. In a similar vein, Ye, 
Zhang and Rezaee (2010) find no significant difference between earnings management 
by boards that have female directors and boards that have no female directors in China. 
They attribute this to the institutional difference between China and other developed 
countries where a negative relationship has been documented. Similarly, Sun, Liu and 
Lan (2011) examine the effect of gender-diverse independent audit committee on 
earnings management. Using 525 firm-year observations of S&P firms from 2003-2005, 
they find no association between the proportions of female directors in audit committee 
and the degree of earnings management. 
(xiii) Board and Audit committee composition 
Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003) investigate the effect of the board and audit committee 
independence as well as the financial expertise of outside directors on earnings 
management of US firms. Using 280 firm-year observations from 1992 to 1996, they find 
independent boards and the financial expertise of outside directors to be associated with 
lower earnings management. Similarly, financial expertise of independent audit 
committee members is associated with lower earnings management. Park and Shin (2004) 
also investigate the effect of board independence and financial expertise on earnings 
management in Canada. Using 539 firm-year observations from 1991-1997, they 
conclude that board independence does not constrain abnormal accruals, but financial 




Regarding audit committee composition, Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) 
examine the effect of board independence and audit committee on earnings management 
towards meeting analysts’ earnings forecast, avoiding reporting losses, and reporting a 
growth in profit. Using 1,991 firm-year observations of UK listed firms from 1993 to 
1996, they find board independence to be negatively related to income-decreasing accrual 
earnings management, while audit committee does not exert any influence on earnings 
management. Ghosh, Marra and Moon (2010) find board size and audit committee size 
to be negatively associated with discretionary accruals based on 9,290 observations. 
Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2005) examine the effect of audit committee 
financial expertise and independence on income-decreasing and income-increasing 
abnormal accruals in two groups (one with relatively high accruals, and the other with 
relatively low abnormal accruals) of US firms in 1996. They find audit committee 
independence and financial expertise to be negatively associated with income-increasing 
and income-decreasing abnormal accruals respectively. 
The ability of audit committee to constrain opportunistic earnings management of 
managers is influenced by their financial expertise as well as their relative status (ability 
to influence outcome based on perceived personal attributes and skills) compared to the 
board. Based on this assumption, Badolato, Donelson and Ege (2014) examine the effect 
of status and financial expertise of audit committees on accounting irregularities and 
discretionary accrual in the US. Using 29,073 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, 
they find that audit committee with financial expertise and higher relative status is 
associated with lower accounting irregularities and abnormal accrual. The idea of this 
study primarily stems from the fact that the ability of the audit committee to check 
management excesses is dependent on the respect they command from the management 
and also their level of financial expertise. 
(xiv) External auditor and earnings management 
Gul, Jaggi and Krishnan (2007), using a sample of 4,720 US firms from 2000 to 2001, 
find that audit fees, as a proxy of auditor independence, is positively related to positive 
discretionary current accrual for short-tenured auditors.  
Gul, Fung and Jaggi (2009) investigate the impact of auditor tenure on earnings 
quality. The argument stems from the fact that short-tenured auditors usually do not have 
firm-specific knowledge at inception and may have to rely on information supplied by 
the client, which may hinder high-quality audit and hence, lower accounting quality. 




may be unwilling to retain the client can also lead to lower accounting quality. Thirdly, 
high-quality auditors will probably drop low quality clients. Using 32,777 firm-year 
observations from 2000-2004, they find that shorter audit tenure is associated with higher 
discretionary accruals. 
Ittonen, Vahamaa and Vahamaa (2013) examine the effect of a female external 
auditor on firms’ earnings management. The idea stems from the fact that female auditors 
are more effective and accurate at processing information (Chung and Monroe, 2001), 
and display greater efficiency in audit judgement (O’Donnell and Johnson, 2001). Using 
770 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2007, they find that female audit engagement 
partners are associated with smaller abnormal accruals.  
(xv) Geographic dispersion/diversification and earnings management 
Geographically diverse firms have larger investor base. Thus, they are under watch by 
more investors, analysts, and regulatory institutions. The use of AEM by these firms has 
a higher probability of being detected. Hence, they may choose to engage in real activities 
manipulation, which is more difficult to discover. On this basis, Shi, Sun and Luo (2015) 
investigate the effect of geographic dispersion of firms on their choice of accrual or real 
earnings management in the US. Using 51,077 firm-year observations from 1994-2011, 
they find that geographically diverse firms use more manipulation of real activities than 
discretionary accruals when compared to geographically concentrated firms. 
Agency conflict hypothesis holds that complexity of an organisation and likely 
agency gains influence managers’ ability to manipulate earnings. Mehdi and Seboui 
(2011) confirmed this notion using 9,888 firm-year observations of US firms. In line with 
transparency hypothesis, Rodríguez-Pérez and Hemmen (2010) argue that for more 
complex businesses, as a result of diversification, debt has a positive relationship with 
positive discretionary accrual. They based this conclusion on an analysis of 2,893 firm-
year observations. Vasilescu and Milo (2016) examine the impact of industrial 
diversification on earnings management. Contrary to geographic diversification and using 
229 UK target firms in a merger and acquisition arrangement, they find a negative 
relationship between industrial diversification and earnings management. This agrees 
with the conclusion of Jiraporn, Kim and Mathur (2008) from 846 firm-year observation.  
(xvi) Corporate social responsibility and earnings management 
Kim, Park and Wier (2012) argue that socially responsible firms should equally exhibit 
their social responsibility by holding unto the highest level of ethical standards in their 




stakeholders. Based on this argument, they investigate the impact of corporate social 
responsibility on accrual and real earnings management of US firms. Using 18,160 firm-
year observations from 1991 to 2009, they find that ‘CSR firms’ are less likely to manage 
earnings through discretionary accruals as well as real activities manipulation. Bozzolan, 
Fabrizi, Mallin and Michelon (2015) examine the influence of CSR orientation of firms 
on the trade-off between real earnings management and accrual earnings management. 
Using 5863firm-year observations, they find that CSR firms substitute AEM for REM. 
This is based on the fact that REM is a manipulation of a firm’s business activities and 
may have future adverse effect on the firm. In the same vein, Gras-Gil, Manzano and 
Fernandez (2016) find a negative association between corporate social responsibility and 
earnings management in Spain. They arrived at this conclusion from their analysis of 286 
firm-year observations from 2005 to 2012. 
(xvii) Credit-rating and reputation 
Brown, Chen and Kim (2015) considered the impact of credit rating by S&P (Standard & 
Poor) on the real earnings management behaviour of manufacturing firms in the US. 
Based on 6,402 firm-year observations from 1989 to 2009, they find that manufacturing 
firms at the investment-speculative borderline (BBB and BB) engage in the most 
aggressive income-increasing real activities manipulation. 
Wu, Gao and Li (2016) examine the impact of reputation through media coverage 
on earnings management. Using 2,556 firm-year observations, they find media coverage 
to be positively related to earnings management.  
(xviii)  Fiscal support 
Fiscal support in the form of preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy reduces the 
pressure on a firm to engage in earnings management (He, 2016), as this substitutes 
earnings management in helping a firm meet the desired earnings benchmark. In the 
context of China, He (2016) explored this assertion. Using a sample of 3,290 firm-year 
observations, he finds a negative relationship between fiscal support and earnings 
management.  
(xix) Share reform  
Kuo, Ning and Song (2014) examine the effect of split share structure reform on earnings 
management in China. The split share structure reform involves the separation of Chinese 
companies’ shares into tradable and non-tradable, with two-third of the former being held 




Using 13,840 firm-year observations, they find that the reform constrained the use of 
discretionary accruals but increased the use of real earnings management. 
(xx) Non-controlling interest, shareholder activism and venture capitalist 
When controlling shareholders manage earnings in such a way that non-controlling 
shareholders’ interest is not jeopardised, opportunistic earnings management is more 
pronounced, as controlling shareholders face less opposition from non-controlling 
shareholders. Based on this notion, Beuselinck and Deloof (2014) find that signed 
discretionary accruals facilitated by intra-group transactions are pronounced in group 
firms based on 5,084 firm-year observations.  
Hadani, Goranova and Khan (2011) argue that increased pressure on the 
management, through shareholder activism, may influence the management to manage 
earnings. Based on this notion, they conducted a study using 348 firms from the S&P 500. 
They find a positive relationship between shareholder activism and earnings 
management.  
Venture capitalist serve as external monitoring agents that influence earnings 
management of companies around IPO. Wongsunwai (2013) investigates this notion and 
find a negative relationship among accrual and real earnings management and high-
quality venture capitalist. 
(xxi) Research and development expenditure 
Research and Development creates earnings volatility, which managers generally 
perceive as unfavourable. To avoid this, management may engage in the management of 
accruals. Based on this notion, Shust (2015) find a positive relationship between accrual 
earnings management and R&D expenditure based on 77,003 firm-year observations. 
(xxii) Causal reasoning 
Management commentaries in companies’ annual reports incorporate explanations of 
companies’ performance and future prospects. In recent times, such causal explanations 
by management have been accentuated by the demands of IASB and FASB. Aerts and 
Zhang (2014) argue that management use commentary as an impression management tool 
aimed at increasing “perceived plausibility of reported performance and mitigate 
performance related concerns” (p. 770). On this note, using 26,297 firm-year 
observations, they find a positive relationship between signed discretionary accrual and 





(xxiii) Meeting dividend thresholds     
Managing earnings towards meeting dividend threshold (expected dividend proxied by 
prior year dividend) may be motivated by debt covenants that restrict the payment of 
dividends relative to the level of earnings. This is confirmed by Daniel, Denis and Naveen 
(2008) among S&P 1500 firms in the US. Atieh and Hussain (2012) on the other hand, 
find that UK firms similarly use accrual earnings management to meet dividend 
thresholds.  However, they argue that such behaviour in the UK context is motivated by 
the prevalent use of dividend-based accounting ratios (e.g., dividend cover) in decision 
making.  
(xxiv) Comparability of reports 
Sohn (2016) examine the influence of comparability of firms’ report with other firms in 
the US on real and accrual earnings management. Using a sample of 32,211 firm-year 
observations they find that firms’ reports comparability is negatively related to accrual 
earnings management and positively related to real earnings management. 
(xxv) Leverage and earnings management 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2017) examine the effect of leverage on the trade-off 
between accrual earnings management and real earnings management. Using a sample of 
9,855 and 85,305 suspect and non-suspect firms’ firm-year observations, respectively, 
they find real earnings management to be positively related to leverage. However, at a 
very high leverage level, firms adopt a mix of real and accrual earnings management. 
(xxvi) Transparency and earnings management 
Liu, Hsu and Li (2015) examine the effect of information disclosure and transparency 
ranking system on earnings management in Taiwan. Based on 8,093 firm-year 
observations, they find a negative relationship between both accrual and real earnings 
management and information disclosure and transparency ranking. 
Transparency in disclosure is argued to be signalled by a detailed description of 
reserves and allowances in the financial statement. Based on this understanding, Cassell, 
Myers and Siedel (2015) examine the relationship between detailed description of 
provision and reserves and discretionary accruals. Using a sample of 5,596 firm-year 
observations, they find higher transparency to be negatively related to accrual-based 





(xxvii) Political competition in the public sector 
In the public sector, in Portuguese municipalities, Ferreira, Carvalho and Pinho (2013) 
examine the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings by local politicians due to 
political competition. Using data from 2002 to 2008, they find political competition to be 
positively related to discretionary accrual. 
(xxviii) Culture and Religion  
Guan and Pourjalali (2010), based on 84,748 firm-year observations, find individualism, 
power distance and masculinity to be positively related to earnings management while 
uncertainty avoidance is negatively related. On the contrary, Zhang, Liang and Sun (2013) 
find collectivism, as opposed to individualism, to be positively related to earnings 
management from an analysis of 41 countries. 
Du (2015) and Du, Jian, Lai, Du and Pei (2015) based on a sample of 12,061 and 
11,357 firm-year observations respectively, find that religion mitigates unethical business 
practices and hence, has a negative relationship with earnings management. 
(xxix) Decentralisation of investment decisions   
Using a sample of 460 firm-year observations, Dhaoui (2008) find the decentralisation of 
R&D decisions to increase information asymmetry and manager’s autonomy, 
consequently increasing earnings management. 
(xxx) Cash flow volatility  
Using 14,528 firm-year observations, Das, Hong and Kim (2013) find a positive 
relationship between CEO bonus and earnings smoothing. They noted that the increase is 
stronger for firms with higher cash flow volatility. Based on this, they argued that 
earnings management is related to overall expected benefits of the firm and not 
necessarily due to opportunistic behaviour. 
3.6.2 Accounting Conservatism 
Timely loss recognition is an alternative name for conditional accounting conservatism 
(Ruch and Taylor, 2015). Accounting conservatism is defined by Ruch and Taylor (2015) 
as “accounting policies and tendencies that contribute to a downward bias in accounting 
net asset value relative to economic asset value” (p. 20). Accounting conservatism is 
divided into conditional conservatism (timely loss recognition) and unconditional 
conservatism. Conditional conservatism is the timeliness of recognition of bad news 
relative to good news in the financial statement (Mora and Walker, 2015). Accounting 




concept), thus resulting in asymmetric recognition of good news relative to bad news, 
which is called conditional conservatism (Ruch and Taylor, 2015; Mora and Walker, 
2015). Examples of conditional conservatism include recognising inventory at the lower 
of stock or net realisable value, impairment of non-current assets and impairment of 
goodwill (Ruch and Taylor, 2015). A key feature of conditional conservatism that 
distinguishes it from unconditional conservatism is that conditional conservativism is 
economic news dependent while unconditional conservatism does not depend on 
economic news. Conditional conservatism is also called earnings conservatism, ex-post 
conservatism or information-driven conservatism (Mora and Walker, 2015). 
Unconditional conservatism or balance sheet conservatism or ex-ante 
conservatism occurs when assets are stated in the statement of financial position at values 
below their neutral value (Mora and Walker, 2015). Unconditional conservatism can 
either occur through ‘conservative asset recognition criteria’ or ‘conservatism in book 
value’ (Mora and Walker, 2015, p. 623). Conservative asset recognition criteria are used 
when an expenditure that has a likelihood of generating future benefits is not treated as 
an asset in the financial statement but as an expense. An example of this is the research 
cost that is usually expensed, though there is a possibility of it generating some future 
economic benefits. Conservatism in book values is caused by conservative depreciation 
rates. Conservative depreciation rates are depreciation rates that are greater than the 
economic rate of depreciation. Economic rate is depreciation rate that ensures that an 
asset generates a constant accounting rate of return over its useful life. Thus, the use of 
conservative accounting depreciation rate instead of economic rate leads to unconditional 
conservatism. Examples of unconditional conservatism include expensing of research and 
development costs, use of LIFO method of inventory valuation, expensing advertising 
costs, over provision for doubtful debt and the use of accelerated depreciation rates (Ruch 
and Taylor, 2015). 
Conservatism as a measure of accounting quality is largely debated. Depending 
on which perspective it is viewed from, conservatism can be a worthy accounting quality 
or an unworthy one. Generally, from a valuation perspective, which assumes accounting 
information is only relevant for equity valuation and for investment decisions, 
conservatism is an undesirable accounting attribute. However, from a contracting 
perspective, it shows the worst position an organisation can be after deducting all possible 
losses. Hence, the credit worthiness of a firm in such worst scenario can be determined. 
Accounting conservatism is affected by many factors as detailed in empirical 




conservatism. The last two factors (IFRS adoption and enforcement) are discussed in 
section 3.7, since this study is concerned about these two factors and a large body of 
literature exist on them.  

























3.6.2.1 Conservatism and institutional environment 
The idea stems from the fact that a firm’s managerial incentive is largely shaped by the 
institutional environment of the firm’s operation. The institutional environment of a firm 
shapes the quality of accounting number (in this case, conservatism) through the interplay 
























Factors affecting accounting 
conservatism 
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 Private vs public company 
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 Managerial overconfidence 
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discretion exercised by managers” (Bushman and Pitoroski, 2006, p. 108). Based on this 
notion, Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) investigate the difference in the practice of 
accounting conservatism between code law countries and common law countries. They 
argued that the high politicisation of firms’ governance structure in code law countries 
through the representation of contracting agents on firms’ boards reduces information 
asymmetry; hence, public disclosure is deemphasised. In common law countries, on the 
other hand, public disclosure is used to reduce information asymmetry as stakeholders’ 
agents, beside shareholders, are not represented on firms’ boards.  Using 40,359 firm year 
observation from 11 developed countries, they conclude that common law countries are 
characterised by timelier recognition of losses than their code-law counterparts.  
Similarly, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine the relationship between some 
characteristics of country level institutions and conditional conservatism. Using 86,927 
firm-year observations from 38 countries from 1992-2001, they reach the conclusion that 
high-quality judicial system and strong investor protection in a country are associated 
with more timely loss recognition. Furthermore, strong public enforcement (measured as 
the existence of a regulatory body) is positively associated with timely loss recognit ion. 
Also, common law countries with high state involvement are characterised by lower 
timely loss recognition relative to those with lower state involvement. On the contrary, in 
civil law countries, high state involvement is associated with higher timely loss 
recognition. 
3.6.2.2 Private/public company and accounting conservatism 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examine the effect of company type on timely loss 
recognition. The motive for the study stems from the notion that regardless of similar 
regulatory mechanisms, private companies face a different market for financial reporting 
from public companies. They contend that private firms are less likely to use public 
financial statements for contracting with lenders and managers and are more likely to be 
influenced by taxation and dividend policies. Using 141,649 and 6,208 firm-year 
observations of UK private and public firms, respectively, from 1990 to 2000, they find 
that private firms exhibit less timely loss recognition. Similarly, Peek, Cuijpers and 
Buijink (2010) investigate the impact of investors’ protection on accounting 
conservatism. They argue that the information need of investors varies in line with firm 
type (i.e., private or public). Using 141,805 firm-year observations and 16,225 firm-year 




countries, they find public firms’ creditors to be positively associated with accounting 
conservatism.  
3.6.2.3 Ownership and accounting conservatism 
Accounting conservatism is a governance mechanism that obviates information 
asymmetry between a borrower and a lender (Watts, 2003). Lenders have a payoff 
asymmetry in that an increase in future earnings of a firm does not lead to an increase in 
the fixed return that debtholders stand to get from a firm, but a decrease in return 
jeopardises their interest in the firm. Hence, they often want to see a worst-case scenario 
(achieved through conservative accounting) to determine a firm’s ability to payback 
borrowed funds. Based on this notion, Chen, Chen, Lobo and Wang (2010) investigate 
the relationship between the ownership of firms and accounting conservatism on the one 
side, and the relationship between ownership of lenders (banks) and accounting 
conservatism, on the other hand, in China. They argue that lenders face a low rate of 
default risk from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) because such risk is insured by the 
government of China. Hence, SOEs are hypothesised to use less accounting conservative 
practices. However, since there is no alleviation of default risk on the part of nonstate-
owned enterprises, lenders will demand a more conservative accounting. Similarly, they 
argue that state-owned banks are less effective at and less concerned about default risk in 
China, hence, their borrowers are expected to be less conservative. Using 5,433 firm-year 
observations from 2001-2006, they find both SOEs as well as borrowers from state-
owned banks to be associated with lower accounting conservatism.  
Similarly, Cullinan, Wang, Wang and Zhang (2012) investigate the impact of the 
existence of large shareholders on accounting conservatism in China. Managers are 
predicted to serve the interest of large shareholders, who may attempt to expropriate, at 
the expense of the minority who ordinarily demand conservatism. Using 3,646 firm-year 
observations from 2007 to 2009, they find a negative relationship between the percentage 
of shares held by the largest shareholders and accounting conservatism. 
The impact of family ownership on timely loss recognition stems from type II 
agency problem. Such agency problem, which result from the domination of the board by 
family members may lead to expropriation of the wealth of minority interest by these 
members in a similar way that managers expropriate wealth from shareholders in a type 
I agency problem. Based on this notion, Wang (2006) argues from two conflicting 
viewpoints on the effect of family ownership on accounting quality. The entrenchment 




the wealth of minority shareholders. On the other hand, the alignment effect argues that 
the existence of a family member on the board checks the opportunistic behaviour of non-
family managers. Using 4,195 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2002, they find 
family-owned businesses to be associated with higher loss recognition, thus supporting 
the alignment effect.  
Ding, Qu and Zhang (2011) examine the impact of family ownership on timely loss 
recognition in China. Using, 542 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2006, they find that 
family firms do not recognise losses in a timelier fashion relative to non-family firms. In 
the same vein, Chen, Chen and Cheng (2014), examine the relationship between non-
CEO family ownership (i.e., where family members are not the CEO) on accounting 
conservatism in the US. Using 8,264 firm-years for 1,204 unique S&P 1500 firms from 
1996 to 2005, they find a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and non-
CEO family ownership. 
3.6.2.4 Board gender and accounting conservatism 
Francis, Hassan, Park and Wu (2015) investigate the impact of CEO gender on accounting 
conservatism based on the argument that females are more risk averse than men and 
would generally adopt a more conservative accounting policy and choice than men. Using 
974 firm-year observations with 92 cases of male to female transitions from 1988 to 2007, 
they find that female CEO exhibit more conservative accounting practices. Investigating 
more specifically, the risk aversion of female CEO, they analysed the sensitivity of female 
CEOs to four types of risk - default risk, litigation risk, management turnover risk and 
systematic risk. They further find that female CEOs’ conservatism is more significant 
when a firm’s exposure to the aforementioned risks is high. 
Furthermore, Krishnan and Parson (2008) examine the impact of board gender 
diversity on accounting conservatism. Using 776 firm-year observations of Fortune 500 
companies from 1996-2000, they find that higher gender diversity is associated with 
higher accounting conservatism.  
3.6.2.5 Managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism 
Overconfidence of managers often leads to optimistic estimate of earnings. Often, these 
forecast earnings are difficult to achieve and managers try to use some accounting 
manipulations to guard against missing these forecasts. One of the means by which they 
do this is to adopt less conservative accounting practices. In line with this thought, Ahmed 
and Duellman (2013) investigate the impact of managerial overconfidence on accounting 




managerial overconfidence is significantly and negatively associated with accounting 
conservatism. 
3.6.2.6 Lender representation on board and accounting conservatism 
Information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower necessitates the need for 
conservative accounting (Watts, 2003; Ball, Robin and Sadka, 2008). Any ‘better’ means 
of obviating this information asymmetry may lead to less reliance on conservative 
accounting. Given this view point, Erkens, Subramanian and Zhang (2014) examine the 
impact of ‘affiliated banker on board’ on accounting conservatism. They opine that the 
representation of a lender on the board of a borrower (tagged affiliated banker on board) 
remove the information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower that would have 
hitherto necessitated the demand for conservative accounting by the lender. Based on this, 
they hypothesised that affiliated banker on board is negatively related to accounting 
conservatism. Using 6,481 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2006, they find that firms 
with affiliated bankers on board have less conservative accounting than those without 
affiliated bankers on board. 
3.6.2.7 Accounting conservatism and social performance  
Organisations are embodiments of stakeholders with conflicting interests. Nonetheless, 
balancing these conflicting interests such that all stakeholders are satisfied is perceived 
as a higher corporate social performance (Clarkson, 1995). One way of ensuring such 
balance is to ensure the resources of a firm are not excessively transferred to a single 
stakeholder body (Clarkson, 1995). This can be achieved through conservative 
accounting, as timely recognition of losses and the deferment of the recognition of profits 
prevents excess distribution of profits to managers and shareholders (Watt, 2003). Based 
on this premise, Francis, Harrast, Mattingly and Olsen (2013) examine the relationship 
between corporate social performance and accounting conservatism. Using 1,465 firm-
year observations from 1998 to 2002, they find that higher corporate social performance 
is related to higher accounting conservatism. 
Similarly, in Taiwan, Cheng and Kung (2015) investigate the impact of mandatory 
corporate social responsibility on conservatism. They argue that socially responsible 
firms should equally display their social responsibility in their accounting practices. 
Using 4,367 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009, they find that social performance 





3.6.2.8 Internal control and accounting conservatism 
Internal controls are mechanisms used by the management to ensure that financial reports 
are true and fair and that the organisation is working the way it purports to work. 
According to Goh and Li (2011), higher accounting conservatism is predicted to be an 
output of a strong internal control.  Thus, they examine the influence of internal control 
quality on accounting conservatism. Using 7,547 firm-year observations from 2003 to 
2005, they find that firms with strong internal controls have higher conservative 
accounting while firms with weak internal controls have lower conservative accounting.  
3.6.2.9 Customer and supplier bargaining power and accounting conservatism 
Customers and suppliers of a firm are usually concerned about their downside risk, which 
is the potential loss a customer or supplier may suffer in the event of a change in the 
present condition of the firm they demand from or supply to. For example, a supplier will 
want to know whether a contract of supplies to be made to a firm will not be truncated by 
a change in the firm’s condition from the present. Accounting conservatism reduces this 
risk through timely recognition of losses, which shows the worst scenario of a firm at a 
point in time. Based on this viewpoint, Hui, Klasa and Yeung (2012) examine the 
relationship between a firm’s customers and suppliers’ bargaining power and accounting 
conservatism. Using COMPUSTAT manufacturing firms from 1995-2007, they find that 
a positive association exist between customers and suppliers’ bargaining power and a 
firm’s timely recognition of losses. 
3.6.2.10 Managerial ownership, legal liability, and accounting conservatism 
Conservatism is arguably an efficient contracting mechanism for reducing the agency 
problem arising from the separation of ownership between managers and shareholders 
(Type I agency problem) (Watt, 2003). The degree of ownership of a firm’s share by its 
managers should therefore be negatively related to accounting conservativism since 
managerial ownership reduces the separation of ownership between managers and 
shareholders. Based on this assumption, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) find, using 
14,786 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2004, that managerial ownership is 
negatively associated with accounting conservatism. However, Shuto and Takada (2010) 
observe that this result is subject to variation in line with the degree of managerial 
ownership (i.e., low, medium, and high), in a Japanese context. Using 27,448 firm-year 
observations from 1991 to 2005, they find that low and high managerial ownership are 




level of managerial ownership, however, a positive association exist with accounting 
conservatism. 
Watt (2003) explains that potential litigations may prevent a firm from overstating 
its net assets as against understating it. However, when such potential litigation is insured, 
managers are less likely to be conservative. Based on this notion, Chung and Wynn (2008) 
investigate the impact of managerial legal liability coverage on accounting conservatism 
in Canada. Using 1,015 firm-year observations of listed firms on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange from 1998 to 2004, they find that managerial legal liability coverage is 
negatively associated with accounting conservatism. 
3.6.2.11 Auditor tenure and accounting conservatism 
Jenkins and Velury (2008) examine the impact of audit tenure on accounting 
conservatism. Using 86,914 firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004, they find the 
length of auditor tenure to be positively associated with accounting conservatism. Li 
(2010) investigate this further by distinguishing the association of auditor tenure with 
accounting conservatism between small and large firms. They argue that large firms are 
closely monitored by their auditors than small firms. Hence, this may account for a 
positive association between auditor tenure and accounting conservatism in large firms 
alone. Using 82,663 firm-year observations from 1980 to 2004, they find the positive 
association between auditor tenure and accounting conservatism to be only attributable to 
large firms. For small firms, they find a significantly negative association. 
3.6.2.12 National culture and accounting conservatism 
Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2014) argue that the recent financial crisis was caused by 
‘culture and excessive risk-taking’ (p. 1116). Based on this argument, they investigate the 
effect of national culture on accounting conservatism in the banking industry in the US. 
They posit that societies characterised by individualism are associated with high risk-
taking, self-orientation, autonomy, overconfidence, and a lack of concern for other 
stakeholders’ welfare. On the other hand, societies characterised by collectivism are more 
risk-averse. From a sample of 65 countries from 2000 to 2006, they find individualism to 
be negatively associated with conservatism while collectivism is positively associated 
with accounting conservatism. This finding corroborates an earlier study by Salter, Kang, 
Dotti and Doupnik (2013). Using a sample of 89,481 firm-year observations from 1989 
to 2006 for 22 countries, they find that collectivism and femininity are positively 




3.6.2.13 Takeover protection and accounting conservatism 
The protection of managers against takeover has the potential of entrenching managers in 
a firm such that they now pursue their goals at the expense of the firm’s. From this view 
point, Zhao and Chen (2008) examine the impact of takeover protection on accounting 
conservatism. Using 6,498 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2002, they find that 
takeover protection is negatively associated with timely recognition of losses. 
3.6.2.14 Cross-listing and accounting conservatism 
Cross-listed firms face various regulations from different stock markets. Hence, they are 
expected to show higher accounting quality. Using this understanding, Huijgen and 
Lubberink (2005) investigate the accounting conservatism practices of UK cross-listed 
firms in the US stock market and those not cross listed. They concluded from their 
investigation that UK firms cross listed in the US are more conservative than firms not 
cross listed. 
3.6.3 Earnings Persistence 
Earnings persistence is the autocorrelation of earnings (Lipe, 1990), that is, the ability of 
the preceding year earnings to determine succeeding year earnings. Persistent earnings 
are deemed sustainable and more useful as input into discounted cash-flow equity 
valuation models (Lipe, 1990). According to Sloan (1996), persistence of earnings is 
more informative and value relevant. Hence, based on this notion, more persistent 
earnings are deemed to be of higher quality. Below is the earnings persistence model: 
                                                𝐸𝑡+1 =  𝛼 +  𝛿𝐸𝑡 +  𝑡    (3.1) 
Where: 𝐸𝑡+1 = next year’s earnings;  𝐸𝑡 = current year earnings; 𝛿 = persistence 
Earning is further decomposed into accrual and cash flow component thus:  
                                𝐸𝑡+1 =  𝛼 +  𝛿𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 +  𝐶𝐹𝑡 +  𝑡+1   (3.2) 
Accrual components of earnings are less persistent (due to greater subjectivity), 
while cash flow components are more persistent (Sloan, 1996). However, investors don’t 
distinguish between the two, they fixate on earnings instead (Sloan, 1996). This is called 
accrual anomaly. Based on this argument, Xie (2001) investigates the market pricing of 
abnormal or discretionary accrual despite its lower persistence and hence, lower quality. 
He finds that the market over estimates the persistence of abnormal accrual and 




market’s inability to capture the lesser persistence of accrual measure and suggest that 
the market inefficiency is due to inventory changes. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) extend Sloan’s (1996) model. They argue that accrual 
involves discretion and estimation error by management; the higher the estimation error 
in accrual, the lower the quality of accrual and hence, earnings. They conclude that 
accrual quality is positively related to earnings persistence and accrual quality can be 
observed from its volatility as well as earnings volatility. 
Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2003) draws an alternative explanation for the 
lesser persistence of accrual component of earnings as compared to the cash component. 
They explain that the lesser persistence of accrual could be due to diminishing marginal 
returns to new investment opportunities, which leads to lower economic profits because 
of dwindling prices, accounting conservatism or managerial discretion. 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) extend Sloan’s model by 
decomposing accrual into short and long-term components of operating assets and 
liabilities and into financial and operating component. They find short-term components 
to be less persistent compared to the long-term component. Similarly, operating accruals 
are less persistent compared to financial.  
3.6.3.1 Accrual anomaly 
Soares and Stark (2009) investigate the existence of accrual anomaly i.e., the overpricing 
of the persistence of accrual and the under-pricing of the persistence of the cash 
component of earnings in the UK stock market. Using Sloan’s (1990) model, they find 
accrual anomaly to exist, which is consistent with prior studies. Accrual anomaly is not 
confined to only stock markets, it also exists in bond markets (Bhojraj and Swaminathan, 
2009).  
Pincus, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2007) investigate whether accrual anomaly 
is a global phenomenon i.e., whether the observed anomaly can be linked to a country’s 
accounting and institutional infrastructure. In their research into 20 countries, existence 
of accrual anomaly is generally documented. They find that common law countries 
particularly exhibit accrual anomaly than code law countries.  
Dechow, Richardson and Sloan (2008) investigate the persistence of subcomponent 
of earnings and their implication for investor pricing. To do this, they decomposed cash 
component of earnings into three components: changes in cash balance, cash distributed 
to equity shareholders and cash distributed to debtholders. They find that higher 




equity holders. However, the persistence of other components of cash is not different from 
that of accrual. Thus, they conclude that investors correctly price distribution to equity 
and debtholders but misprice cash balance changes, similar to accrual. 
Chen and Shane (2014) investigate the persistence of cash subcomponent of 
earnings. Change in cash balance, as in Dechow et al. (2008), was further decomposed 
into normal and abnormal components. They find that abnormal decrease in cash have 
higher persistence than abnormal increase, and every other component of earnings.  
Artikis and Papanastasopoulos (2016) investigate the persistence of cash 
component of earnings in the UK. By decomposing into change in cash balance, 
distribution to equity and debtholders (as in Dechow et al. (2008)), they find that higher 
persistence of cash component of earnings is attributable to distribution to equity holders. 
Changes in cash balance and distribution to debtholders are of the same persistence level 
with the accrual component of earnings. Debt and equity issuances are well priced by 
investors, while the change in cash balance is mispriced. 
3.6.3.2 Consequences of earnings persistence 
Baber, Kang and Kumar (1998) investigate the implication of earnings persistence for 
executive compensation as an attempt to attenuate the horizon problem38. Based on 
efficient contracting and using a cross-sectional analysis of 713 US CEO pays in 1992 
and 1993, they find that earnings persistence is positively related to executive pay, 
especially when executives are nearing retirement. Furthermore, Nwaeze, Yang and Yin 
(2006) investigate the implication of earnings persistence for executive compensation. 
Using cash flow persistence as a proxy for earnings persistence, they find that persistent 
earnings are used in determining executive compensation. 
Higher quality earnings should not just be able to predict next year’s earnings but 
the future stream of cash flows (Dechow et al., 2010).  Therefore, some researchers have 
examined if current cash flow is a better determinant of future cash flow than current 
earnings, by investigating the best valuation model for firms. Penman and Sougiannis 
(1998) analyse the best valuation model from amongst accrual earnings technique, 
discounted cash flow techniques, and dividend discounting techniques. They find that 
accrual earnings technique has the least valuation error, thus, making earnings more value 
relevant than cash-flow. Dechow and Ge (2006) investigate the magnitude and the sign 
of accrual on earnings persistence. They find that persistence of earnings relative to cash 
                                                             
38 Horizon problem refers to a situation where managers invest in short-term investments that are optimal 
investments for their own personal gains (for example, where compensations are linked to returns) but are 




flow is higher for high accrual firms and lower for low accrual firms, with the latter 
mainly driven by special items.  
3.6.3.3 Factors affecting earnings persistence 
Li (2008) investigates the readability of firms’ annual report and its impact on earnings 
persistence. They find that firms whose annual reports are easier to read have more 
earnings persistence. Dichev and Tang (2009) examine the impact of earnings volatility 
in predicting earnings persistence. They find that earnings with high volatility have low 
persistence, while earnings with low volatility have high persistence. Chen, Folsom, Paek 
and Sami (2014) investigate the effect of accounting conservatism on earnings persistence 
in the US. They find that higher conservatism generates less persistent earnings, while 
lower conservatism generates higher persistence. 
Ge (2007), in his investigation of the implication of off-balance sheet operating 
leases for earnings prediction, find that off-balance sheet operating leases lead to reduced 
future earnings. He concludes that investors do not correctly estimate the implications of 
off-balance sheet operating lease. Similarly, Lee (2010) investigates whether change in 
purchase obligation has an effect on firms’ performance. He finds that change in purchase 
obligation is positively associated with future sales and earnings.  
Figure 3.7 summarises the consequences of and factors affecting earnings 
persistence as discussed above. IFRS adoption and enforcement are discussed in section 
3.7, since the two are the primary factors affecting earnings persistence that this study 
will be examining. 








Consequences of earnings persistence 
 Persistent earnings increase executive 
compensation 
 Persistent earnings are more value-relevant 
Factors affecting earnings persistence 
 Readability of annual reports 
 Off-balance sheet items 
 Change in purchase obligation 





3.7 Review of Empirical Evidence and the Development of Hypotheses 
3.7.1 IFRS Adoption and Earnings Management 
Barth et al. (2008) investigate the effect of IAS adoption on earnings management in 21 
countries. Based on 1,896 firm year observations from 1994 to 2003, they find that IAS 
adoption is associated with less earnings management in the 21 countries examined. 
Similarly, Chen, et al. (2010) investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on accounting 
quality in 15 European Union countries. Based on 21,707 firm-year observations from 
2000 to 2007, they find that IFRS adoption leads to a reduction in earnings management 
in the 15 EU countries. 
In Greece, Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on 
earnings management. Based on a sample of 254 firms from 2004 to 2006, they find that 
IFRS adoption is associated with lower earnings management in Greece. 
Across Europe, Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) examine the effect of IFRS 
adoption on income smoothing in 90 European banks. They find that IFRS significantly 
reduces income smoothing among the sampled European banks. In the same vein, Zeghal, 
Chtourou and Fourati (2012) examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings 
quality in 15 EU countries. Based on a sample of 1,547 firms from 2001 to 2008, they 
find that earnings management was less in countries whose GAAP exhibit high 
divergence from IFRS.  
Chua et al. (2012) investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management in Australia. Using 1,376 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2009, they 
find that income smoothing subsequent to IFRS adoption has reduced in Australia. 
In China Zhou, Xiong and Ganguli (2009) examine the impact of IFRS adoption 
on earnings management. Based on 3,298 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2000, they 
find that IFRS adoption is associated with less earnings management in China. Similarly, 
based on a sample of 870 firms with 3240 firm-year observations, Liu, Yao, Hiu and Liu 
(2011) find that IFRs adoption is associated with reduced earnings management in China.  
Wan Ismail, Kamarudin, Zijl and Dunstan (2013) examine the impact of IFRS 
adoption on earnings management in Malaysia. Based on 4010 firm-year observations 
from 2002 to 2009, they find that IFRS adoption is associated with lower earnings 
management in Malaysia. 
Lourenco, Branco and Curto (2015) investigate the impact of partial and full 
adoption of IFRS on earnings management in Brazil. Based on a sample of 380 firms with 




adoption of IFRS (2008-2009) is not associated with a decrease in earnings management 
but full adoption (2010-2011) is significantly negatively related to earnings management.  
On the contrary, many studies find a negative relationship between IFRS and 
earnings management. Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) investigate the impact of 
voluntary IFRS adoption on earnings management in Germany. Based on 636 firm-year 
observations from 1991 to 2001, they find that voluntary IFRS adoption does not 
constrain earnings management in Germany. Similarly, Pannenin and Lin (2009) examine 
the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings quality in Germany. Based on 839 firm-year 
observations from 2000 to 2006, they find that earnings management increased following 
IFRS adoption in Germany. Christensen, Lee, Walker and Zeng (2015) investigate the 
impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management in Germany. Using a sample of 743 
observations from 1998 to 2005, they find that earnings management (through earnings 
smoothing and targeting of small positive earnings) reduced after IFRS adoption for firms 
that voluntarily adopted IFRS, based on their level of incentives. However, earnings 
management of mandatory adopters of IFRS did not reduce following IFRS adoption. 
Thus, they conclude that incentives to improve accounting quality rather than IFRS 
adoption leads to improved accounting quality.  
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on earnings management in Australia, UK and France. Using 5,051 firm-year 
observations across the three countries, they find that the pervasiveness of earnings 
management did not reduce after IFRS adoption. In the same vein, Callao and Jarne 
(2010) investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management in 11 European 
countries. Using 5,632 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2005, they found that 
earnings management increased in the EU following IFRS adoption. In New Zealand, 
Kabir et al. (2010) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings quality of New 
Zealand firms. Based on 723 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2009 they find that 
earnings management increased post-IFRS in New Zealand.  
Houqe, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2012) examine the impact of IFRS adoption 
given existing level of investor protection on earnings management in 43 countries. Based 
on 104,348 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2007, they find that mere adoption of 
IFRS does not improve earnings quality. Similarly, increase in the degree of investor 
protection does not improve earnings quality. Only the combination of the increase in 
investors’ protection with IFRS adoption improves earnings quality.  Also, Ahmed et al. 
(2013) examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings management across 




adoption increases earnings smoothing and aggressive reporting of accruals. Capkun et 
al. (2016) argue that 2005 amendments made to IFRS increases the standards’ flexibility 
for opportunistic managerial behaviour, thereby reducing accounting quality. In other 
words, firms adopting IFRS post-2005 are expected to experience a reduced accounting 
quality.  Using a sample of 3,853 firms from 29 countries, they conclude that IFRS post-
2005 increases earnings management. 
Cameran, et al. (2014) investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management among private (non-listed) Italian firms from 2005 to 2008. From a total of 
948 firm-year observations, they concluded that earnings quality decreased subsequent to 
IFRS adoption among non-listed Italian firms.  Doukakis (2014) examine the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on both accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management in 22 European countries. Based on 15,206 firm-year observations from 
2000 to 2010, they find that mandatory IFRS adoption has no significant impact on both 
real and accrual earnings management. Moreover, firms that had relatively strong 
management incentives to engage in earnings management had higher earnings 
management. Bryce et al. (2015) investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management in Australia.  They observe 1,200 firm-years of 200 companies from 2003 
to 2008. They found that earnings management did not decrease as a result of IFRS 
adoption in Australia. 
Burnett, Gordon, Jorgensen and Linthicum (2015) investigate the impact of IFRS 
adoption on earnings management in Canada. From 488 firm-year observations, they find 
no significant improvement in earnings quality in Canada. Similarly, Liu and Sun (2015) 
examine the effect of IFRS adoption on the earnings quality of Canadian firms. Based on 
a sample of 274 firms with 1,644 firm-year observations, they find no significant 
difference in the earnings management practices of Canadian firms before and after IFRS 
adoption. 
In Egypt, Elbannan (2010) investigate the impact of IAS-based accounting 
standards on earnings quality. They divided their adoption period into initial adoption 
period (1997-1998) and revision period (2006-2007). Based on a sample of 153 and 141 
respectively for the study period, they find no support that IFRS reduces earnings 
management in Egypt. Similarly, Wang and Campbell (2012) investigate the impact of 
IFRS adoption on earnings management in China. Based on a sample of 1329 firms with 
11947 firm year observations from 2000 to 2009, they find that IFRS does not have any 




In the case of Nigeria, it is expected that higher disclosure requirements by IFRS 
as compared to the Nigerian SASs will reduce earnings management practices of Nigerian 
listed firms. Hence, the first hypothesis is stated as follows:  
H1: IFRS adoption significantly reduces earnings management behaviour of 
Nigerian listed firms.  
Table 3.1 Summary of Literature on the Effects of IFRS Adoption on Earnings 
Management 
Author (year) Context Period Effect of IFRS on EM 
IFRS reduces earnings management 
Barth et al. (2008) 12 countries 1994 – 2003  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
Chen et al. (2010) 15 EU countries 2000 – 2007 





90 European Banks 2000 – 2007  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
Zeghal et al. (2012) 15 EU countries 2001 – 2008  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM for countries with 
divergence between 
GAAP and IFRS. 
Zhou et al (2009) China 1994 – 2000  




Greece 2004 – 2006  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
Liu et al (2011) China  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
Chua et al. (2012) Australia  2004 – 2009  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
Wan Ismail et al 
(2013) 
Malaysia 2002 – 2009 
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
Lourenco et al 
(2015) 
Brazil 2004 – 2011  
IFRS adoption reduces 
EM. 
IFRS increases earnings management 
Pannenin and Lin 
(2009) 
Germany 2000 – 2006 




Australia, UK and 
France 
2002 – 2006  
IFRS adoption increases 
EM in France and has no 
effect in both the UK and 
Australia. 
Kabir et al (2010) New Zealand 2002 – 2009  





Callao and Jarne 
(2010) 
11 EU countries 2002 – 2005  
IFRS adoption increases 
EM. 
Ahmed et al. 
(2013) 
20 countries 2002 – 2004  
IFRS adoption increases 
EM. 
Capkun et al. 
(2016) 
29 countries  
IFRS adoption increases 
EM. 
Cameran et al. 
(2014) 
Italy 2005 – 2008  
IFRS adoption increases 
EM for private firms. 
Christensen et al. 
(2015) 
Germany 1998 – 2005 
IFRS adoption increases 
EM for mandatory 
adopters but reduces EM 
for voluntary adopters. 
IFRS does not affect earnings management 
Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) 
Germany 1991 – 2001 
IFRS adoption does not 
affect EM. 
Elbannan (2010) Egypt 
1997 – 1998  
2006 – 2007   
IFRS adoption has no 
effect on EM. 
Houqe et al. (2012) 43 countries 2000 – 2007  
IFRS adoption alone has 
no effect on EM. But 
IFRS adoption with 
increased investor 
protection reduces EM. 
Wang and 
Campbell (2012) 
China 200 – 2009  
IFRS adoption has no 
effect on EM. 
Doukakis (2014) 22 countries 2000 – 2010  
IFRS adoption has no 
effect EM. 
Bryce et al. (2015) Australia 2003 – 2008  
IFRS adoption has no 
effect on EM. 
Burnett et al. 
(2015) 
Canada 2007 – 2012  
IFRS adoption has no 
effect on EM. 
Liu and Sun (2015) Canada 2008 – 2014  
IFRS adoption has no 
effect on EM. 
 
3.7.2 Enforcement and Earnings Management 
Regarding the effect of enforcement on earnings management, Marra, Mazzola and 
Prencipe (2011) examine the effectiveness of corporate governance prior to and after 
IFRS adoption from 2003 to 2006. Based on 888 firm-year observations, they find that 
the existence of audit committee and board independence are negatively and significantly 
associated with earnings management in the post-IFRS adoption period. Thus, concluding 
that firm level enforcement mechanisms play an important role in ensuring accounting 
quality. A similar conclusion was reached by Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011), in 




Ernstberger et al. (2012) examine the effect of enforcement of accounting reforms 
in Germany on earnings management in the IFRS regime. Using 1,464 firm-year 
observations from 2003 to 2006, they found that earnings management decreased with 
the accounting reforms, while IFRS adoption had no significant influence on earnings 
management. Christensen et al. (2013) also argue that enforcement rather than IFRS leads 
to higher accounting quality when IFRS adoption is mandatory. 
However, Cai et al. (2014) has further analysed the above studies’ findings, in 
their examination of the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings management considering 
the influence of pre-adoption divergence of the sampled countries’ national GAAP from 
IFRS. They observe 31 countries with a total of 128,292 firm-year observations from 
2000 to 2009 and find that high-divergent countries with higher level of legal enforcement 
have a reduced earnings management following IFRS adoption; low-divergent countries 
with higher enforcement do not have a significantly lower earnings management 
following IFRS adoption; and low-divergent countries with lower enforcement do not 
benefit from IFRS adoption in the least. 
Bocking, Gros and Worrret (2015) examine the effect of German two-tier 
enforcement systems in constraining earnings management. Using a sample of 3,539 
firm-year observations from 2005 to 2011, they find that enforcement is negatively related 
to accrual earnings management when errors in financial statements of companies are 
first released but weakens in later years.  
Alhadab, Clacher and Keasey (2016) reached a conclusion that regulatory 
environment affects the extent of earnings management. This stems from their 
examination of IPO firms on the highly regulated Main market as compared to the lightly 
regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) on the London Stock Exchange. Using 
571 IPO firms from 1998-2008, they find that IPO firms on the AIM exhibit higher 
accrual based and sale-based earnings management but a lower discretionary expense-
based earnings management than IPO firms on the Main market.  
In Nigeria, it is expected that the monitoring and enforcement policies undertaken 
by the FRCN on the financial reporting practices of Nigerian listed firms will reduce their 
earnings management behaviour. The second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H2: The monitoring and enforcement approach by the FRCN significantly reduces 
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3.7.3 IFRS Adoption and Accounting Conservatism 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on conditional 
conservatism in Germany. Based on a sample of 80 firms with 84 firm-year observations 




Germany. Chua, Cheong and Gould (2012) examine the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on timely loss recognition in Australia. Based on a sample of 172 firms with 
1,376 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2009, they concluded that IFRS adoption leads 
to more timely loss recognition in Australia. 
Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) examine the impact of IAS adoption on timely 
loss recognition in 21 countries. Based on a sample of 327 with firm year observations of 
1,896 from 1993 to 2003, they find that IAS adoption leads to more timely recognition of 
losses. Chan, Hsu and Lee (2015) investigate the effect of mandatory adoption of IFRS 
on timely loss recognition in 14 European countries. Based on 23,225 firm-year 
observations from 2002 to 2007, they find that mandatory IFRS adoption leads to more 
timely loss recognition for firms with higher cost of debt, less dependence on private debt 
and bank financing.  
Elbannan (2010) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on timely loss recognition 
in Egypt. Based on a sample of 294 firms for the period 1997 to 2007, they find that 
Egyptian firms recognised fewer losses in the initial post-IFRS adoption period of IAS. 
However, a significantly positive association between timely loss recognition and IAS 
adoption was found in the revision period (2006-2007). 
On the contrary, Paananen and Lin (2009) examine the effect of IFRS adoption 
on timely loss recognition in Germany. Based on 839 firm-year observations from 2000 
to 2006, they find that German companies engaged in less timely loss recognition 
subsequent to IFRS adoption. Lai, Lu and Shan (2013) examine the impact of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism in Australia. Based on 16,826 firm year 
observations from 2002 to 2009, they find that accounting conservatism reduced 
following mandatory IFRS adoption. Elshandidy and Hassanein (2014) investigate the 
impact of IFRS on accounting conservatism in the UK. Based on a sample of 72 firms 
with 432 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2007, they find that mandatory IFRS 
adoption leads to a reduction in accounting conservatism. Cameran, Campa and 
Pettinicchio (2014) examine the impact of IFRS adoption of timely loss recognition by 
non-listed Italian companies. Based on 948 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2008, 
they find that IFRS adoption leads to a decrease in timely loss recognition. 
Chen, Tang, Jiang and Lin (2010) examine the impact of IFRS adoption in 15 
European Union countries.  Based on 21,707 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2007, 
they find that IFRS is associated with a less timely loss recognition. Piot, Dumontier and 
Janin (2010) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism in 22 




find that IFRS adoption has led to decline in conditional conservatism. Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011) examine the impact of IFRS adoption on timely loss recognition 
among European banks in 15 European countries. Based on a sample of 90 European 
banks from 2000 to 2007, they find that IFRS adoption led to decrease in loan loss 
provision among the sampled banks. They attributed this decrease to the incurred loss 
approach that is adopted in recognising losses under IFRS. Andre et al. (2015) examine 
the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism in 16 European 
countries. Based on 13,711 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2010, they find a decline 
in conditional conservatism subsequent to IFRS adoption.  
In China, Zhou, Xiong and Ganguli (2009) examine the impact of IFRS adoption 
on timely loss recognition. Based on a firm-year observation of 3,298 from 1994 to 2000, 
they find that IFRS adoption is not associated with more timely loss recognition in China. 
In Russia, Kim (2016), based on 872 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2012, 
find that IFRS adoption increases timely loss recognition for firms facing coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphic pressure but not for firms facing only coercive 
isomorphic pressure.  
Based on the public accountability model of accounting regulation, which takes 
cognizance of all relevant stakeholders (including lenders who are more interested in 
timely loss recognition), it is contended that IFRS adoption will improve timely loss 
recognition. Thus, the third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: IFRS adoption significantly increases timely loss recognition by Nigerian 
listed firms. 
Table 3.3 Summary of Literature on the Effects of IFRS on Timely Loss 
Recognition 
Author (year) Context Period 
Effect of IFRS on 
Timely Loss 
Recognition 
IFRS increases timely loss recognition 
Barth et al. (2008) 21 countries 1993 – 2003  
IFRS increases timely 
loss recognition. 
Chan et al. (2015) 14 EU countries 2002 – 2007  
IFRS increases timely 
loss recognition for firms 
with higher debt and 
reduces timely loss 








Germany 1998 – 2002  
IFRS increases timely 
loss recognition. 
Elbannan (2010) Egypt 1997 – 2007 
Timely loss recognition 
increases post -IFRS. 
Chua et al. (2012)  Australia 2001 – 2009 
IFRS increases timely 
loss recognition. 
IFRS reduces timely loss recognition 
Chen et al. (2010) 15 EU countries 2000 – 2007  
IFRS reduces timely loss 
recognition. 
Piot et al. (2010) 22 EU countries 2001 – 2008  





15 European Banks 2000 – 2007  
IFRS reduces timely loss 
recognition. 
Andre et al (2015) 16 EU countries 2000 – 2010  
IFRS reduces timely loss 
recognition. 
Paananen and Lin 
(2009) 
Germany 2000 – 2006  
Timely loss recognition 
reduces post –IFRS. 
Lai et al. (2013) Australia 2002 – 2009  
Timely loss recognition 
reduces post –IFRS. 
Elshandidy and 
Hassanein (2014) 
UK 2002 – 2007  
IFRS reduces timely loss 
recognition. 
Cameran et al. 
(2014) 
Italy 2005 – 2008  
IFRS reduces timely loss 
recognition. 
IFRS does not affect timely loss recognition 
Zhou et al (2009) China 1994 – 2000  
IFRS has no effect on 
timely loss recognition. 
 
3.7.4 Enforcement and Accounting Conservatism 
Regarding the effect of enforcement on timely loss recognition, Jayaraman (2012) find a 
positive association between timely loss recognition and enforcement of internal trading 
(IT) law for only IFRS adopters that enforced the IT law based on 10,164 firm-year 
observations of 27 countries. Similarly, using neo-institutional theory in the context of 
Russia, Kim (2016) finds that firms facing only coercive isomorphic pressure (compelled 
to adopt some rules) exhibit lower timely loss recognition. However, firms facing a 
combination of coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures (i.e. mandatorily 
adopting IFRS and complying with other enforcement rules) exhibit a higher timely loss 
recognition behaviour. Based on these findings, we expect that the creation of the FRCN 




positive effect on timely loss recognition by Nigerian listed firms. The fourth hypothesis 
is thus stated as follows: 
 
H4: The monitoring and enforcement approach by FRCN significantly increases timely 
loss recognition by Nigerian listed firms 
3.7.5 IFRS Adoption and Earnings Persistence  
Research into the effect of IFRS on earnings persistence, unlike earnings management, 
has not received substantial academic interests. However, few empirical evidence on the 
effect of IFRS on earnings persistence still abound. These studies are examined below. 
Chalmers, Clinch and Godfrey (2011) examine the impact of IFRS adoption of 
earnings persistence in Australia. Using 20,025 firm-year observations between 1990 and 
2008, they find that IFRS results in higher earnings persistence in Australia. Sun, Cahan 
and Emmanuel (2011) examine the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings persistence 
among foreign firms cross listed in the US. Based on 3,396 firm-year observations from 
2000 to 2008, they find that IFRS adoption is associated with higher earnings persistence 
in the sampled 23 countries. Liu and Sun (2015) investigate the impact of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on earnings persistence in Canada. Based on a sample of 274 firms with 
1,644 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2014, they find IFRS adoption to be positively 
related to earnings persistence.  
In contrast, Doukakis (2010) examines the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings 
persistence in Greece. Based on 956 samples from 2002 to 2007, he finds that IFRS does 
not improve the persistence of earnings. Kabir, Laswad and Islam (2010) investigate the 
power of current year earnings in predicting next one-year cash flow subsequent to IFRS 
adoption in New Zealand. Based on a sample of 118 firms with 723 firm-year 
observations from 2002 to 2009, they conclude that IFRS does not improve the predictive 
power of earnings on cash flow in New Zealand. 
Atwood, Drake, Myers and Myers (2011) compare the persistence of earnings 
under IFRS, US GAAP and non-US domestic GAAP (DAS). Based on 58,832 firm-year 
observations of 33 countries from 2002 to 2008, they find no difference in the persistence 
of earnings reported under IFRS and US GAAP but IFRS losses are less persistent than 
US GAAP losses. Similarly, there is no difference in the persistence of earnings under 
IFRS and DAS. 
Lai, Li, Shan and Taylor (2013) examine the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on earnings persistence in Australia. Based on 7,509 firm-year observations from 1998 to 




In the case of Nigeria, this study predicts that IFRS will increase the persistence 
of earnings of Nigerian listed firms based on the public accountability model of 
accounting regulation, which takes cognizance of all relevant stakeholders. Thus, the fifth 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H5: IFRS adoption increases the persistence of earnings of Nigerian listed firms. 
Table 3.4 Summary of Literature on the Effects of IFRS on Earnings Persistence 
Author (year) Context Period 
Effect of IFRS on 
Earnings Persistence 
IFRS increases earnings persistence 
Chalmers et al. 
(2011) 
Australia 1990 – 2008  
IFRS increases earnings 
persistence. 
Sun et al. (2011) US 2000 – 2008  
IFRS increases earnings 
persistence. 
Liu and Sun (2015) Canada 2009 – 2014  
IFRS increases earnings 
persistence. 
IFRS does not affect earnings persistence 
Doukakis (2010) Greece 2002 – 2007  
IFRS has no effect on 
earnings persistence. 
Kabir et al. (2010) New Zealand 2002 – 2009  
IFRS has no effect on 
earnings persistence. 
Atwood et al. 
(2011) 
33 countries 2002 – 2008  
IFRS & US GAAP have 
no effect on earnings 
persistence bus US 
GAAP losses are more 
persistent than IFRS 
losses. 
Lai et al. (2013) Australia 1998 – 2008  
IFRS has no effect on 
earnings persistence. 
 
3.8 Research Method  
3.8.1 Research Design 
The research design employed in this study is a longitudinal research design. According 
to Bryman (2012), longitudinal research design involves a study of the same sample of 
objects over a period of time. Longitudinal research design can be a panel design or a 
cohort design. In a panel design, a randomly selected number of subjects are studied at 
different points in time. A cohort design, on the other hand, involves the study of all or a 
sample of subjects who share a certain characteristic at different points in time. This study 




Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Hence, they all share a similar characteristic by being 
listed on the NSE and thus, are subject to similar rules and regulations. 
3.8.2 Data collection and sampling 
The study uses secondary data in testing the hypotheses developed. The data were 
obtained from an unstructured archive and hand-collected. According to Bloomfield, 
Nelson and Solte (2016), an unstructured archive is a collection of data (e.g., in 
documents or databases) in a way not readily suitable for the researcher’s intended 
purpose. The sorting and extraction of the data from the unstructured archive is called 
hand collection. Data for this study were extracted from the annual reports and financial 
statements of the Nigerian listed companies. Many of the reports were downloaded from 
africanmarkets.com39. A few financial statements were obtained from the Nigerian stock 
exchange where they were not available on the African markets’ website. 
Sampling frame is a representation of the population from which the samples are 
selected (Black, 2010). A frame can be a list, a directory or a map that captures the 
elements of the population. The sampling frame for this study is the list of listed firms 
printed from the NSE website. The list as at 2016 contains 179 firms. The sampling 
procedure adopted in selecting the sample firms is depicted below:  
Table 3.5 Sampling  
 Number of 
firms 
Total number of firms listed as at 2016 (population)        179 
Less financial services firms  (55) 
Total non-financial services firms         124 
Number of firms without full financial statements for 2009-2011         (41)40 
Final sample           83 
 
Financial services firms are excluded from the sample because they are subject to 
different rules and their accounting quality measurement is different from other 
industries’ (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2012; Gombola, Ho and Huang, 2016). 
Similarly, firms that do not have financial statement for the pre-IFRS adoption and pre-
enforcement periods (2009 to 2011) are excluded, as the study can only make inference 
from firms that have data for the two periods. 
                                                             
39 ‘African markets’ is a website that hosts financial statements of African companies and their market data. 
40 Most of these firms without financial reports were not listed for the periods preceding IFRS adoption and 




Table 3.6: Distribution of Sampled Firms by Industry 
Industry Sample Size Percentage 
Agriculture     4     4.82 
Conglomerates 4            4.82 
Construction/Real Estate 5            6.02 
Consumer Goods 20   24.10 
Healthcare 7 8.43 
ICT    4     4.82 
Industrial Goods   12    14.46 
Natural Resources 4 4.82 
Oil and Gas 8 9.64 
Services 15 18.07 
Total 83   100 
 
3.8.3 Earnings Management Models  
There are many earnings management proxies used in the literature and there is no best 
way of measuring it (Dechow et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the majority of IFRS-related 
studies have used the popular discretionary accrual model by Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995), which is a modification of Jones (1991) model. However, the model has 
a number of limitations.  First, management of earnings through depreciation, as in the 
Jones model (and its variants), is unlikely to occur in the short-term (Beneish, 1998), 
since changing accounting policies with respect to depreciation in the short run to manage 
earnings can be easily detected. Second, discretionary accrual models are affected by 
country-specific, industry-specific and firm-specific characteristics (Peek, Meuwissen, 
Moers & Vanstraelen, 2013), which reduce their reliability. Hence, based on these 
criticisms, the study also uses abnormal working capital accrual (AWCA) of DeFond and 
Park (2001) as an alternative measure of earnings management. As suggested by Bar-
Yosef and Prencipe (2013), the AWCA model provides a more reliable estimate for fewer 
observations than the discretionary accrual models. Both variants of earnings 
management models are discussed below: 
3.8.3.1 Discretionary accrual based on modified Jones model 
The first earnings management proxy of this study is the modified Jones model of 
Dechow et al. (1995). The discretionary accrual is the difference between total accrual 
and the non-discretionary accrual. The researcher took the following steps in estimating 
the discretionary accrual. 






=  𝛼𝑗 [
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 ] +  𝛿1𝑗  (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 –  
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛿2𝑗 [
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
]  +  𝑖𝑡                                   (3.3) 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flow 
from operations for firm i in year t 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 = total assets for firm i in year t-1 
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  = change in sales for firm i in year t, derived by Salest – Salest-1 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = change in account receivable for firm i in year t, derived by ARt – ARt-1 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡  = property plant and equipment for firm i in year t 
Second, the researcher finds the non-discretionary accrual (NDA) by estimating the 
following regression equation: 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 [
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1






) + 𝛿2𝑗 [
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
]                          (3.4) 
Third, the discretionary accrual is computed by subtracting NDA from TACC, thus: 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 - 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡           (3.5) 
Fourth, the discretionary accrual is then regressed on IFRS adoption, enforcement 
through the establishment of FRCN and other control variables in the full model below: 
 
|𝐷𝐴|𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐴𝑈𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿9𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                               (3.6) 
3.8.3.2 Abnormal working capital accrual model (AWCA) 
The abnormal working capital accrual is estimated with equation 5 below:  
             𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 − [(
𝑊𝐶𝑡−1
𝑇𝑡−1
) ×  𝑇𝑡]                                                                       (3.7) 
Where: 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accrual for period t 
WCt   = non-cash working capital for year t (i.e. current assets –cash-short-term 
investments) – (current liabilities-short-term debt) 
Tt         = turnover for (sales) year t 
Tt-1       = turnover for (sales) year t-1 
WCt-1    = non-cash working capital for year t-1 
As in the modified Jones model, the AWCA is regressed on IFRS adoption, enforcement 
by the FRCN and other control variables as defined in the modified Jones model. Thus, 





𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐴𝑈𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿8𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿9𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                      (3.8) 
3.8.4 Timely Loss Recognition (Conditional Conservatism) 
Another earnings characteristic that has been widely used for examining earnings quality 
is timely loss recognition (Dechow et al., 2010). Consistent with previous studies (Lang 
et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2015; Leung and Clinch, 2014), timely 
loss recognition is estimated using the model below:  
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐴𝑈𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿9𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿10𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                      
(3.9) 
Where: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 = large losses; a binary variable measured as 1 where net income scaled by 
total asset is less than -0.20 and 0 otherwise  
3.8.5 Earnings Persistence 
The persistence of earnings is another proxy for measuring earnings quality (Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004). Persistence of earnings implies the ability of current 
year’s earning to predict one-year future earnings (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). Earnings 
persistence is an important earning characteristic for equity valuation models (Dechow et 
al., 2010). The earnings persistence model is as follows: 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡          (3.10) 
Where:  
EPSit = earnings per share for firm i in year t 
IFRSit = binary variable; 1 for IFRS adoption and 0 for non-IFRS adoption for 
firm i at period t 
The earnings persistence model is an autoregressive model which implies a 
dynamic panel model, as one of the independent variables is the lag of the dependent 
variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
3.8.6 Independent and Control Variables 
The variables of interest are IFRS and the ENF variable. A negative and significant 




However, for the persistence of earnings and timely loss recognition model, a positive 
relationship is expected.  
Control variables used in the previous literature include cash flow from operations 
(CFO), return on assets (ROA), leverage (LEV), size of the firm (SIZE), audit quality 
(AUD), new issue of equity (EISSUE), and new issue of debt (DISSUE). 
Table 3.7 summarises the measurements of all the dependent, independent and 
control variables. The literature from where they have been found is also provided. 
Table 3.7 Summary and Definition of Variables for all Models 
Variables Measurements Source 
Dependent Variables (Accounting Quality) 
|𝐷𝐴|𝑖𝑡 See equation 3.5 
Dechow et al. (1995); 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2005); Callao and Jarne 
(2010); Wan Ismail et al. 
(2013); Bryce et al. (2015). 
AWCAt See equation 3.7 
DeFond and Park (2001); 
Marra et al., (2011); 
Ernstberger et al., (2012); 
Bar-Yosef and Prencipe 
(2013). 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 
A binary variable measured as 1 
where net income scaled by total 
asset is less than -0.20 and 0 
otherwise. 
Lang et al (2006); Barth et al., 
(2008); Zeghal et al. (2012); 
Christensen et al., (2015); 
Leung and Clinch, 2014). 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 
Earnings per share for firm i in year 
t+1 
Sloan (1996); Schipper and 
Vincent, (2003); Francis, et 
al., (2004); Doukakis (2010); 
Chalmers et al. (2011); Sun et 




Binary variable; 1 for periods after 
IFRS adoption (2012-2014) and 0 for 
periods before IFRS adoption (2009-
2011) for firm i 
Barth et al. (2008); Chen et al. 
(2010); Iatridis and Rouvolis 
(2010); Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011); 
Zeghal et al. (2012); Chua et 
al. (2012); Zhou et al (2009); 
Liu et al (2011); Pannenin and 




(2015); Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008); Capkun et al. (2016); 
Burnett et al. (2015); Liu and 
Sun (2015). 
𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 
Binary variable; 1 for periods 
following enforcement (2011 to 
2014) and 0 for period before 
enforcement (2009-2010) for firm i 
Jayaraman (2012); Ernstberger 
et al., (2012); Christensen et 




Company size measured as the log of 
total assets of firm i at period t 
Barth et al. (2008); Chen et al. 
(2010); Zhou et al (2009); Liu 
et al (2011); Zeghal et al. 
(2012); Chua et al. (2012); 
Christensen et al. (2015); 
Burnett et al. (2015); Liu and 
Sun (2015); Bryce et al. 
(2015); Capkun et al. (2016). 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 
Leverage; measured as total debt 
divided by total assets of firm i at period 
t 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 
cash flow from operation of firm i at 
period t 
𝐴𝑈𝑄𝑖𝑡 
Audit quality measured as 1 for big 4 
audit firms and 0 for non-big 4 audit 
firms for firm i at period t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 
Profitability; measured as a ratio of 
return to assets of firm i at period t 
𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 New equity issue by firm i at period t Lang et al. (2006); Barth et al. 
(2008); Zeghal et al. (2012) 
Christensen et al. (2015). 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  New debt issue by firm i at period t 
 
3.9 Data Analysis 
3.9.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.8 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables before and after IFRS 
adoption (panel A). Statistical significance of the differences in means of the variables is 
also tested using t-test (parametric) and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (nonparametric).  
The mean of AWCA is larger while the mean for DA is smaller in the post-IFRS 
adoption period, suggesting that the switch to IFRS may have given companies an 
opportunity to substitute a short-term earnings management strategy (AWCA) for a long-
term strategy (DA). However, the change in the AWCA and the DA are not significant. 
Average timely loss recognition (LL) increases in the post-IFRS adoption period 
which agrees with the increase in new debt issue. This confirms the assertion of Watt 
(2003) that timely loss recognition is a useful accounting information for debtholders. 





As for earnings per share (EPS), the minimum figure shows the amount of losses 
to be much higher in the post-IFRS period, suggesting a recognition of some expenses 
that would ordinarily not be recognized under the Nigerian SASs (e.g., impairments). The 
mean EPS on the other hand is slightly lower in the post-IFRS period. Again, t-test and 
Wilcoxon test indicate no significant difference in the earnings per share. 
The mean of company size significantly increases following IFRS adoption. This 
corresponds to the significant increase in the average total assets in the post-IFRS period. 
Average cashflow from operations increases in the post-IFRS adoption period possibly 
due to the increased total assets, which generate more cash flow from operations. The 
mean return on assets (ROA) prior to IFRS adoption is significantly higher than the mean 
ROA in the post-IFRS adoption period. This is likely a result of the significant increase 
in the average total assets in the post-IFRS period.  Average leverage is higher in the post-
IFRS period, justifying the significant increase in new debt issue (DISSUE) following 
IFRS adoption. The significant reduction in the new equity issue is a substitute for the 
increase in debt capital. There is a slight reduction in the use of big audit firms following 
IFRS adoption, probably due to the increased cost of employing a big 4 audit firm. It was 
observed that some listed companies shifted to employing midsize audit firms like PKF 
and BDO following IFRS adoption. Average change in turnover increased in the post-
IFRS period. The reduction in the average change in account receivable and an increase 
in operating cash flow reflect the possibility that cash sales increased post-IFRS adoption. 
The increase in average PPE in the post-IFRS period constitute 51% of the increase in the 
mean of total assets.  
Table 3.9 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables before and after the 
establishment of the FRCN. T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the 
statistical significance of the differences in means of the variables.  
The mean AWCA is larger while the mean DA is smaller following the FRCN 
establishment, which suggests a substitution of AWCA for DA. However, this difference 
is not significant based on the result of the T-test and the Wilcoxon test.  
Timely loss recognition in the post-FRCN establishment period increases, which 
justifies the increase in average leverage and new debt issue. However, this increase is 
not statistically significant.  
The mean of company size significantly increases following the establishment of 
the FRCN. This corresponds to the significant increase in the average total assets in the 
post-FRCN establishment period. Average cashflow from operations increases in the 




generate more cash flow from operations. The mean return on assets (ROA) prior to the 
establishment of the FRCN is significantly higher than the mean ROA in the post-IFRS 
adoption period. This is likely a result of the significant increase in the average total assets 
in the post-FRCN establishment period.  Average leverage is higher in the post-FRCN 
establishment period, justifying the significant increase in new debt issue (DISSUE) 
following IFRS adoption. There is no reduction in the new equity issue in the post-FRCN 
establishment period. There is a slight reduction in the use of big audit firms following 
IFRS adoption, probably due to the increased cost of employing a big 4 audit firm. It was 
observed that some listed companies shifted to employing midsize audit firms like PKF 
and BDO in the post-FRCN establishment period. 
 In a similar way, as found in post-IFRS adoption period, average change in sales, 
average account receivable and PPE increased following the establishment of the FRCN.  
Table 3.10 presents the correlation results among the variables used in the four 
models, i.e., DA, AWCA, timely loss recognition and earnings persistence. The 
correlation between the DA and AWCA is positive and significant at 10% level of 
significance. However, IFRS and ENF have a negative but insignificant relationship with 
both DA and AWCA, suggesting that the two independent variables may reduce earnings 
management. Similarly, both IFRS and ENF have positive relationships with timely loss 
recognition, suggesting that the two independent variables may increase conditional 
conservatism. The general results indicate no multicollinearity problem among the 
variables, as no two variables used in a model have a correlation more than 0.8 (Field, 
2014). 
3.9.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis is used for the discretionary accrual and AWCA model. 
Specifically, the fixed-effect model is adopted, as the Hausman test (p-value = 0.000) 
indicates no significant difference between the coefficients of the fixed-effect and 
random-effect models. The variables were winsorized at 1% to control for outliers. A 
modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity was conducted and the null 
hypothesis of constant variance was rejected at 1% level of significance, implying the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. To control for this, the standard errors were clustered 




Table 3.8 Descriptive Statistics of Variables before and after IFRS Adoption  
 
Key: DA=discretionary accrual, AWCA= abnormal working capital accrual, LL = large losses, EPS = earnings per share, CFO = cash flow from operations, ROA 
= return on assets, LEV = leverage, DISSUE = new debt issue, EISSUE = new equity issue and AUD = audit, Total ACC = total accruals, ΔSALES = change in 
sales, ΔAccRec. = change in account receivables, PPE = property plant & equipment, Total ASS = total assets. 
 
Note: ***, **, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A Pre-IFRS adoption Post-IFRS adoption Univariate analysis 
Variables Obs Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev 





|DA| 229 .008 .389 .124 .074 238 .008 .389 .115 .065 0.1593 0.2612 
AWCA 236 2.106 38900 3027 6010 237 2.106 38900 3201 6428 0.6796 0.9410 
LL 237 0 1 .18565 .38394 236 0 1 .21186 .41409   0.4761 0.4755 
EPSt1 238 -2.54 26.67 1.55 3.49 227 -15.49 28.08 1.51 4.04 0.3824 0.6443 
SIZE 240 11.66 20.08 16.12 1.60 240 11.66 20.19 16.42 1.69 0.0452** 0.0567* 
CFO 235 -8.43 95.17 4.24 11.19 238 -8.43 95.17 5.87 15.18 0.1447 0.2844 
ROA 237 -.259 .393 .101 .107 240 -.259 .393 .071 .110 0.0115** 0.0306** 
LEV 240 .117 1.504 .584 .240 240 .117 1.50 .610 .233 0.2731 0.2445 
DISSUE 242 0 1 .302 .460 239 0 1 .385 .488 0.0725* 0.0716* 
EISSUE 242 0 1 .041 .199 240 0 1 .021 .143 0.0716* 0.0716* 
AUD 237 0 1 .63713 .48185 240 0 1 .59167 .49255 0.2412 0.2408 
Total ACC 241 0.983 112000 3277.88 9267.83 240 390    94300 3492.46 9542.33 0.7825 0.4088 
ΔSALES 236 -272000 208000 4577.53 18200   238 -223000    107000 2498.76 20500   0.2570 0.0124** 
ΔAccRec. 227 -16500    26000 873.09  3651.46 238 -20300    30700 764.72  5163.92 0.7972 0.2191 
PPE 240   3.561    349000 15500     41300        240 5700 748000 26000     72000        0.0493** 0.0506* 




Table 3.9 Descriptive Statistics of Variables before and after FRCN Establishment (Enforcement) 
Panel B Pre-FRCN establishment Post-FRCN establishment Univariate analysis 
Variables Ob
s 
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev 





|DA| 149 .008 .389 .124 .075 318 .008 .389 .117 .067 0.2778 0.4265 
AWCA 157 2.106 38900 3092  6230 316 2.105 38900 3172 6227 0.8960 0.8622 
LL 156 0 1 .17308 .37582 319 0 1 .21137 .41019 0.3277 0.3272 
EPSt1 155 -2.54 20.81 1.55 3.31 310 15.49 28.08 1.51 3.98 0.4249 0.8623 
SIZE 158 11.66 19.81 16.06 1.59 322 11.66 20.19 16.37 1.68 0.0520* 0.0282** 
CFO 153 -8.43 79.51 4.19 10.19 320 -8.43 95.17 5.47 14.62 0.1825 0.9791  
ROA 156 -.259 .393 .105 .109 321 -.259 .393 .077 .108 0.0187** 0.0282** 
LEV 158 .117 1.504 .576 .233 322 .117 1.504 .607 .238 0.1564 0.1445 
DISSUE 160 0 1 .250 .434 321 0 1 .389 .488 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 
EISSUE 160 0 1 .031 .175 322 0 1 .031 .174 0.9954 0.9954 
AUD 155 0 1 .63871 .48193 322 0 1 .60248 .49015 0.4522 0.4516 
Total ACC 159 2.733 112000 3232.16 10100 322 0.39 94300 3460.39 9025.63 0.7902 0.5790 
ΔSALES 155 -272000    128000 3433.59 13400   319 -223000    208000 3582.43 21700 0.9381 0.1745 
ΔAccRec. 147 -16500 17300 513.50  2917.85 318 -20300    30700 958.21 5046.04 0.3453 0.2959 
PPE 158 41.780 306000 14500     38600 322 3.561 748000 23800     66400 0.1008 0.0622* 
Total ASS 158 86.224 402000 31200 63100       322 98.091 985000 50900     119000 0.0497** 0.0553* 
Key: |DA| =discretionary accrual, AWCA= abnormal working capital accrual, LL = large losses, EPS = earnings per share, CFO = cash flow from operations, ROA = 
return on assets, LEV = leverage, DISSUE = new debt issue, EISSUE = new equity issue and AUD = audit, Total ACC = total accruals, ΔSALES = change in sales, 
ΔAccRec. = change in account receivables, PPE = property plant & equipment, Total ASS = total assets.  
 





Table 3.10 Pairwise Correlation of all Variables used for all Models 
 EPS EPS1 LL AWCA ROA SIZE |DA| LEV IFRS ENF PPE EISSUE DISSUE IFRSEPS AUD ΔSALES ΔACCREC TOTAL ASS CFO 
EPS 1 
                  
EPSt1 0.843*** 1 
                 
LL -0.282*** -0.244*** 1                 
AWCA 0.268*** 0.241*** -0.0290 1                
ROA 0.372*** 0.353*** -0.510*** -0.00784 1               
SIZE 0.416*** 0.387*** -0.166*** 0.410*** 0.0913 1              
|DA| 0.145** 0.130** -0.00128 0.105* 0.0374 0.0956* 1             
LEV -0.00690 0.0269 0.326*** 0.125** -0.251*** 0.0130 0.000301 1            
IFRS 0.0314 -0.0211 0.00728 -0.0100 -0.0915 0.0719 -0.0740 0.0499 1           
ENF 0.0114 -0.0199 0.0478 -0.0225 -0.0929 0.0733 -0.0856 0.0765 0.689*** 1          
PPE 0.397*** 0.392*** -0.0924 0.436*** 0.125** 0.571*** 0.261*** -0.0502 0.0896 0.0703 1         
EISSUE -0.0529 0.00760 0.0911 -0.0288 -0.0590 0.0627 0.0461 0.0454 -0.0785 -0.0134 0.00462 1        
DISSUE -0.0478 -0.0284 0.0268 0.0437 -0.0572 0.162*** 0.121* -0.0301 0.0609 0.118* 0.165*** 0.0336 1       
IFRSEPS 0.711*** 0.524*** -0.187*** 0.128** 0.231*** 0.290*** 0.0498 -0.0548 0.328*** 0.226*** 0.355*** -0.0458 -0.000649 1      
AUD 0.209*** 0.192*** -0.0726 0.148** 0.112* 0.358*** -0.00885 0.117* -0.0695 -0.0384 0.204*** 0.00668 -0.0540 0.0910 1     
ΔSALES 0.271*** 0.302*** -0.113* 0.163*** 0.112* 0.263*** 0.356*** -0.0148 -0.0515 0.00476 0.325*** 0.128** 0.109* 0.191*** 0.115* 1    
ΔACCREC 0.133** 0.101* -0.0879 0.123* 0.0379 0.250*** 0.0159 0.0448 -0.00790 0.0485 0.129** 0.0147 0.0254 0.130** 0.0743 0.0624 1   
TOTAL ASS 0.384*** 0.356*** -0.0958* 0.520*** 0.0812 0.653*** 0.167*** -0.00128 0.103* 0.0855 0.940*** 0.0174 0.142** 0.336*** 0.230*** 0.278*** 0.196*** 1  
CFO 0.416*** 0.407*** -0.117* 0.331*** 0.203*** 0.416*** -0.0423 -0.0856 0.0682 0.0615 0.773*** -0.0365 0.105* 0.406*** 0.150** 0.215*** -0.00760 0.691*** 1 
Key: |DA| =discretionary accrual, AWCA= abnormal working capital accrual, LL = large losses, EPS = earnings per share, CFO = cash flow from operations, ROA = return on assets, LEV = 
leverage, DISSUE = new debt issue, EISSUE = new equity issue and AUD = audit, Total ACC = total accruals, ΔSALES = change in sales, ΔAccRec. = change in account receivables, PPE = 
property plant & equipment, Total ASS = total assets.       
 




A logistic regression model, developed by Lang et al. (2006), was run for the 
timely loss recognition model following Barth et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2015). 
The standard errors are clustered to control for heteroscedasticity using Huber-White 
estimation. For the persistence model, a system generalized method of moment (i.e., 
system GMM) was run since one of the independent variables is a lag of the dependent 
variable. The “Allerano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced error” 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 294) was conducted. The p-values for the test are 0.012 
and 0.334 respectively for orders 1 and 2, suggesting no autocorrelation at higher orders. 
Hansen test of over identifying restrictions gave a p-value of 0.579, which suggests the 
validity of the instrument. 
Table 3.11 presents the results for the four models of accounting quality. In the 
modified Jones model, IFRS is significantly positive at 1% level of significance, 
indicating that the adoption of IFRS in Nigeria does not reduce earnings management of 
Nigerian listed firms but rather increases it. Thus, contrary to the expected result, the first 
hypothesis is rejected. However, this result is consistent with the findings of Capkun et 
al. (2016), who argue that the 2005 amendments made by the IASB to IFRS increase the 
ability of managers to use discretion in reporting, which consequently increase their 
earnings management behaviour.  
On the other hand, enforcement is significantly negative at 5% level of 
significance in the modified Jones model, indicating that the creation of the FRCN and 
its implementations of procedures and policies for the enforcement of accounting 
standards significantly reduce earnings management behaviour of Nigerian listed firms. 
Thus, the second hypothesis is confirmed. This finding supports the conclusion of 
Christensen et al. (2013) that when IFRS is mandatorily adopted, it is enforcement of the 
standard rather than IFRS adoption that improves accounting quality.  This suggests that 
prior studies that focused only on the effect of IFRS adoption in explaining accounting 
quality are limited by not considering the effect of enforcement. Overall, this result is 
novel, as it shows that the adoption of IFRS alone may be counterproductive in achieving 
the desired goal of improving accounting quality in Nigeria following the 2008/2009 
market crisis.  This result further clarifies why earnings management based on 
discretionary accrual did not significantly reduce in Nigeria, as the two regulatory 







Table 3.11 Regression Results for all the Models 
 
Variables 






















































































IFRSEPS    -0.8312 
(0.023) ** 
EPS    1.2393 
(0.000) *** 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
effect 
- - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 8.5% 33.6% 48.6%§ - 
N (firm-yrs) 459 464 454 460 
*, ** and *** imply significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The results of the AWCA model indicate only enforcement by the FRCN to be 
significantly negative at 5%. Thus, the second hypothesis is supported in a similar way to 
the modified Jones model. Although IFRS adoption is positively related to earnings 
management, proxied by AWCA, it is not significant. This result also goes contrary to 
our expectation. Hence, enforcement by the FRCN outweighs the impact of IFRS 
adoption in reducing earnings management by Nigerian firms based on the AWCA model. 
For the timely loss recognition model, both IFRS adoption and the FRCN 
enforcement are found to significantly reduce timely loss recognition by the Nigerian 
listed firms at 1% level of significance. Therefore, the third and fourth hypotheses, 




consistent with the argument of Capkun et al. (2016) that post-2005, IFRS adoption 
reduces accounting quality. However, the negative coefficient of the Enf variable implies 
that the FRCN may not view timely loss recognition as a desirable accounting quality and 
may view it from the valuation perspective (Ruch and Taylor, 2015). A valuation 
perspective assumes that accounting information is useful for investment decisions, 
hence, timely loss recognition is not a desirable attribute. 
Finally, in the earnings persistence model, the interactive variable between IFRS 
and EPS is negatively associated with one-year future earnings (EPSt+1) at 5% 
significance level. Thus, the fifth hypothesis is rejected.  This result supports Capkun et 
al.’s (2016) argument that post-2005, IFRS adoption reduces accounting quality. This 
provides further evidence that adoption of IFRS does not enhance accounting quality in 
Nigeria. 
  Consistent with Marra et al. (2012) and Zeghal et al. (2012), cash flow from 
operations (CFO) has a negative effect on discretionary accrual. Similarly, ROA has a 
negative relationship with AWCA but a positive relationship with DA. Size has a positive 
relationship with AWCA (Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis and Leventis, 2013) 
while EISSUE reduces AWCA.  
For the timely loss recognition model, leverage has a significant and positive 
relationship with large losses, thus supporting the argument that debtholders are interested 
in the debt-paying ability of a firm when all possible losses are accounted for. ROA and 
Size have negative relationship with LL, while EISSUE has a positive relationship with 
LL (Zeghal et al., 2012). 
3.9.3.1 Sensitivity analysis 
The argument in this study is that the effective date of enforcement was 2011. 
Notwithstanding this argument, the sensitivity of the result to an alternative effective date 
(i.e., 2010) is tested. This is to ensure that the effectiveness of the improved enforcement 
by the NASB is considered. To test whether the initial results are sensitive to this 
argument, a new regression is run with the binary variable, Enf, measured as 0 for 2009 
and 1 from 2010 – 2014. Table 3.12 presents the result of the regression analysis of the 
earnings management and the timely loss recognition model. The earnings persistence 
model is not presented since it is not affected by enforcement. The results are largely 
similar to the initial results. IFRS reduces timely loss recognition and increases earnings 
management through the manipulation of discretionary accruals. However, although 




effect on earnings management. There seems to be a change of focus in the enforcement 
priorities of the NASB in 2010 and the FRCN in 2011. The NASB focuses on timely loss 
recognition as a desirable accounting attribute while the FRCN focuses on reducing 
earnings management.   
            Table 3.12 Sensitivity Analysis Results (Effective Date of Enforcement) 
Models Fixed-Effect Regression Binary 
Logistic 
Regression 



































































Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects - - Yes 
Adjusted R2 42.03% 5.48% 47.48% 
N (firm-yrs) 459 464 454 
*, ** and *** imply significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
         To isolate the impact of the enforcement by the FRCN from the effect of IFRS 
adoption, since an interaction variable between IFRS and enforcement could not be 
created due to the binary variable used to measure both the Enf variable and the IFRS 
variable, accounting quality regression models are further estimated for the period 2009 
– 2011 period. This period excludes the IFRS adoption period of 2012, hence, only the 
impact of enforcement is determined. It is expected that a similar result to the initial 




As obtained in the initial results, enforcement has a negative relationship with the 
discretionary accrual, thereby reducing earnings management. Similarly, the FRCN does 
not consider timely loss recognition as a desirable accounting attribute, hence, the 
negative relationship between timely loss recognition and enforcement.    
                     Table 3.13 Sensitivity Analysis Results (2009-2011 Period) 
Models Random-Effect Regression Binary 
Logistic 
Regression 





























































Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 17.63% 49.22% 46.9% 
N (firm-yrs) 221 228 230 
*, ** and *** imply significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
To further test whether the conclusions drawn from the regression results on the 
effect of enforcement for the period 2009 – 2011, which agrees with the initial findings, 
is sensitive to the effective date of enforcement, a different set of regression is run for the 
period 2009 – 2011 with the enforcement variable measured as 0 for 2009 and 1 for 2010 
– 2011. The result, see Table 3.14, equally agrees with the initial findings, as enforcement 
has a negative relationship with earnings management and a positive relationship with 





Table 3.14 Sensitivity Analysis Result for the Period 2009 – 2011 and 2010 as the 
Effective Date of Enforcement 
Models Random-Effect Regression Binary 
Logistic 
Regression 





























































Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 17.64% 49.37% 44.46% 
N (firm-yrs) 221 228 230 
*, ** and *** imply significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
3.10 Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, IFRS adoption and 
accounting enforcement, on four proxies of accounting quality. While prior studies find 
positive effects (Christensen et al., 2013; Cai et al., 2014; Kim, 2016) of both IFRS and 
enforcement on accounting quality, albeit at varying levels of significance, this study 
shows that IFRS and enforcement can have different effects on accounting quality. 
Christensen et al. (2013) find that IFRS has little impact in improving market liquidity, 
rather the enforcement of accounting standards increases market liquidity. Similarly, Cai 
et al. (2014) find that only countries with high divergence from IFRS and strong legal 




Furthermore, this study’s finding reemphasises the importance of considering the 
institutional setting in IFRS-related research. The unique Nigerian setting, where 
enforcement was made a year before IFRS adoption, revealed the opposite effects of the 
two regulatory mechanisms to accounting quality. It also shows the importance of being 
informed of the impact of any regulatory tool prior to the adoption and enforcement in 
solving problems associated with market failures.   
Finally, this study finds that the effect of IFRS and enforcement on accounting 
quality may not be limited by the extent of divergence of a country’s national GAAP from 
IFRS, as argued by Cai et al. (2014). The Nigerian GAAP has a low divergence from 
IFRS and yet the effect of IFRS in reducing accounting quality is significant.  
The adoption of IFRS by Nigeria, as this study reveals, clearly increases 
accounting manipulation, which may make the effort of the FRCN to reduce earnings 
management in the country more difficult because of the flexibility allowed by IFRS. 
Although, enormous costs and efforts have been put into IFRS adoption and enforcement 
in Nigeria, a reversal of these steps may not be feasible or may even be costlier. Future 
research should look at specific changes in IFRS that aid accounting manipulations so 
that they can be addressed by the regulator.  Conclusively, countries with similar 
institutional settings like Nigeria will find the result of this study a great input in making 
informed policies when regulating their reporting regime. 
Despite the strength of this study, there are some limitations. The study does not 
address the effect of the interaction of IFRS and enforcement, as creating such variable 
leads to a perfect collinearity with the IFRS variable. This is so because IFRS was 
mandated at the same time (2012) in Nigeria for the listed companies. Hence, there is no 
variation in their adoption of the standard by the firms. Similarly, a more critical theory 
(e.g., institutional theory) may be explored to further understand the underlying 
isomorphic pressures that could explain the change in the accounting quality of Nigerian 
listed firms. This would need further data (interviews) collection which is beyond the 








The Effect of Accounting Regulation on Stock Market Liquidity in 
Nigeria 
4.1 Background to the Study 
The collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the global 
meltdown of 2008 are evidence of the consequences of lax regulatory regimes. Sequel to 
these events and motivated by the growing spate of globalisation (Ball, 2016), countries 
across the globe have adopted several measures to strengthen their financial reporting 
regulation and capital market activities. In recent years, such measures have taken the 
form of the adoption of ‘high quality’ financial reporting standards (IFRS) and concurrent 
enforcement (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). Advocates of IFRS have argued that its adoption 
brings about several capital market benefits (De George, Li and Shivakumar, 2016). For 
example, the use of fair-value accounting in IFRS, is argued to be more transparent, 
increases disclosure, and leads to better cross-country comparability of financial 
statements. These attributes consequently reduce information asymmetry, which leads to 
higher stock liquidity, lower cost of capital, improved stock valuation, and increased 
cross-border financing (De George et al., 2016).  
However, evidence of the capital market benefits of IFRS adoption remains 
mixed. Regarding stock market liquidity, previous studies conclude that voluntary 
adoption of IFRS does not lead to improved stock liquidity (Leuz, 2003; Daske, 2006; 
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2013). For mandatory IFRS adopters, Daske, Hail, Leuz 
and Verdi (2008) find that stock liquidity and value-relevance of accounting numbers 
increased, while cost of capital reduced for firms with incentives to be transparent and in 
countries with strong legal enforcement. Similarly, Li (2010) find that IFRS adoption 
reduces cost of capital for EU countries with strong legal enforcement. Furthermore, 
Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) find that enforcement made concurrently with IFRS is 
more important in explaining the liquidity benefits ascribed to IFRS adoption in prior 
studies than IFRS adoption itself. A key finding in all these prior studies is the need to 
enforce IFRS in order to have a positive capital market outcome. More so, Leuz and 
Wysocki (2016), argue that prior studies suffer from the inability to properly distil the 
effect of IFRS separately from the effect of other institutional reforms on capital market 
outcomes, as IFRS is concurrently adopted alongside other reforms. Similarly, Brown, 




studies are deficient, as they do not capture mechanisms that really influence compliance 
with accounting standards in the form of audit and independent enforcement body.  
Amidst this ongoing debate, this study seeks to find the implication of IFRS 
adoption and enforcement on stock market liquidity in the context of Nigeria. Nigeria 
creates a novel setting for this inquiry, as enforcement, through the establishment of 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria in 2011, precedes IFRS adoption in 2012. Thus, 
this enables the researcher to naturally disentangle the effect of IFRS from enforcement.  
4.2 Statement of the Problem 
Most empirical studies find a positive effect of IFRS adoption on several capital market 
outcomes (e.g., market liquidity, cost of capital and value relevance). However, studies 
that have taken further analyses (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; Florou and Kosi, 2015) of 
these results conclude that such market benefits are concentrated in countries with strong 
legal system or whose local GAAP exhibits a high divergence from IFRS. Moreover, 
Daske et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2013) argue that such conclusions need further 
justifications, as there are many cofounding variables, most importantly enforcement 
institutions, that affect this causal relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and 
capital market outcomes. Christensen et al. (2013) particularly argue that in most 
jurisdictions, IFRS is adopted with concurrent strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, 
which makes the positive effect of IFRS on capital market outcomes found in several 
studies questionable. In their study, they find that enforcement rather than IFRS adoption 
explains the capital market benefits in the EU. Thus, knowing which of these competing 
explanations account for the capital market benefits is crucial for regulators, policy 
makers, and researchers. This study seeks to address this problem from a developing 
country perspective.  
Nigeria in particular, creates a novel setting for this inquiry, as enforcement 
through the establishment of Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria in 2011, precedes 
IFRS adoption in 2012. Thus, this enables the researcher to naturally disentangle the 
effect of IFRS from enforcement. More so, De George et al. (2016) made a recent call for 
a ‘precise41’ enforcement mechanism that underpins the market benefits observed in prior 
studies. Such precise enforcement mechanism is available in Nigeria through the creation 
of the FRCN.  
                                                             
41 That is, not a mix of different reforms and rules happening concurrently, all of which could have some 




4.3 Research Objective 
The objective of this study, which constitutes the third issue addressed in this thesis, is to 
examine the impact of IFRS adoption and the creation of Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria (enforcement) on stock market liquidity of Nigerian listed firms. To achieve this 
objective, the following research questions will be answered: 
a) What is the impact of IFRS adoption on stock market liquidity of Nigerian listed 
firms? 
b) What is the impact of the establishment of the Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria on stock market liquidity of Nigerian listed firms? 
4.4 Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It explores a theoretical link 
(signalling theory) between market liquidity and IFRS adoption and enforcement, which 
has not been considered in prior studies. This is in response to the call made by Leuz and 
Wysocki (2016) for a ‘descriptive empirical42’ study that is theory-driven. Secondly, as a 
single country study, it is less influenced by conflicting heterogeneous market responses 
to IFRS adoption that may be found in multiple country studies. Thirdly, this study is the 
first, as far as the researcher is aware, to examine the effect of IFRS adoption together 
with enforcement on market liquidity from a developing country context. Finally, the 
adoption of IFRS and the creation of FRCN are the major reforms expected to trigger 
capital market benefits in Nigeria, hence, obviating many alternative explanations (e.g., 
strong legal enforcement and institutions) for any observed capital market benefits. This 
is because Nigeria has a weak legal enforcement, weak corporate governance 
mechanisms, and low divergence from IFRS (ROSC, 2004; 2011). 
4.5 Scope of the Study 
Capital market response to accounting regulation can be viewed from many angles. For 
example, value-relevance, cost of capital, analyst forecast error, and the number of analyst 
following. However, of all these responses, market liquidity is the one that can be most 
theoretically justified (Christensen et al., 2013). More so, following the 2008 financial 
crisis, the importance of market liquidity has risen for investors’ decision making 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 2012).  
                                                             
42 A descriptive empirical study according to Leuz and Wysocki (2016) is targeted at theoretically 
explaining any association that may be found with capital market outcome and IFRS adoption and not 




Particularly in Nigeria, low market liquidity is recognised as one of the major 
problems faced by the Nigerian Stock Exchange, as revealed by the SEC report (2009). 
Hence, based on these arguments, this study will focus on the consequence of accounting 
regulation on market liquidity of Nigerian listed firms. 
4.6 Literature Review 
4.6.1 Regulatory Bodies for the Nigerian Capital Market 
Nigeria operates only one capital market (i.e., the Nigerian Stock Exchange) on which 
Nigerian listed companies’ stock are traded. Prior to the establishment of the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE), the banking sector was the hub for savings and deposits in 
Nigeria. Nigeria’s capital balances were invested in the London Stock Exchange through 
stock brokers based in London. Subsequently, the Lagos Stock Exchange was established 
in 1960 and began operation in 1961 as Nigeria’s capital market (SEC, 2009). In 1977, 
the Lagos Stock Exchange was named the Nigerian Stock Exchange. At this point in time, 
the NSE was incorporated as an association limited by shares under the Companies’ 
Ordinance. In 1990, however, the NSE became limited by guarantee. The NSE comprises 
of 3 listing segments, namely the premium board (comprising of elite companies that are 
industry leaders), the main board, and the Alternative Securities Market (ASeM) for small 
and midsized companies.  
The Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) was established by the Finance (Control 
and Management) Act Cap. 144 of 1958 in replacement of the Finance Department. The 
FMF is responsible for the control and management of public funds. In line with the 
provisions of the Act, the Ministry’s functions are: supervision and control of the 
Federation account43 including those meant for development and contingencies; 
managing and controlling the federal government’s account (i.e., consolidated revenue 
fund); management of the federal government’s investments; controlling and managing 
federal government’s expenditure; annual preparation of the federal government’s 
budget; and controlling and managing external finances of the federal government 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) came into being as a result of the 1958 Act 
of Parliament as amended44. The CBN is charged with the issuance of Nigeria’s currency 
(Naira), taking charge of the nation’s monetary policies, maintaining the external reserve, 
promoting a sound financial system in Nigeria, and serving as a banker to the federal 
government and other banks. The CBN regulates the capital market through its control of 
                                                             
43 Federation account in Nigeria accounts for all funds which are meant to be distributed among the three 
tiers of government in Nigeria (i.e. federal, state and local government). 




the Nigeria’s financial sector. In the same vein, it regulates the issuance of government 
treasury bills and certificates. 
The antecedents to the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) began with the creation of a Capital Issues Committee (CIC) by the CBN in 1962. 
The Committee was charged with considering applications from companies that needed 
to raise capital from the market and recommending the timing of any issues. Following 
the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Indigenisation) Decree of 1972, 
which recommended a minimum equity participation of Nigerians in some enterprises, 
public participation in shareholding increased, which led to increased capital market 
activities. The Capital Issues Commission was established in 1973, replacing the Capital 
Issues Committee, to regulate the pricing and issuance of securities for public offers. 
Sequel to this development, the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree of 1977 (a second indigenisation law) was made, thus, capital market activities 
received a further boost.  The Financial System Review Committee recommended the 
establishment of the SEC to the federal government. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act of 1979 (re-enacted as SEC Act of 1988) established the SEC with the 
following mandates: regulation and development of the capital market; determination of 
the prices of securities and establishment of the basis of allotment of securities. In 1996, 
a review of SEC’s role and effectiveness in the capital market was conducted. This led to 
the promulgation of Investment and Securities Act No. 45 of 1999 (re-enacted in 2007). 
The SEC became a member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) in   June 1985 and qualified as an Appendix ‘A’ Signatory to the IOSCO 
MMOU in 2006. Figure 4.1 illustrates the Nigerian capital market regulatory bodies. 
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4.6.2 The Nigerian Stock Market before IFRS adoption and FRCN Establishment 
The Nigerian capital market experienced an unprecedented growth following major 
reforms in the banking, insurance, and pension sector between 2004 and 2007. The 
recapitalisation of banks and insurance companies in 2005 and 2007 led to the banks 
approaching the capital market for funds. Their success in raising over $10 billion 
encouraged other companies to approach the capital market for equity funding of their 
businesses. Similarly, the Pension Reform Act of 2004 that established a contributory 
pension scheme in Nigeria led to a contribution pool of N125 billion (i.e., $83 million) 
(as at 2009 with 15% projected annual growth) for investment purposes. Furthermore, the 
implementation of a number of economic reforms45, the cancellation of sovereign debt 
owed to the Paris Club, and the improvement in Nigeria’s foreign reserve balance 
“increased awareness and confidence in the capital market and encouraged availability of 
credit to local banks by responding international banks and investors” (SEC, 2009, p. 10).  
Cumulatively, these factors led to the growth of the Nigerian capital market from a market 
capitalization of N1.4 trillion in 2003 to N10.2 trillion in 2007. Daily average trade in 
2008 was more than N10 billion. Standard and Poor’s described the Nigerian capital 
market as the fastest growing in emerging markets (SEC, 2009). 
However, there was a downturn in the growth of the Nigerian capital market by 
the end of 2008. There was a significant drop in the All-Share Index by 56% by December 
2008. Average trading volume equally dropped by 77% and market capitalization 
abnormally reduced by N5.7 trillion just between March and December 2008 (SEC, 
2009). The downturn was a result of reduction in investors’ confidence in the market. The 
SEC report (2009) states the following: 
The increasing unease about valuation in the market precipitated 
a noticeable exit of domestic and foreign investors from the 
market. Regulatory pronouncements and actions seemed to only 
exacerbate the situation, the resultant uncertainty further 
undermined investors’ confidence in the market (p. 11). 
 
The unease about valuation, as mentioned in the SEC report above, was in part a 
result of weaknesses in regulation and accounting and auditing standards (ROSC, 2011). 
For example, some banks employed creative accounting in inflating their balance sheet 
values, which translated to high market values. The ROSC (2011) further unveiled many 
accounting manipulations by Nigerian listed companies, including improper revenue 
                                                             
45 For example, the establishment of due process in public procurement and contracts and the establishment 




reporting, non-disclosure of full liability for employee benefits, and misclassification of 
leases. The lack of transparency in reporting as well as regulation (SEC, 2009) led to the 
pull out of both domestic and foreign investors. 
The ROSC (2011) recommended the adoption of IFRS and the creation of the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) to ameliorate the financial reporting 
integrity of Nigerian companies in 2012 and 2011, respectively. The FRCN is charged 
with enforcing and monitoring compliance with the Nigerian accounting standards (later 
IFRS) by Nigerian firms among other duties. It is the consequence of these regulations 
on the capital market that is the subject matter of this study. 
4.6.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was propounded by Spence (1973) in relation to job applicants that try 
to reduce information asymmetry between themselves and potential employers by 
showcasing their potentials through rigorous higher education trainings. In essence, 
signalling theory entails the reduction of information asymmetry between two parties 
(Spence, 2002). Information asymmetry presumes the possession of private information 
by one party, which would ordinarily enhance the decision-making of the other party if it 
were available.  According to Stiglitz (2002), information asymmetry is when “different 
people know different things” (p. 469). To reduce information asymmetry, one party (the 
signaller) signals to another party (the receiver) who in turn interprets the signal. 
Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel (2011) opine that what is being signalled to the 
receiver by the signaller is an “underlying, unobservable ability of the signaller to fulfil 
the needs or demands of an outsider observing the signal” (p. 43). This unobservable 
ability is referred to as quality. For example, Ross (1973) argues that the ability of a firm 
to generate future cash streams can be signalled by the firm’s financial structure and 
managerial incentives. Similarly, Zhang and Wiersema (2009) claim that the 
unobservable quality of a firm is signalled to potential investors through the firm’s 
financial statements.  
A salient characteristic of the signaller is that they are insiders that are privileged 
with information that is not ordinarily available to outsiders. Receivers, on the other hand, 
are outsiders that would benefit from any piece of information released by the signaller. 
Connelly et al. (2011) argue that both the signaller and the receiver benefit from the 
signalling. Furthermore, the receiver must be interested in and watch out for the signals 




In the case of Nigeria, this study conceptualises the Nigerian Government, 
represented by the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN), as the signaller. 
Through the adoption of high-quality accounting standards (IFRS) and the enforcement 
of accounting standards, the FRCN sends signals of better financial reporting to the 
receivers (i.e., both internal and external investors). Following various accounting 
manipulations that culminated into the Nigerian stock market crash and other associated 
capital market problems, these signals are important for rejuvenating investors’ interests 
in the Nigerian capital market. Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and has been enjoying 
investors’ (receivers’) attention, but this was hampered by the aforementioned problems. 
Thus, the adoption of IFRS and enforcement of standards is expected to reduce 
information asymmetry through increased disclosures embedded in IFRS and an increase 
in the level of trust (or financial statements integrity) through enforcement of standards. 
The FRCN builds the trust by publicising its monitoring and enforcement procedures on 
its website and various documents, as well as publicising sanctions levied on individual 
companies. The Nigerian government stands to benefit from increased investments, while 
receivers benefit from increased portfolio of shares and returns, and higher liquidity that 
is hinged on more trusted information.  Figure 4.2 shows how the adoption of IFRS and 
the FRCN’s enforcement procedures affect market liquidity in Nigeria. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the various concepts of signalling theory put together within the 
context of Nigeria. The FRCN mandates the adoption of IFRS and enforces accounting 
standards46. IFRS reduces information asymmetry through more disclosures, while 
enforcement reduces information asymmetry through publication of sanctions and 
enforcement procedures, which reassures investors of the higher quality of Nigerian listed 
companies’ financial statements. Given these, the investors’ (potential and current) 
suspicion of sellers holding private information will reduce, which leads to lower bid-ask 
spread and consequently, higher liquidity. 
4.6.3.1 IFRS, FRCN, and information asymmetry 
The argument in this study is that IFRS adoption reduces information asymmetry through 
its requirement of higher disclosures than the Nigerian SAS. Similarly, the establishment 
of the FRCN improves the trust in the financial reports of Nigerian listed firms by 
publishing financial reporting monitoring procedures and sanctioning of erring 
companies. These two mechanisms are expected to lead to a reduction in information 
asymmetry. To understand whether this reduction in information asymmetry is perceived 
by stakeholders, two financial analysts were contacted. The first granted an oral interview, 
while the second gave the researcher a write-up on the issue. The first interviewee 
(interviewee 1) has more than 7 years’ experience as the head of securities dealing in a 
firm that has been in existence since 1993 in Nigeria. The second interviewee 
(interviewee 2) has more than 18 years of experience in financial market and is currently 
the CEO of a stock broking firm that has been in existence since 1994 in Nigeria. 
Interviewee 2 describes the situation prior to IFRS adoption and how IFRS 
ameliorated it as follows: 
“Before the adoption of IFRS, there used to be much dysfunction 
in asset and liability coordinates, which otherwise led to bubble 
creation and ultimately the crash of the market in 2008. We saw 
a situation whereby banks were carrying assets in their books that 
had become toxic and the majority of the banks had almost 
become illiquid. The CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria) had to open 
a discount window (Expanded Discount Window) in order to 
enable the affected banks meet their liquidity needs. The bubble 
got to a worrisome level that the survival of the banks became 
entirely dependent on the discount window. Such that when the 
window was closed, the banks could no longer meet their 
obligations to their depositors, and immediately the share price of 
the affected banks began to plummet. Since the adoption of IFRS, 
it has become almost impossible for such assets to be hidden 
                                                             
46 The FRCN was not created to solely enforce IFRS. It did enforce the Statement of Accounting Standards 




without being noticed. Now the red flag is seen ahead of time and 
hardly will investors be caught unawares”.  
In this regard, IFRS ensures more disclosures that lay bare any toxic asset for all 
financial statements users to see. Thus, it lowers information asymmetry that was the 
obvious problem of the Nigerian SAS. 
Investors generally believe IFRS to be of better quality than the Nigerian SAS and 
after suffering loss of wealth, following the 2008 market crash, the adoption of IFRS has 
restored their confidence. There are obvious requirements through which IFRS is able to 
achieve this, as explained by the interviewees:    
“Since the adoption of the IFRS for companies quoted on the 
NSE, there has been a measured improvement in restoration of 
investors’ confidence after the crash of the market in 2008. The 
market suffered a great deal not particularly because of 
overpriced equities but more because investors believed the 
financial statements of the quoted companies especially the 
banks, could no more be trusted. The figures stated in most of the 
submitted financial reports were at variance with the actual and 
as such, investors believed they had been short-changed with the 
resulting erosion of value. The provision in IFRS for retention of 
presentation and classification of subsequent reports could have 
come to the rescue of investors, if it had been the accounting 
standard prior to the crash of the market. This would have 
afforded a situation whereby comparisons will continuously be 
made and the gap or inconsistency would have come to light 
before much damage was done” (interviewee 2).  
“For example, impairment loss under IFRS reduces the 
companies’ profit which affects the analysts’ forecast of the profit 
of the companies. This affects investors’ sentiment and the bid 
and ask price. Initially firms were not taking into account 
impairment. It was the enforcement of IFRS that made Nigerian 
firms to take into account impairment in their books” (interviewee 
1). 
The timely presentation of financial statements and its consistencies facilitated by 
the FRCN is also perceived positively by the stock market, which has translated to lower 
information asymmetry. One of the interviewees puts it as follows: 
“When you introduce a regulatory body, it gives investors, 
confidence in the economy. The crash in 2008 was as a result of 
the fact that our regulatory bodies failed in their duties and 
responsibilities then. We had a situation where companies that 
were not existing were being traded on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. For example, the FRCN suspended the chairman of 
Stanbic IBTC and 3 other directors because their accounting 
reports did not comply with IFRS and they were misreporting by 




paid to their parent body in South Africa. FRCN gave directives 
that the reports should be withdrawn from 2013 to 2014. This 
issue gave investors and market participants more confidence that 
whatever is being reported is the actual performance of the 
business” (interviewee 1). 
Summing up, the above interviews provide anecdotal evidence that the adoption 
of IFRS and the establishment of the FRCN have the potential to increase market liquidity 
by reducing information asymmetry in Nigeria. 












Figure 4.3 shows the enforcement period for both the SAS and IFRS. Although, 
the NASB strengthened its enforcement in 2010 (ROSC, 2011), this study contends that 
the market becomes aware of the efficiency of the NASB following the reorganization of 
the NASB into the FRCN with more powers and resources in 2011 (ROSC, 2011). 
Although the enforcement in 2010 will reinforce the enforcement in 2011, the FRCN will 
be more thorough in its enforcement in 2011 due to the ‘attention-based view’47 (Marra 
and Mazzola, 2014) and will make this known to the market via publicity of sanctions 
against erring firms. The FRCN will concentrate its attention towards improving the 
credibility of financial reports in its first year for two main reasons. Firstly, improving the 
credibility of the financial reports is the sole reason for reorganizing the NASB into the 
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FRCN. Secondly, the procedures it takes in its first year determines how seriously the 
Nigerian firms would take it. Notwithstanding these arguments, a sensitivity analysis of 
the effective date of enforcement is conducted in section 4.9 
4.6.4 Market Liquidity 
Market liquidity is a market situation whereby transactions rapidly take place with 
insignificant impact on prices (Borio, 2000). In the words of Elliot (2015), market 
liquidity is the ease with which an asset is sold or bought in a timely manner, and the 
associated cost of sale (including accepting a lower price to have a buyer in a reasonable 
time). Market liquidity has four dimensions, namely tightness, depth, immediacy, and 
resiliency. Tightness refers to the difference between the ask price and the bid price (i.e., 
the bid-ask-spread). Depth refers to the volume of transactions a market can absorb 
without changes in prices. Immediacy implies the speed of execution of large orders, 
while resiliency refers to the ease with which prices return to normalcy after a temporary 
disturbance (Borio, 2000). Market liquidity is an important concept for efficient 
functioning of the capital market (Nikolaou, 2009). In fact, the recent 2008 financial crisis 
is linked to a fall in the resilience of capital markets (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012; 
Anderson, Webber, Noss, Beale and Crowley-Reidy, 2015).  
Liquidity costs are divided into two parts, namely direct trading cost and price-
impact cost (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012). Direct trading costs are normal costs 
associated with executing a transaction at the market. They include brokerage 
commission, taxes, and exchange fees. Price-impact costs are the premium and discounts 
a buyer pays or seller gives to buy and sell securities, respectively, and the inventory risks.  
When a buyer has a private information about the likelihood of a future price increase of 
a stock, they tend to buy more to make future profits. The seller, on noticing the buying 
pressure, interprets this as conveying a private positive information and will only sell the 
stock at a higher price (premium). Equally, when buyers notice selling pressure, they 
interpret this as conveying a private negative information and will only buy at a discount. 
Inventory risk is the risk that the price of a stock falls while a seller holds the stock in 
anticipation of a buyer.  
Market illiquidity has many consequences. Illiquidity can discourage participation 
in financial markets such that the market becomes ineffective. More so, illiquidity can 
increase share issuance premium, as higher transaction costs are factored in, which in 




(Anderson et al., 2015). When securities are used as collateral for bank loans, illiquidity 
can spur bank insolvency and further exacerbate contagion48.  
4.6.4.1 Consequences of market liquidity 
The market liquidity of a firm has many consequences for the decision making of the 
firm. These consequences, as found in the literature, are considered below. 
Ellul and Pagano (2006) hypothesised that illiquidity results in under-pricing of 
IPOs, as investors are concerned about ‘after-market illiquidity’ (p. 381) resulting from 
information asymmetry about the future value of the stock and its fundamental risk.  They 
confirmed this hypothesis based on an observation of 337 IPOs in the UK from 1998 to 
2000. 
Higher liquidity encourages managers to opt for equity financing rather than debt 
financing as equity financing is cheaper at that moment. This, however, alters a firm’s 
capital structure. Based on 5,000 firm-year observations, Frieder and Martell (2006) find 
that an increase in leverage is associated with a decrease in market liquidity and vice 
versa. In a similar vein, Lipson and Mortal (2009), based on 46,685 firm-year 
observations, find a negative relationship between leverage and stock market liquidity. 
Furthermore, in Thailand, Udomsirikul, Jumreorvong and Jiraporn (2011) find a negative 
relationship between leverage and stock market liquidity based on a sample of 707 firms. 
Nadarajah, Ali, Liu and Haung (2016) equally support these findings based on 9,855 firm-
year observations from 2001 to 2013 in Australia. 
Brockman, Howe and Mortal (2008) argue, in line with what they call ‘liquidity 
hypothesis of repurchases’, that the level of a firm’s market liquidity determines its pay-
out policy (i.e., dividend or share repurchase).  Stock prices decreases if market liquidity 
drops. A fall in market liquidity is caused by share repurchase decision, as trading activity 
of share repurchase often widens bid-ask spread. Based on 17,012 observations they 
conclude that firms with relatively higher market liquidity repurchase their stock, while 
firms with lower market liquidity pay dividend. On the contrary, Jiang, Ma and Shi (2017) 
argue that opacity of information environment creates an avenue for insiders to make 
private gains without being detected. However, higher transparency (i.e., higher liquidity) 
obviates the likelihood of insiders’ expropriation, as the risk of being caught and legal 
action is higher. Consequently, net benefits of dividend payment are higher for higher 
liquidity. Based on 19,074 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2014 they find a positive 
relationship between market liquidity and dividend pay-out. 
                                                             




Fang, Noe and Tice (2009) find that a firm’s stock liquidity is positively related 
to the firm’s value based on 8,290 firm-year observations. Cheung, Chung and Fung 
(2015) buttress this finding by examining the impact of market liquidity on firm value in 
the Real Estate and Investment Trust (REIT) industry.  They find that stock liquidity 
increases firm value based on 1,229 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2006. 
Fang, Tian and Tice (2014) theorise that high market liquidity can invite hostile 
takeover. In a similar vein, lower trading cost (i.e., higher liquidity) facilitates easy exit 
and entry of institutional investors, which may trigger hostile takeover. Managers try to 
prevent this by focusing on short-term performance measures, through discountenancing 
innovation, to prevent temporary undervaluation of their firm’s stock. Using 29,469 firm-
year observations, from 1994 to 2005, they conclude that higher market liquidity reduces 
firm innovation. Based on a similar theoretical stance with Fang et al. (2014), Huang, Lao 
and McPhee (2016) posit that stock market liquidity encourages accrual manipulation, as 
managers try to prevent hostile takeover by focusing on short-term performance 
measures, through accrual manipulations, to prevent temporary undervaluation of their 
firm’s stock. Using 47,533 observations from 1993 to 2013, they find that higher stock 
market liquidity increases accrual manipulation. 
Liquidity is also important in mergers and acquisition decisions. Massa and Xu 
(2013) examine 534,165 mergers and acquisition transactions of US firms from 1987 to 
2007 and reach the conclusion that the stock of an acquirer, acquiring a liquid target, 
becomes more liquid and secondly, liquid targets earn higher premium from their 
acquirer.  
4.6.4.2 Factors Affecting Stock Market Liquidity 
(i) Information (non) disclosure 
Boone and Raman (2001) investigate the effect of off-balance sheet research and 
development (R&D) expenditure on stock market liquidity, arguing that the non-
disclosure of the R&D expenditure increases information asymmetry. Based on a sample 
of 158 and 487 R&D-intensive and non-R&D-intensive firms respectively, they find that 
non-recording of R&D expenditure is associated with lower stock market liquidity. 
Cao, Field and Hanka (2004) examine the argument that insider trading impairs 
market liquidity by increasing information asymmetry. Using 1,497 around IPOs lockup 
expiration from 1995 to 1999, they find, in contrast to the theory, a positive association 




Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find a negative relationship between accounting 
information quality and information asymmetry, which translates to a higher market 
liquidity. Similarly, Laidroo (2011) examines the impact of disclosure quality of public 
announcements on market liquidity in the Baltics. Based on 260 firm-year observations 
of 52 companies, he finds a positive relationship between public announcements’ 
disclosure quality and stock market liquidity. 
In 2010 and 2011, the Eurozone banking supervisors conducted a stress test for 
major European banks and published the results alongside their credit risk exposure. 
Bischof and Daske (2013) argue that this mandatory disclosure triggered subsequent 
voluntary disclosure by the banks, which has implications for the banks’ market liquidity. 
Based on 3,075 disclosure reports, they find an increase in market liquidity of the banks 
that follow the mandatory disclosure with voluntary disclosure, but a decrease in market 
liquidity for firms that did not follow up with voluntary disclosure. 
Blankespoor, Miller and White (2013) argue that not all relevant investors get 
necessary information about firms through traditional means, for example the press. Thus, 
they examine the impact of ‘firm-initiated news’ disseminated through twitter on stock 
market liquidity, as this reduces information asymmetry. Using 4,516 observations of 85 
IT firms, they find a positive association between dissemination of firm-initiated news on 
twitter and stock market liquidity.  
Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2014) argue that managers 
voluntarily release information (earnings guidance) above the mandated level to reduce 
information asymmetry between institutional investors and retail investors, which 
improves market liquidity. Based on 2,263 firm-fiscal quarter observations, they find an 
increase in market liquidity following voluntary release of information. 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015) examine the impact of corporate governance on risk 
disclosure of firms in the UK and Italy and the consequence of such disclosure on market 
liquidity of firms. Using 1,890 firm-year, they find that Italian firms with strong corporate 
governance that voluntarily disclose risk information have higher market liquidity. 
Bouzouita, Gajewski and Gresse (2015) hypothesise that the positive correlation 
between IPO under-pricing and stock market liquidity is related to increased production 
of information, which is informed by more analyst following firms after under-priced 
IPO. They confirmed this hypothesis using a sample of 326 IPOs of French companies 
from 1995-2008. 
Akrout and Ben Othman (2016), using signalling theory, argue that increased 




information asymmetry and consequently increases market liquidity. Using 276 firm-year 
observations from 2010 to 2012, they find a positive relationship between environmental 
disclosure and stock market liquidity.  In the US, Schoenfeld (2017) examines the effect 
of voluntary disclosure on market liquidity. Based on 368 S&P 500 firms, they find a 
positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity.  
Cashman, Harrison, Seiler and Sheng (2016) posit that geopolitical risk worsens 
information uncertainty for real estate firms with cross-border activities in the Asia-
Pacific region which create financing problems as investors are unable to really evaluate 
the firms. Using a sample of 184 real estate firms, they find support for their viewpoint. 
(ii) Share issue privatization 
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises through their listing on stock exchanges increases 
the depth of the market, as investors have more opportunities to diversify. Similarly, when 
such privatisation is accompanied by cross-country listings, depth also increases as a 
result of increase in both domestic and foreign investors’ participation. Consequently, 
stock market liquidity increases. Based on this theorisation, Bortolotti, De Jong, 
Nicodano and Schindele (2007) examine the impact of share issue privatisation on stock 
market liquidity in 19 countries from 1985 to 2002, they find a positive association 
between stock market liquidity and share issue privatisation.  
(iii) Asset liquidity  
Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner (2012) assess the relationship between asset liquidity and 
market liquidity of a firm. They argue that firms with less growth potentials and firms 
with financial constraints have higher market liquidity, as they are unlikely to invest their 
liquid assets. Based on this argument, they examine four measures of liquidity to arrive 
at the conclusion that asset liquidity has a positive relationship with market liquidity for 
firms with less growth potentials and firms with financial constraints.   Similarly, 
Charoenwong, Chong and Yang (2014) empirically test competing explanations of the 
relationship between asset liquidity and stock liquidity. The utilisation uncertainty 
hypothesis holds that higher cash holding translates to more future investment and hence, 
a higher uncertainty about the future value of assets. Moreover, the excess cash may be 
invested in negative NPV investments, which leads to lower liquidity.  On the contrary 
valuation hypothesis argues that liquid assets are much easier to value relative to 
nonliquid assets, thus, firms with more liquid assets exhibit lower valuation uncertainty. 
Based on 91,251 firm-year observations, they find asset liquidity to be positively related 




IFRS, as improved information environment reduces the reliance on the relationship 
between asset and stock market liquidity. 
(iv) Corporate governance  
Effective corporate governance mechanisms reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and investors, as more checks against opportunistic information manipulations 
by managers are in place, consequently, stock market liquidity increases. Based on this 
argument, Ali, Liu and Su (2016) find a positive relationship between corporate 
governance quality (measured by corporate governance ranking and rating in Howarth 
report) and stock market liquidity in Australia using 1,582 firm-years. 
Attig, Fong, Gadhoum and Lang (2006) argue that the higher the deviation 
between firm ownership and control, the higher the information asymmetry, which 
consequently results in lower stock liquidity. Based on a sample of 1,031 Canadian firms, 
they find that higher ownership-control divergence leads to lower market liquidity. Chu, 
Liu and Tian (2015) extend this line of argument. Based on 1,718 firm-year observations 
of 345 Chinese firms, they find the negative relationship between ownership-control 
divergence and stock market liquidity to be accentuated by state ownership and lower 
shareholder protection. On the contrary, Cueto, Lorne and Switzer (2013) find ownership 
concentration to have a negative effect on stock market liquidity among Brazilian and 
Chilean firms. However, they find cross-listing in the US stock market and threat from 
outside takeovers to have a positive effect on market liquidity based on a sample of 72 
firms.  
Zheng and Li (2008) find that under-pricing of IPO leads to ownership dispersion 
which subsequently leads to higher market liquidity. Using 1,179 sample firms, they find 
a positive relationship between under-pricing of IPO and stock market liquidity. 
Agudelo (2010) investigate the impact of foreign investors’ entry into six Asian 
and Johannesburg stock exchanges on market liquidity. Based on an observation of 359 
stocks, they find a positive relationship between foreign investor entry and stock market 
liquidity.  
Brockman and Oslen (2013) posit that the issue of warrants has a significant effect 
in altering the ownership structure of firms, which consequently affect firms’ market 
liquidity. They analyse 164 warrant-issuing US firms and arrive at the conclusion that the 





Sakawa, Ubukata and Watanabel (2014) argue that the control of a firm by a main 
bank, which is the largest lender to and shareholder of the firm reduces, information 
asymmetry and consequently increases stock market liquidity. Based on a sample of 819 
Japanese firms, they find a positive relationship between stock market liquidity and main 
bank-controlled board. Furthermore, they find a positive relationship between foreign 
shareholding and stock market liquidity.  
Syamala, Chauhan and Wadhwa (2014) investigate the impact of institutional 
ownership on stock market liquidity in India. Based on a sample of 800 firms from 2001 
to 2012, they find a significantly positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and stock market liquidity. Similarly, Tang and Wang (2011) find a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and stock market liquidity based on a sample of 1,343 
Chinese firms. Furthermore, Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013) find a negative relationship 
between high non-institutional ownership and market liquidity, but a positive relationship 
between board independence and separation of board chairman and CEO role and market 
liquidity based on 5,282 firm-months. 
Jiang, Kim and Kuvvet (2014) posit that better corporate governance can reduce 
ambiguity or uncertainty (i.e., a situation when an outcome and the distribution of an 
outcome are unknown) and a reduction in ambiguity leads to higher market liquidity. 
They confirm this hypothesis through an examination of 37,528 observations. 
Shi, Dempsey, Duong and Kalev (2015) compare the stock market liquidity of 
Hong-Kong (common law) and China (civil law) to establish whether any difference is 
due to the level of investor protection in the two countries. They find that Hong-Kong 
companies are more liquid than Chinese companies using a sample of 26 firms and 72 
firms from Hong-Kong and China respectively. They associate this finding to the 
difference in the level of investor protection in the two countries. 
Umar and Sun (2016) examine the relationship between stock market liquidity 
and leverage of banks. They find that for large banks, the relationship between market 
liquidity and leverage is positive, while for small banks the relationship is negative, based 
on a sample of 188 banks in BRICS49 countries. 
Farber, Huang and Mauldin (2016) investigate the impact of audit committee 
accounting expertise on stock market liquidity. Based on 2,342 firm-year observations of 
460 firms randomly selected from S&P 1500, they find a positive relationship between 
accounting expertise of audit committee and stock market liquidity. 
                                                             




(v) Dividend pay-out policy  
The ‘liquidity hypothesis of dividends’ (Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt, 2007) argues, in 
contrast to Miller and Modigliani’s dividend irrelevance, that trading in financial markets 
is not friction-free but has associated costs. Hence, investors satisfy their liquidity needs 
at minimal or no cost by giving preference to cash dividend-paying stock. Using a sample 
of NYSE and AMEX firms from 1963 to 2003, they find a negative relationship between 
cash dividends payment and market liquidity.  
(vi) Internationalisation 
Levine and Schmukler (2006) investigate the impact of firms raising capital and trading 
in foreign markets on stock market liquidity of firms in their domestic market. Using a 
sample of 2,900 firms across 45 developing countries, they find a negative relationship 
between the ‘foreign’ trading activities of firms raising capital abroad and liquidity of 
their domestic market. They explain this result as arising from the concentration of the 
activities of the firms raising capital abroad in international markets rather than their 
domestic markets. 
(vii) Investors’ sentiment and heterogeneity 
Liu (2015) confirms that investors’ optimism about future performance of the stock 
market (i.e., investors’ sentiment) is positively related to market liquidity. The theoretical 
basis of this stems from the notion that higher investors’ sentiment increases noise 
trading50, which ultimately increases market liquidity. Following this notion, Narasimhan 
and Kalra (2014) find a positive relationship between derivative trading and the liquidity 
of underlying stock of 60 stocks on the Bombay Stock Exchange.  
Ng, Wu, Yu and Zhang (2016) examine the impact of foreign investment 
heterogeneity on stock market liquidity. Based on 27,828 firm-year observations, they 
find a negative relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and stock market 
liquidity, while a positive relationship between foreign portfolio ownership and market 
liquidity was found. The theoretical argument holds that FDI allows foreign investors to 
own and control the firm, which allows them to gain private information and hence 
increases information asymmetry. Foreign portfolio investment, on the other hand, 
increases a firm’s shareholder base but not control. Consequently, market liquidity is 
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improved through increased trading volume. Figure 4.4 summarises the factors that affect 
stock market liquidity based on the literature. 












4.6.5 Review of Empirical Evidence and Development of Hypotheses 
4.6.5.1 IFRS adoption and market liquidity  
IFRS adoption has implications for several capital market outcomes, including cost of 
capital, market liquidity, and value relevance of accounting numbers. Whilst these three 
are the most common, research into the impact of IFRS adoption on other capital market 
outcomes aside these three has also been conducted.  However, the scope of this study is 
restricted to the impact of IFRS on market liquidity, as already discussed in section 4.5. 
Empirical findings on the impact of IFRS on market liquidity in prior studies are 
discussed below.  
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the literature on the link between IFRS adoption 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Literature on the Effects of IFRS on Market Liquidity 
Author (year) Context Period 
Effect of IFRS on 
Market Liquidity 
IFRS increases market liquidity 
Lang and Mafett 
(2011)                      
37 countries 1996 – 2008  
IFRS increases market 
liquidity. 
Katselas et al. 
(2016) 
16 countries 1998 – 2008 
IFRS increases market 
liquidity. 
Neel (2017) 23 countries 2001 – 2008  




Germany 1997 – 1998  
IFRS increases market 
liquidity. 
Mohd (2005)  US 1983 – 1988   
SFAS 86 increases 
market liquidity 
Frino et al. (2013) Italy 2004 – 2005 
IFRS increases market 
liquidity. 
IFRS does not increase market liquidity 
Christensen et al. 
(2013) 
23 countries 2001 – 2009  
IFRS does not 
significantly increase 
market liquidity. 
Daske et al. (2013) 30 countries 1990 – 2005  
IFRS significantly 
increase market liquidity 




Germany 2006 – 2008  
IFRS 8 does not 
significantly increase 
market liquidity. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine the impact of IAS on bid-ask spread in 
Germany. They argue that IAS adoption in Germany increases disclosure relative to the 
German GAAP and hence, reduces information asymmetry. Using a sample of 102 
German firms, they conclude that IAS adoption increases market liquidity in Germany. 
In the US, Mohd (2005) examines the impact of a change in accounting treatment 
of R&D from immediate expensing to an alternative capitalisation option on information 
asymmetry of software firms. Based on 253 firm-year observations, he finds lower 
information asymmetry following the introduction of SFAS51 86. Furthermore, a 
significantly lower information asymmetry is associated with firms capitalizing R&D 
compared to firms expensing it.  
                                                             





Frino, Palumbo, Capalbo, Gerace and Mollica (2013) assess the improvement in 
market liquidity in Italy following the adoption of IFRS. Using a sample of 222 
observations, they find a decrease in bid-ask spread for both large trades and small trades. 
Lang and Maffett (2011) document a positive relationship between transparency 
(measured by high-quality auditors, high-quality accounting standards, lower earnings 
management, more analyst coverage, and less analysts forecast error) and stock market 
liquidity across 37 countries, based on 507,822 firm-month observations.  
Katselas, Sviatoslav and Rosov (2016) investigate the impact of IFRS adoption 
on transparency through a reduction in the cost of adverse selection (proxied with the bid 
ask-spread). They examine 1,310 firms in 16 countries with 12,246 firm-month 
observations and conclude that cost of adverse selection reduced following IFRS adoption 
for voluntary adopters, but not for countries with high-quality local standard. 
Furthermore, they observe that reduction in the cost of adverse selection is dependent on 
strong enforcement in individual countries. 
Neel (2017) argues that the comparability of financial statements arising from 
IFRS adoption is positively related to market liquidity of firms. On this note, he explores 
a sample of 1,861 first-time adopters across 23 countries to reach a conclusion that 
financial statement comparability increases market liquidity following IFRS adoption. 
On the contrary, Christensen et al. (2013) examine the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on market liquidity in 35 countries. Based on 613,752 firm-quarter observations, 
they find that mandatory IFRS adoption has little effect on market liquidity, even when a 
country has strong legal enforcement. Similarly, Daske et al. (2013), based on 69,528 
firm years across 30 countries, find that IFRS adoption has a positive effect only for 
serious adopters (i.e., firms that adopt IFRS as part of a strategy to reinforce their 
commitment towards transparency). Furthermore, Franzen and Weißenberger (2018) 
investigate the impact of the adoption of IFRS 8 (segment reporting) on market liquidity 
in Germany. Based on 650 firm-year observations, they conclude that the adoption of 
IFRS 8 does not significantly improve market liquidity in Germany. 
Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer and Riedl (2010) examine the reaction of investors 
across European markets around 16 events surrounding IFRS adoption. They argue that 
the investors’ reaction could be negative or positive depending on their perception of 
IFRS. For example, they argue that investors may react negatively to IFRS adoption if 
they perceive the cost to be more than its benefits, or the differences in enforcement of 
compliance may facilitate managerial opportunistic behaviour, or that IFRS does not 




expect higher information quality following IFRS adoption. Based on “three-day value-
weighted market-adjusted returns” (p. 41) for 1,956 firms from 2002 to 2005, they find a 
positive investors’ reaction for companies with both lower and higher quality pre-
adoption information but a negative investors’ reaction for code law countries.  
Based on Armstrong et al.’s (2010) analysis, it is predicted that IFRS adoption 
will increase market liquidity in Nigeria, since IFRS was adopted in Nigeria to 
particularly improve the financial reporting integrity of the country. 
H1: IFRS adoption increases market liquidity of Nigerian listed companies  
4.6.5.2 Enforcement and market liquidity 
Kyriacou and Mase (2000) investigate the impact of a change to a rolling settlement 
system from an account-based settlement system in the UK stock exchange on market 
liquidity. They suggest that such change increases transaction cost of margin trading52, 
hence, leading to the exit of margin traders. Based on a sample of 51 firms, they find a 
positive relationship between the rolling settlement system and market liquidity.  
Ernstberger et al. (2012) examine the impact of accounting reform geared towards 
ensuring accurate application of accounting standards on stock market liquidity in 
Germany. Based on 1,464 observations, they find a higher market liquidity following the 
reform. Furthermore, they find this result to be more pronounced among firms with lower 
internal enforcement mechanisms. Christensen et al. (2016) investigate the effect of 
regulatory changes in the European Union on stock market liquidity. They argue that the 
regulatory changes are geared towards increasing transparency and reducing market 
abuse, which reduces information asymmetry and consequently improves stock liquidity. 
Using 112,260 firm-quarter observations, they find a significantly positive relationship 
between regulatory changes and stock market liquidity. 
Hedge and McDermott (2004) examine the effect of the introduction of 
DIAMONDS (index-tracking stock for Dow Jones Industrial Average 30 index) and Q’s 
(index-tracking stock for NASDAQ 100 index) on market liquidity. Based on a total 
sample of 41.2 million trades and 18.2 million quotes, they find a positive relationship 
between the introduction of the index-tracking stocks and stock market liquidity. 
Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) examine the impact of the differences in details of 
exchanges’ rules on market manipulation, broker-agency conflict and insider trading 
across 42 stock exchanges on stock market liquidity. Arguing that the extent of detail 
                                                             
52 Margin trading involves borrowing from a stock broker to buy stock. Such buyer opens a margin account 




affects investors’ confidence and consequently market liquidity, they find a negative 
relationship between the extent of detail and bid-ask spread.   
Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2005) examine the impact of financial analysts’ rating of 
disclosure policies of US firms on market liquidity of the firms. Using 1,374 firm-year 
observations, they observe that higher ratings are associated with increase in market 
liquidity of the firms. Jain, Kim and Rezaee (2008) argue that the introduction of SOX 
improves financial statement quality. Therefore, information quality increases and this 
consequently improves stock market liquidity. Based on a sample of 71,755,401 
observations of 610 US firms, they find a positive relationship between SOX introduction 
and stock market liquidity. Shroff, Sun, White and Zhang (2013) examine the effect of 
voluntary disclosure by US firms through management forecasts and press releases 
following Securities Offering Reform53 on market liquidity. Based on a sample of 792 
seasoned equity offerings, they find a positive relationship between SOR and market 
liquidity. Qu, Wang, Qin, Zhao and Wang (2017) examine the impact of US SEC’s 
regulation of fair disclosure of corporate information disclosed via social media. Based 
on a sample of 228 firms, they find a significantly positive relationship between the 
regulation and stock market liquidity. 
In China, Lee and Wong (2012) find a positive relationship between financial 
liberalisation (including banking deregulation and financial markets reform) and stock 
market liquidity.  
Evidence from prior studies above is unanimous on the positive relationship 
between enforcement or regulation and stock market liquidity. In Nigeria, it is expected 
that the establishment of the FRCN will improve market liquidity based on the interview 
with the financial analysts (see section 4). Thus, the second hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H2: The establishment of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria increases 




                                                             
53 The reform restricts gun-jumping. Gun-jumping involves soliciting for IPOs prior to approval by a 




Table 4.2 Summary of Literature on the Effects of Enforcement on Market 
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4.8 Research Method 
4.8.1 Research Design 
This study employs a longitudinal research design. Longitudinal research design involves 
a study of the same sample of objects over a period of time (Bryman, 2012). Longitudinal 
research design has two variants, namely panel design and cohort design. For a panel 
design, randomly selected subjects are studied at different points in time. In a cohort 
design, on the other hand, a study of all or a sample of subjects who share a common 
characteristic is conducted at different points in time. This study uses a cohort 
longitudinal design as the population of study are firms listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE). Hence, they all share a similar characteristic by being listed on the NSE 
and thus, are subject to similar rules and regulations. 
4.8.2 Sampling 
The study uses secondary data in testing the two hypotheses developed. The data were 
hand collected from an unstructured archive. An unstructured archive is a collection of 
data (for example, in documents or databases) that is not in a way that is readily suitable 
for the researcher’s intended purpose (Bloomfield, Nelson and Soltes, 2016). Hand 
collection is the sorting and extraction of the data from the unstructured archive. Data for 
this study were gathered from African Markets54 and the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
databases. Upon collection of the data, the data were processed to obtain both the 
dependent and independent variables. 
Sampling frame is a representation of the population from which the samples are 
selected (Black, 2010). A frame can be a list, a directory or a map that captures the 
elements of the population. The sampling frame for this study is the list of listed firms 
printed from the NSE website. The list as at 2016 contains 179 firms. The sample period 
is 2009 – 2014. The sampling procedure adopted in selecting the 76 non-financial firms 
is depicted in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Sampling  
     Firms 
Total number of firms listed as at 2016  179 
Less financial services firms  (55) 
Total non-financial firms       124 
Number of firms without relevant data for the sample period (2009-2014)       (44) 
Less outliers        (4) 
Final sample          76 
                                                             




Financial services firms are excluded from the sample because they face a 
different set of regulations55 in Nigeria, which can bias the true relationship between 
market liquidity and accounting regulation. Out of the 124 non-financial firms, 44 firms 
were excluded due to missing information56, which makes them unsuitable for analysis. 
Box plot was constructed for the data using IBM SPSS 22 which labels the extreme values 
and outliers in the data. Four of the companies had overly large values for their market 
liquidity in the opposite direction of the others. Hence, they were trimmed. The final 
sample is 76 non-financial firms. 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Industry of Sampled Firms 
Industry Sample Size Percentage 
Agriculture     4     5.26 
Conglomerates 5               6.58 
Construction/Real Estate 4               5.26 
Consumer Goods 17 22.37 
Healthcare 8 10.53 
ICT 4 5.26 
Industrial Goods  12    15.79 
Natural Resources 3 3.95 
Oil and Gas 6 7.89 
Services 13 17.11 
Total 76   100 
The distribution of the final sample of non-financial firms together with their 
industry is depicted in Table 4.4. 
4.8.3 Market Liquidity Models (Dependent Variable) 
Three proxies are adopted in this study in measuring the market liquidity of the Nigerian 
listed firms. These proxies are the bid-ask spread, the volume of trade and the proportion 
of zero daily returns. The next section considers each of these proxies. 
Table 4.5 depicts the definitions and measurements of all the variables used in the 
market liquidity models. 
 
 
                                                             
55 For example, corporate governance of banks was restructured, and a second bank consolidation was 
mandated by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009. Several mergers and acquisitions were also carried out 
during the sample period. 




Table 4.5 Definition and Measurement of Variables for the Market Liquidity Models 
Variables Measurement Source 
Dependent Variables 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡  bid-ask-spread for firm i at quarter t  
Christensen et al. 
(2013); Bar-Yosef 
and Prencipe (2013); 
Frino et al. (2013); 




natural logarithm of quarterly trade volume 
for firm i at quarter t 
Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000); Bekaert et al. 
(2007); Chai et al. 
(2010); Bar-Yosef 
and Prencipe (2013). 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡  
proportion of zero daily returns for firm i at 
quarter t 
Lesmond et al. 
(1999); Bekaert et al. 
(2007); Chai et al. 
(2010); Christensen 
et al. (2016). 
Independent Variables 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  
binary variable; 1 for periods after IFRS 
adoption (2012-2014) and 0 for periods before 
IFRS adoption (2009-2011) for firm i 
Christensen et al. 
(2013); Bar-Yosef 
and Prencipe (2013); 
Frino et al. (2013); 




binary variable; 1 for periods following 
enforcement (2011 to 2014) and 0 for period 
before enforcement (2009-2010) for firm i 
Ernstberger and 
Stich (2012); 
Christensen et al. 
(2016); Hedge and 
McDermott (2004); 
Heflin et al. (2005) 
Jain et al. (2008); 
Shroff et al. (2013); 
Qu et al. (2017). 
Control Variables 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 for firm 










(2013); Li et al. 
(2011); Christensen 
et al. (2013); Bar-
Yosef and Prencipe 
(2013); Frino et al. 
(2013); Katselas et 
al. (2016). 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
quarterly return volatility measured as the log 
of squared quarterly returns for firm i at 
quarter t (Li, Nguyen, Pham and Wei, 2011) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
percentage of independent directors to total 
directors on board for firm i at quarter t. 







highest percentage of ownership held by a 
single individual or entity for firm i at quarter 
t. 
Attig et al. (2006); 
Cueto et al. (2013); 
Bar-Yosef and 
Prencipe (2013); Chu 
et al. (2015) 




company size measured as the natural log of 
total assets of firm i at quarter t 
Fehle (2004); Attig 
et al. (2006). 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 
leverage for firm i at quarter t, measured 
as the proportion of total liabilities to total 
assets. 
Frino et al. (2013); 
Bar-Yosef and 
Prencipe (2013) 
𝑤𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝐴𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) 
it (firm-specific error term) + uit 
(idiosyncratic error term) 
Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009) 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 
Interaction variable between IFRS and the 
percentage of independent directors to total 
directors on board for firm i at quarter t 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 
Interaction variable between enforcement and 
the highest percentage of ownership held by a 
single individual or entity for firm i at quarter 
t. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 industry dummy for the sampled firms 
4.8.3.1 Quoted bid-ask spread model 
The bid-ask spread is the difference between the bid (the buying price) and ask price (the 
offer price) of a firms’ stock. The higher the bid-ask spread, the lower the liquidity of a 
firm and vice versa. The bid-ask spread (BAS) (quoted and effective) is considered the 
best measure of market liquidity (Amihud, 2002; Christensen et al., 2013). However, only 
the quoted BAS is used in this study because the data for calculating effective spread is 





     (4.1) 
The details of the BAS model for testing the effect of IFRS adoption and 
enforcement are given below: 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿9𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿10𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡                                (4.2) 
The definition of variables and their measurements are presented in Table 4.5. 
4.8.3.2 Volume model 
As a form of robustness test, volume of trade is used to further assess the reduction in 




that the activities of market participants (e.g., block shareholders and financial analysts), 
who are capable of making informed judgements or opinions from publicly disclosed 
information, widens the bid-ask-spread (also see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2007). 
This is because on extracting such informed judgement about a firm’s performance, the 
demand for the stock increases and sellers would only sell at a premium, based on the 
buying pressure (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012). Thus, although bid-ask spread 
increases, informed traders would still prefer to be well-informed and trade in illiquid 
market, which increases volume (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Conversely, where 
informed traders are less active or few (as is likely the case in Nigeria) or where 
information disclosed (inside information) is rather negative about a firm’s performance, 
bid-ask spread reduces, and volume also reduces due to reduced activities of informed 
traders or the consequence of negative information disclosed.  
This study argues that IFRS reduces inside information in Nigeria because of its 
robust disclosure requirements compared to the Nigerian GAAP and the FRCN reduces 
inside information by compelling companies to disclose necessary information and 
sanctioning them when they do not. Secondly, this study contends that informed traders 
are less active in Nigeria. Hence, IFRS and FRCN are expected to be negatively related 
with trade volume.  
The volume model is given below: 
         𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿9𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿10𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                            (4.3) 
The definition of variables and their measurements are presented in Table 4.5. 
4.8.3.3 Proportion of zero daily returns days model 
Another measure of liquidity is the proportion of the zero daily returns (hereafter, zero 
returns) developed by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999). Lesmond et al. (1999) argue 
that if available information is not sufficient to compensate for the cost of transacting, 
informed traders may not trade or they may reduce their trading activity. Thus, there will 
be no price movement from the previous day. Similarly, uninformed traders would 
generally not trade when liquidity is low or transaction cost is high. Again, there would 
be no price movement from the previous day.  The proportion of zero daily returns 
measures the number of days without price movement to the total trading days. Bekaert, 





The proportion of the zero daily returns is estimated using the formula below: 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 =
𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡
   (4.4) 
Bekaert et al. (2007) argue that there are some limitations with the zero returns 
measure. Thus, they recommend a transformation of this measure using the formula 
below: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 − 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡     (4.5) 
The zero returns model is with IFRS, enforcement and other control variables is 
stated as follows: 
         𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛿1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿9𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿10𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡      (4.6) 
 
The definition of variables and their measurement are presented in table 4.3. In all 
the models, the interaction variable between IFRS and Enf is omitted because including 
such variable creates a perfect multicollinearity with IFRS variable. The reason for this 
is because IFRS was made mandatory for all the Nigerian firms at the same time (i.e., 
year 2012). Similarly, the FRCN affects the firms in the same way.  
4.9 Data Analysis 
4.9.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables before and after the adoption 
of IFRS. It can be seen that the mean bid-ask-spread significantly reduces post-IFRS 
adoption. This suggests a reduction in information asymmetry due to more disclosure of 
information by IFRS than the Nigerian GAAP.  There is also a reduction in trading 
volume of stock, which further supports the reduction in information asymmetry 
following IFRS adoption. However, a reduction in trading volume may imply that there 
is a reduction in the activities of informed traders in Nigeria or they are few, as argued by 
Kim and Verrecciha (1994). Zero returns significantly reduces post-IFRS adoption. Since 
the zero returns is a transformation of Lesmond et al.’s model (i.e., 1 - Zeroit), which 
measures liquidity, the reduction in zero returns supports the existence of few informed 
traders or a reduction in their activities.  
Furthermore, market returns become more volatile (volatility) in the post-FRCN 
establishment period. This suggests a higher uncertainty in predicting firms’ returns. 
There is a significant reduction in market return post-IFRS adoption, which supports the 




There is a significant increase in the proportion of independent directors following IFRS 
adoption. Perhaps, this is informed by the firms’ need to show more transparency. Size 
of firms significantly increased as well, but there is no proportionate increase in earnings 
(EPS) to justify the investment in more assets.  
Table 4.7 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables before and after the 
establishment of the FRCN. It can be seen that the mean bid-ask-spread significantly 
reduces post-FRCN establishment. This suggests a reduction in information asymmetry 
due to the enhanced monitoring by the FRCN.  There is also a reduction in trading volume 
of stock, which further supports the reduction in information asymmetry following the 
establishment of the FRCN. However, a reduction in trading volume may imply that there 
is a reduction in the activities of informed traders in Nigeria or they are few, as argued by 
Kim and Verrecciha (1994). Zero returns significantly reduces post-FRCN establishment, 
which further supports a reduction in the activities of informed traders.  
Furthermore, market returns become more volatile (volatility) in the post-FRCN 
establishment period. This suggests a higher uncertainty in predicting firms’ returns. 
There is a significant reduction in market return post-FRCN establishment, which 
supports the significant increase in volatility. There is a significant increase in the 
proportion of independent directors in the post-FRCN establishment period. Perhaps, this 
is informed by the firms’ need to show more transparency. Size of firms significantly 
increased as well, but there is no proportionate increase in earnings (EPS) to justify the 
investment.  
Table 4.8 depicts the correlation between all the variables used in the three 
liquidity models. None of the variables has a correlation of 80% or more, which suggests 
that there is no multicollinearity. Furthermore, volume and zero are positively correlated 
as found by Bekaert et al. (2007) and Chai et al. (2010). Zero is negatively correlated with 
BAS at 10% level of significance. This low correlation also confirms the finding of Chai 
et al. (2010). However, the negative correlation between Zero and BAS is due to the 
transformation in Lesmond et al.’s (1999) zero model57. Both the IFRS and Enf variables 
are negatively and significantly correlated with all the three measures of liquidity, 
suggesting that the two mechanisms increase liquidity of the Nigerian listed firms. 
However, the negative correlations with the volume and zero returns further suggests the 
existence of few informed traders or a reduction in their activities. 
                                                             




Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis of Variables before and after IFRS Adoption 
Variables 
Pre-IFRS Adoption Post-IFRS Adoption Univariate Analysis 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max T-test 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
BAS 888 0.1035 0.268 0 1.7297 907 0.0066 0.0095 0 0.1074 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Volume 884 12.1424 2.0556 4.7593 18.184 899 11.7527 2.5213 1.3783 17.4184 0.0004*** 0.0363** 
Zero 884 0.3856 0.2999 0 1 901 0.3188 0.2935 0 1 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Lev 868 0.783 1.6783 0.0275 16.5731 892 0.7886 1.5277 0.0506 13.5206 0.9411 0.3926 
Maxinv 912 0.4008 0.205 0.0539 0.887 908 0.4054 0.2104 0.0539 0.887 0.6360 0.5531 
Ind 912 0.0082 0.0472 0 0.429 908 0.0237 0.0753 0 0.429 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
EPS 853 1.6026 3.1246 0 18.3471 888 1.8496 4.0005 0 28.34 0.1525 0.2358 
Size 752 6.9969 0.6397 5.7674 8.603 732 7.1264 0.6882 5.7241 8.9491 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 
Return 912 0.0111 0.0593 -0.1068 0.12265 912 -0.0131 0.0365 -0.0658 0.0788 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Volatility 912 -2.9061 0.7161 -4.2209 -1.8241 912 -3.0425 0.4117 -3.9311 -2.2935 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 











Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis of Variables before and after FRCN Establishment 
Variables 
Pre-FRCN Establishment Post-FRCN Establishment Univariate Analysis 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max T-test 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
BAS 585 0.1551 0.3182 0 1.7297 1,210 0.0059 0.0088 0 0.1074 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Volume 585 12.203 2.0709 4.8993 18.184 1,198 11.8204 2.4088 1.3783 17.4184 0.0010*** 0.0086*** 
Zero 585 0.4427 0.3109 0 1 1,200 0.3076 0.2819 0 1 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Lev 568 0.7666 1.5757 0.0275 15.808 1,192 0.795 1.6169 0.0483 16.5731 0.7279 0.3379 
Maxinv 608 0.4001 0.2049 0.0539 0.887 1,212 0.4046 0.2091 0.0539 0.887 0.6576 0.6021 
Ind 608 0.0018 0.0221 0 0.273 1,212 0.0231 0.075 0 0.429 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
EPS 557 1.5889 3.0611 0 17.6626 1,184 1.7943 3.8257 0 28.34 0.2669 0.0327 
Size 496 6.9717 0.6359 5.7674 8.5132 988 7.1055 0.6779 5.7241 8.9491 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 
Return 608 0.0083 0.0695 -0.1068 0.1227 1,216 -0.0057 0.0372 -0.0658 0.07881 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Volatility 608 -2.6777 0.5498 -3.4268 -1.8241 1,216 -3.1225 0.5491 -4.2209 -2.2935 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 





4.9.2 Regression Analysis 
To test whether fixed effect or random effect is appropriate, the Hausman test was 
conducted. The test gave a p-value of 0.9041 for the BAS model which implies a non-
rejection of the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients of the fixed and random 
effect model is systematic. A random effect model is hence favoured. Furthermore, 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects was conducted. With a p-
value of 0.0271, which is less than 0.05 (5% significance level), the test result indicates 
the existence of random effect (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2012). Based on this result, a 
random-effect regression is run to test the hypotheses of this study using the BAS model.  
For the volume and zero daily returns model, the Hausman test gave a p-value of 
0.000, which supports the use of fixed-effect. Thus, the fixed-effect regression is used for 
both the volume and the zero returns model. 
To control for heteroskedasticity in all the three models, particularly as it a major 
problem associated with short panels58 (Hill et al., 2012), the standard errors were 
clustered to obtain heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The results of the random-
effect model and the fixed-effect models are presented in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 depicts the regression results of the three liquidity models. IFRS 
adoption significantly reduces the bid-ask spread at 1% level of significance. Thus, the 
adoption of IFRS improves market liquidity of the Nigerian listed firms. This result 
confirms the first hypothesis of this study. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Mohd, 
2005; Frino et al., 2013; Lang and Maffett, 2011; Neel, 2017; Katselas et al., 2016), 
IFRS’s higher disclosures than the Nigerian GAAP reduces information asymmetry, and 
consequently improves market liquidity. This result however, contradicts the finding of 
Franzen and Weißenberger (2018). This is because their study only examined the 
adoption of IFRS 8, which may not be perceived by stakeholders as a substantial 
improvement to the information environment of Germany. For the volume and zero 
returns models, IFRS does not have any significant effect. This result, as argued by Chai 




                                                             




Table 4.8 Pairwise Correlation of all Variables in all the Models 
Variables Zero Lev Maxinv Ind Volume EPS Size BAS IFRS Enf IFRSmax Enfmax Return Volatility 
Zero 1              
Lev -0.128*** 1             
Maxinv -0.107*** -0.0713** 1            
Ind 0.0483 0.0211 0.169*** 1           
Volume 0.627*** -0.163*** -0.182*** 0.0425 1          
EPS 0.0804** 0.00928 0.227*** 0.0107 -0.00440 1         
Size 0.337*** -0.0477 0.303*** 0.242*** 0.354*** 0.478*** 1        
BAS -0.0573* -0.0111 0.0211 -0.0536* -0.0490 -0.0159 -0.0540* 1       
IFRS -0.0995*** 0.0628* 0.0231 0.116*** -0.0729** 0.0487 0.0890*** -0.251*** 1      
Enf -0.219*** 0.0673* 0.0243 0.157*** -0.0822** 0.0284 0.0828** -0.369*** 0.690*** 1     
IFRSmax -0.0887*** 0.000948 0.463*** 0.200*** -0.123*** 0.162*** 0.212*** -0.200*** 0.791*** 0.545*** 1    
Enfmax -0.178*** -0.0141 0.597*** 0.256*** -0.147*** 0.172*** 0.243*** -0.269*** 0.503*** 0.721*** 0.765*** 1   
Return -0.0169 -0.0130 0.00274 -0.0321 -0.0391 -0.00255 -0.0171 -0.0559* -0.263*** -0.141*** -0.205*** -0.101*** 1  
Volatility 0.178*** -0.0304 -0.0102 -0.0571* 0.0249 0.00895 -0.0170 0.102*** -0.0780** -0.320*** -0.0619* -0.230*** 0.238*** 1 
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Table 4.9 Regression Results 
Variables  
BAS Volume Zero Daily 
Returns 
 
         Estimates 
         (p-value) 
 
         Estimates 
          (p-value) 
Estimates 
(p-value) 
Intercept 0.2433  






    (0.000)*** 
-2.5628 
     (0.000)*** 
         -0.2433  
(0.075)* 
Volatility 0.0011 
  (0.644) 
0.0763 
(0.150) 
          0.0556  
    (0.000)*** 




0.0029   
(0.623) 
IFRS              -0.0136 
          (0.000)*** 
-0.2721 
   (0.339) 
0.0096  
(0.836) 
Enf -0.0984                    
(0.000)*** 
-0.4795 
    (0.034)** 
-0.2355  
      (0.000)*** 






Maxinv 0.1076                             
(0.026)** 
3.927  
    (0.050)** 
0.5222  
 (0.095)* 

















    (0.036)** 
Size -0.0155         
(0.007)*** 
1.3138 
     (0.042)** 
0.2829   
    (0.021)** 
Qrt fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes - -59 
Adjusted R2 21.78% 5.89% 18.45% 
Firm-quarters 1,416 1,417 1,418 
***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The establishment of and enforcement by the FRCN significantly improves 
market liquidity of the Nigerian listed firms across all the three proxies of market 
liquidity. Thus, the second hypothesis of this study is confirmed. This result confirms the 
findings in prior studies (Kyriacou and Mase, 2000; Hedge and McDermott, 2004; Heflin 
et al., 2005; Jain et al., 2008; Ernstberger and Stich, 2012; Lee and Wong, 2012; Shroff 
et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2016; Qu et al., 2017). The establishment of and 
enforcement by the FRCN has a significant negative relationship with the bid-ask spread 
at 1% level of significance. However, its significant negative relationship with volume 
                                                             
59 Clustering is at firm-level. 
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and zero returns implies that there is a reduction in the activities of informed traders in 
the Nigerian stock market (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Lesmond et al., 1999; Bekaert et 
al., 2007). Based on these results, the second hypothesis of this study is also confirmed. 
This indicates that the establishment of the FRCN reduces information asymmetry via the 
publication of monitoring procedures and sanctions, which reassures the Nigerian public 
of the credibility of the financial statements produced by the Nigerian listed firms.  
Consistent with prior studies (Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Bar-Yosef and Prencipe, 
2013; Franzen and Weißenberger, 2018) market return is significantly negative across all 
the three liquidity models. Return volatility is positively related to zero returns, which is 
also consistent with prior studies (Bar-Yosef and Prencipe, 2013; Christensen et al., 2016; 
Franzen and Weißenberger, 2018).   Maxinv is significantly positive across all the three 
measures of liquidity (see Bar-Yosef and Prencipe, 2013), while size is negatively related 
to the BAS but positively related to volume and zero returns (Fehle, 2004; Attig et al., 
2006). The interaction term between Enf and Maxinv improves market liquidity as shown 
by its negative relationship with BAS and positive relationship with volume and zero 
returns. Which means the enforcement by the FRCN and the highest percentage of 
individual ownership of the shares of the firm is perceived as a positive development by 
the Nigerian stock market. 
The results equally confirm the assumption of the signalling theory that the 
adoption of IFRS and the establishment of the FRCN signals to the market that a 
transparent financial reporting regime has been adopted in Nigeria. Thus, the market 
participants respond to these reforms by reducing their suspicion of sellers withholding 
private information. The government of Nigeria (the signaller) benefits from a higher 
market liquidity, which translates to higher investment. The investors, on the other hand, 
benefit from a more transparent market, which will reduce adverse selection. 
4.9.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Some studies use trading volume as a control variable (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Frino 
et al, 2013; Bar-Yosef and Prencipe, 2013; Franzen and Weißenberger, 2018). To test 
whether the result of this study is sensitive to the non-inclusion of volume as a control 
variable, another regression is run for the BAS and zero returns models with volume as 
one of the control variables. The results of the sensitivity test presented in Table 4.10 
shows that the explanatory power of the variables of interest (Enf and IFRS) is robust and 
does not change with the inclusion of volume.  
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         Estimates 
         (p-value) 
Estimates 
(p-value) 
Intercept 0.2525  








    (0.000)*** 
         -0.0874  
(0.460) 
Volatility 0.0014 
  (0.587) 
          0.0533 
    (0.000)*** 
EPS 0.0005    
(0.655) 
0.0054   
(0.246) 
IFRS              -0.0155 
          (0.000)*** 
0.0224  
(0.604) 
Enf -0.1014                    
(0.000)*** 
-0.2045  
      (0.000)*** 
















Enfmax -0.0926               
(0.078)* 
0.0621 
    (0.058)* 
Size -0.0005         
(0.580) 
0.2138  
    (0.031)** 
Qrt fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes - 
Adjusted R2 26.10% 33.72% 
Firm-quarters 1,415 1415 
***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
4.9.2.2 Further sensitivity analysis 
The market may have been aware of the strengthened enforcement by the NASB in 2010. 
Thus, information asymmetry may have reduced from this point onwards. To test whether 
the initial results are sensitive to this argument, a new regression is run with the binary 
variable Enf, measured as 0 for 2009 and 1 from 2010 – 2014. Table 4.11 presents the 
regression results. A similar result is obtained, as IFRS adoption and enforcement by the 
NASB/FRCN have a significant negative relationship with the bid-ask spread. Similarly, 
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their negative relationship with both volume and zero returns reinforces the argument that 
the informed traders became inactive following the reduction in the bid-ask spread. 
Table 4.11 Sensitivity Analysis Results (Date of Enforcement) 
Variables 
BAS Volume Zero Daily 
Returns 
 
         Estimates 
         (p-value) 
 
         Estimates 













    (0.000)*** 
-2.8911 
     (0.000)*** 
         -0.4887  
(0.000)*** 
Volatility -0.0189 
  (0.000)*** 
0.0778 
(0.185) 
          0.0406 
    (0.000)*** 




0.0029   
(0.623) 
IFRS              -0.5439 
          (0.001)*** 
-0.2721 
   (0.038)** 
-0.1116 
(0.066)* 
Enf -0.0544                   
(0.000)*** 
-0.1169 
    (0.447) 
-0.1266 
      (0.000)*** 






Maxinv 0.1351                             
(0.000)*** 
3.927  
    (0.050)** 
0.6339  
 (0.033)** 

















    (0.000)** 
Size -0.0045       
(0.573) 
1.2738 
     (0.058)* 
0.3076   
    (0.021)** 
Qrt fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes - -60 
Adjusted R2 23.54% 5.59% 17.37% 
Firm-quarters 1,416 1,417 1,418 
***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Since an interactive variable between IFRS and enforcement cannot be created due 
to the Enf and IFRS variable being measured by year dummies and such variable will have a 
perfect multicollinearity with the IFRS variable, another regression is run for the period 2009 
– 2011 when IFRS was not adopted. This is to ensure that the conclusion that enforcement 
improves market liquidity is not spurious. Table 4.12 shows the result of the regressions for 
                                                             
60 Clustering is at firm-level. 
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all the market liquidity proxies. Enforcement has a significantly negative relationship with 
the bid-ask spread, volume and zero returns at 1%, 10% and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively, which confirms the initial results and conclusions.   
Table 4.12 Sensitivity Analysis Result (for the Period 2009 – 2011)  
Variable 
BAS Volume Zero Daily 
Returns 
 
         Estimates 
         (p-value) 
 
         Estimates 













    (0.000)*** 
-1.4698 




  (0.000)*** 
0.034 
(0.647) 
          0.0573 
    (0.000)*** 






Enf -0.0812                  
(0.001)*** 
-0.3922 
    (0.084)* 
-0.2139 
      (0.000)*** 






Maxinv 0.0729                             
(0.113) 
10.4222 
    (0.233) 
-0.1966 
 (0.909) 











    (0.014)** 
Size -0.0093       
(0.606) 
-0.3154 
     (0.642) 
-0.1365   
    (0.441) 
Qrt fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes - -61 
Adjusted R2 49.87% 6.27% 27.47% 
Firm-quarters 690 690 690 
***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Similarly, to test whether the significance of the enforcement in improving market 
liquidity is not sensitive to the effective date of enforcement, a further regression is run with 
the binary enforcement variable, Enf, measured as 0 for 2009 and 1 for 2010 and 2011. Table 
4.13 presents the regression results. Similar to the previous results, enforcement significantly 
improves market liquidity. 
                                                             
61 Clustering is at the firm-level. 
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Table 4.13 Sensitivity Analysis Result for the Period 2009 – 2011 and 2010 as the 
Effective Date of Enforcement 
Variable 
BAS Volume Zero Daily 
Returns 
 
         Estimates 
         (p-value) 
 
         Estimates 













    (0.000)*** 
-1.094 




  (0.000)*** 
0.1758 
(0.069)* 
          0.0386 
    (0.002)*** 






Enf -0.1542                 
(0.000)*** 
0.2252 
    (0.147) 
-0.0832 
      (0.011)** 






Maxinv 0.1183                             
(0.002)*** 
9.7927 
    (0.299) 
-0.12 
 (0.949) 











    (0.004)*** 
Size -0.0114       
(0.533) 
-0.9272 
     (0.177) 
-0.1977 
    (0.277) 
Qrt fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes - -62 
Adjusted R2 43.39% 5.91% 23.62% 
Firm-quarters 690 690 690 
***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
4.10 Discussion of Findings and Conclusion 
This study examines the effectiveness of accounting reform in the form of IFRS adoption 
and the strengthening of enforcement institution in improving market liquidity in a highly 
corrupt environment without other improvements in macro institutional structures that 
could reinforce the accounting reform.  The study finds that regardless of the weaknesses 
in macro institutional structures, accounting reforms that have been undertaken by the 
Nigerian government are effective in enhancing the country’s capital market outcome. 
Although, both enforcement and IFRS adoption are important regulatory 
measures that have significant impact on the Nigerian capital market in the form of 
                                                             
62 Clustering is at the firm-level. 
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improved market liquidity, the strength of enforcement is enhancing market liquidity is 
more than that of IFRS63. This argument supports the conclusion of Christensen et al. 
(2013) that concurrent enforcement rather than the adoption of IFRS is a better 
explanation for improved capital market outcomes in prior studies. Although This finding 
indicates the importance of institutional settings in accounting regulations study.  
Contrary to prior studies that argue that higher benefits of IFRS adoption is 
attributable to countries that have strong legal enforcement (Daske et al. 2008, Li 2010), 
this study finds that despite the weak legal enforcement in Nigeria, IFRS adoption 
significantly increases market liquidity in Nigeria.  Similarly, the argument that IFRS 
only has a positive effect on capital market outcomes of countries whose GAAP exhibit 
higher divergence from IFRS (see Florou and Pope 2012, Byard et al. 2011, Tan et al. 
2011) does not hold in Nigeria as the Nigerian GAAP has a low divergence from IFRS 
(ROSC 2004, 2011).  
This study contributes to prior literature on the effects of IFRS adoption and 
enforcement on capital market outcomes, which has remained inconclusive (Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016, De George et al. 2016). Due to the setting of our study, where enforcement 
had improved prior to IFRS adoption, we were unable to examine the effect of IFRS on 
market liquidity where IFRS was adopted before the strengthening of enforcement. Thus, 
future studies may explore the effect of IFRS in such other unique settings. 
This study is also limited by the inability to examine the effect of the interaction 
of IFRS and enforcement on market liquidity. This is because creating such variable leads 
to a perfect multicollinearity with the IFRS variable, as there is no variation in the 
adoption period of IFRS by Nigerian listed firms. Similarly, a more critical theory (e.g., 
institutional theory) may be explored to further understand the underlying isomorphic 
pressures that could explain reduction in information asymmetry in Nigeria around the 
period of enforcement and IFRS adoption. This would need further data (e.g., interviews 
with financial analysts) collection which is beyond the scope of this work.   
Notwithstanding this shortcoming, this study’s result is novel, as it uncovers that 
both IFRS and enforcement are of benefits to the capital market by exploring the unique 
setting of Nigeria. Hence, this study recommends that countries with a similar setting as 
Nigeria are encouraged to adopt IFRS and create an institution to monitor financial 
reporting in general, as this would bring about an improved capital market outcome. 
                                                             
63 See the last sensitivity analysis result 
 
 




Summary and Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Reflection 
The first empirical part of the thesis (chapter 2) challenges the notion that developing 
countries are replete with weak accounting infrastructure, which makes them to 
symbolically adopt IFRS. In the context of Nigeria, the study begins by examining 
whether the recent reform of accounting infrastructure tells a different story from what is 
in extant literature regarding developing countries’ adoption of IFRS.   It begins with 
assessing whether the outcome of the institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria is substantive 
or symbolic. This is due to the fact that most developing countries do not have the 
necessary infrastructures to substantively adopt IFRS. However, in Nigeria, the recent 
reform of accounting infrastructures through the establishment of the FRCN, the reform 
of accounting profession and education, and some other ancillary isomorphic factors like 
parent companies’ influence makes the adoption of IFRS substantive.  
The study adopts the Dillard et al.’s (2004) variant of institutional theory to 
understand the institutionalisation process of IFRS in Nigeria. It is important to explicate 
the institutionalisation process to fully comprehend why the outcome may be a 
substantive or symbolic adoption. This study finds that institutionalisation follows a 
stepwise process. At the social, political, and economic level, the institutionalisation 
process is tailored towards creating an enforcement institution (i.e., the FRCN) that will 
transfer the rule (IFRS) to the organisational field. At the organisational field, the 
enforcement institution develops different strategies that will ensure that companies 
‘appear’ to comply with IFRS by using it for external reporting. The substantive adoption 
(for internal reporting) of IFRS at the organisational level is ensured by the joint effect of 
the strategies developed by the FRCN and other ancillary factors.  
By conducting annual review of financial statements and sanctioning erring 
companies, the FRCN ensures that Nigerian companies’ audited financial statements are 
in compliance with IFRS. Furthermore, the requirement by the FRCN that auditors must 
sign audited financial statements in their names has made external auditors to be more 
meticulous in ensuring that their clients’ financial statements comply with IFRS. The 
members of ICAN and accounting graduates exert normative pressure on companies 
through their IFRS-based trainings. Since the board of directors are required to submit 
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quarterly reports to the SEC and the FRCN, they ensure that these quarterly reports 
comply with IFRS. Thus, this makes Nigerian firms to use IFRS for internal reporting, 
thereby, adopting it substantively. Other factors consolidating this substantive use of 
IFRS are the requirements by parent companies that their Nigerian subsidiaries’ reports 
comply with IFRS; the cost of translating internal reports from Nigerian SAS to IFRS; 
and the internal checks of underlying records by internal auditors.  
An important contribution of this chapter is that it shows the institutionalisation 
of IFRS as a process rather than as outcome, which is the gap that previous studies could 
not feel. By unveiling the institutionalisation process, the study is able to explain how the 
outcome of IFRS adoption in Nigeria has been substantive. Secondly, the chapter tells a 
different story of the institutionalisation of IFRS. Unlike in previous studies where IFRS 
is symbolically adopted, in Nigeria, IFRS is substantively institutionalised. Thirdly, the 
chapter shows that developing countries can focus on establishing a strong enforcement 
institution and overhaul their accounting education to ensure substantive adoption of 
IFRS regardless of any enhancement in the macrolevel governance structures such as the 
rule of law. Finally, the chapter has a significant implication for the inferences made in 
both chapters three and four, in that a substantive adoption implies IFRS data used in 
chapters three and four are reliable.   
Chapter three moves further to examine the second argument associated with 
IFRS adoption. Given the substantive adoption of IFRS in Nigeria, it is important to 
determine whether this outcome translates to a better accounting quality, as argued by the 
IASB and the US SEC. There have been many studies (e.g., Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; 
Barth et al., 2008; Chua et al., 2012; Kabir et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2013; Doukakis, 
2014; Burnett et al., 2015; Christensen et al., 2015; Bryce et al., 2015; Capkun et al., 
2016) from both developed and developing countries that looked into the effect of IFRS 
adoption on accounting quality. However, their results have been highly mixed. Some 
argue that IFRS adoption does not improve accounting quality (e.g., Kabir et al., 2010; 
Bryce et al., 2015; Christensen et al., 2015; Capkun et al. 2016). Other studies, on the 
other hand, conclude that IFRS adoption increases accounting quality (e.g., Barth et al., 
2008; Chen et al., 2010; Chua et al., 2012; Wan Ismail et al., 2013; Lourenco et al., 2015). 
Following these streams of conflicting findings, Chritsensen et al. (2015) argue that for 
voluntary IFRS adopters, incentives to improve reporting quality rather than IFRS 
adoption, enhances accounting quality.  For mandatory IFRS adopters, enforcement of 
accounting standards rather than IFRS, improves accounting quality. To confirm the 
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above, assertion, a setting where the effect of enforcement and IFRS adoption on 
accounting quality can be easily separated is needed. The unique setting of Nigeria, where 
the FRCN was established one year before IFRS adoption, provides a rare opportunity 
for answering this question. 
Chapter 3 assesses the effect of IFRS and enforcement on accounting quality in 
Nigeria. The chapter explores accounting quality from three dimensions, namely earnings 
management, timely loss recognition, and earnings persistence.  The chapter adopts fixed-
effect panel regression for earnings management, binary logistic regression for timely 
loss recognition and generalised method of moment (GMM) for earnings persistence. The 
chapter’s finding is novel. Previous studies that looked at the joint effect IFRS adoption 
cum enforcement on accounting quality find that enforcement rather than IFRS adoption 
improves accounting quality (Christensen, 2013; 2015). Other studies find that IFRS 
adoption and enforcement reinforce each other in improving accounting quality (Cai et 
al., 2014; Kim, 2016). However, this chapter finds that IFRS adoption reduces accounting 
quality, while enforcement of accounting standard increases accounting quality.  
Chapter four examines the argument relating to the effect of IFRS adoption on the 
capital market. This study focuses on market liquidity, as it is the most theoretically linked 
capital market outcome resulting from accounting infrastructures reform (Christensen et 
al., 2013). Leuz and Wysocki (2016) argue that the effect of IFRS on accounting quality 
does not affect its effect on the capital market, since the capital market acts on news and 
signals. The result of IFRS adoption and enforcement on market liquidity in Nigeria 
confirms this viewpoint. Although IFRS reduces accounting quality and enforcement 
increases it, the adoption of IFRS and the establishment of the FRCN both increase market 
liquidity in Nigeria. Thus, there is a trade-off between improved accounting quality and 
capital market benefits following IFRS adoption. 
Three proxies of market liquidity were used in this chapter. A random-effect 
regression was adopted for the bid-ask spread regression, while a fixed-effect regression 
was adopted for both the zero returns and the volume models. The study finds that, 
although, IFRS adoption and enforcement reduce information asymmetry, the two 
regulatory mechanism decreased volume and zero returns (as modified). This is due to 
the inactiveness of informed traders or because the inside information revealed was a 
negative one (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994).  
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5.2 Implications of the Study 
The results of chapter three hold some economic and social implications. Rather than 
developing countries that have similar socio-political and economic settings with Nigeria 
investing in IFRS adoption, their strengthening of their enforcement mechanisms is what 
is essential for them to improve accounting quality in their countries. Secondly, the model 
used in Nigeria by establishing the FRCN can be adopted by other developing countries 
regardless of a weak social, political, and economic environment, as it has shown to be 
effective.  
Adopting IFRS by a country like Nigeria is inimical to having an improvement in 
accounting quality. IFRS increases flexibility in applying accounting methods, thereby 
jeopardizing the desire to control the managerial manipulations by the FRCN. Therefore, 
countries may adopt IFRS, but they would need to modify the standards to suit their local 
needs. It is also not the case that a bundle of accounting regulatory mechanisms satisfies 
all stakeholders.  
Although IFRS reduces accounting quality and enforcement increases it in chapter 
three, the adoption of IFRS and the establishment of the FRCN both increase market 
liquidity in Nigeria. Thus, there is a trade-off between improved accounting quality and 
capital market benefits following IFRS adoption. Adopting IFRS, regardless of its 
potentials to decrease accounting quality, may be a worthwhile endeavour since countries 
can have the market liquidity of their firms increased, thereby, attracting foreign 
investments. 
Overall, the study shows that in a country like Nigeria where corruption is rife, 
and macro institutional structures are weak, accounting regulation, especially 
enforcement of accounting standards, is still effective in improving accounting quality 
and encouraging positive capital market response.   
Conclusively, developing countries would derive two benefits of improved 
accounting quality and higher market liquidity with strengthening or establishing strong 
enforcement institutions. However, they have to make a choice between improved 
accounting quality and higher market liquidity while adopting IFRS. 
5.3 Limitations of the Studies and Avenues for Further Research 
Chapter two is limited by the case study research design approach that it employs. As in 
all case study designs, generalising beyond the case is difficult. Similarly, in this study, 
the researcher is unable to generalise the substantive institutionalisation of IFRS beyond 
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the case units studied. Moreover, the researcher was only able to get back 13% of the 
distributed mail questionnaires, which inhibited a generalisable inference about the 
institutionalisation of IFRS by all Nigerian listed firms.  
Chapter three and four are limited by the inability of the researcher to interact 
IFRS with the enforcement variable so as to assess the joint effect of the two variables of 
interest and the separate effect of the variables. Notwithstanding this limitation, however, 
the researcher was able to evaluate the separate effects of the two regulatory mechanisms 
by creating a subsample. Furthermore, the regulatory mechanisms were proxied by year 
dummies, which is the only possible measure. However, such measures may capture more 
than the accounting regulatory change. 
Future research can address some other issues germane to the research direction 
of this study. A similar study can be carried out using a larger data set, if available, for 
countries in West Africa, which have similar institutional structures with Nigeria, to 
further confirm the conclusions of this study. Furthermore, future studies can explore 
various dimensions of corporate governance to reveal further insights into firm-level 
influences on accounting quality and market liquidity. Other unique settings can be 
explored to unveil new theoretical insights relating to accounting regulations.  
Table 5.1 Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypotheses Results 
1. IFRS adoption significantly reduces earnings 
management behaviour of Nigerian listed firms. 
Hypothesis not accepted 
2. The monitoring and enforcement approach by the 
FRCN significantly reduces earnings management 
behaviour of Nigerian listed firms. 
Hypothesis accepted 
3. IFRS adoption significantly increases timely loss 
recognition by Nigerian listed firms. 
Hypothesis not accepted 
4. The monitoring and enforcement approach by 
FRCN significantly increases timely loss recognition 
by Nigerian listed firms 
Hypothesis accepted 
5. IFRS adoption increases the persistence of 
earnings of Nigerian listed firms. 
Hypothesis not accepted 
6. IFRS adoption increases market liquidity of 
Nigerian listed companies  
Hypothesis accepted 
7. The establishment of the Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria increases the stock market 
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Appendix I: Interview Protocol 
 
Department of Accountancy, Economics and 
Finance, 
School of Social Sciences, 
Heriot-Watt University, 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
Email: za17@hw.ac.uk 
Mobile No: +447470019434 
Date: 03/01/2017 
Attn: Mr Abd, 
ABC Nigeria 
XXX House,  




Re: Enforcement of IFRS in Nigeria 
I am a PhD student in the Department of Accountancy, Economics and Finance, Heriot-
Watt University in Edinburgh, UK. My research work is to understand how external auditors 
make Nigerian listed companies adopt IFRS substantively. Substantive adoption means 
companies not only use IFRS for external reporting but also use it for internal reporting. 
To facilitate my note-taking, I would like to record our conversations. The interview is strictly for 
the purpose of research and only my supervisors and I will be privy to the audio recording. The 
audio recording will be eventually deleted after they have been transcribed. Subsequently, I would 
like to send you the interview transcript for clarifications and amendments. Also, it would be 
appreciated if you make available any documents, data and resources that may be helpful for 
substantiating your responses.  
The interview is planned to last no longer than one hour. During this time, I have a number of 
questions to cover. If time begins to run short, you may be interrupted to ensure all the questions 
are covered. 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. 
 
 
           __  
Abdul-Baki, Zayyad       Prof. Ros Haniffa 
Doctoral Researcher            Supervisor
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Section A: Interviewee Background 
1. What is your position in the firm? 
_____________________________________________ 
2. How long have you been in the firm? 
___________________________________________ 
3. Were you in a different firm before this? 
________________________________________ 
4. If yes, what is the name of the firm and how long were you there? ___________________ 
5. What are your qualifications? 
_________________________________________________ 
Section B: Impact of IFRS Enforcement on its Institutionalisation 
6. Are Nigerian listed companies required to use IFRS for internal reporting? 
7. Do your clients use IFRS for internal reporting? 
8. What are the factors that make your clients use IFRS for internal reporting? 
9. If IFRS is not used for internal reporting, what would be the implications for external 
reports (published accounts)? 
10. What are the benefits of IFRS? 
11. What are the cost of IFRS? 
12. Are the benefits of IFRS more than the cost? 
13. Does the cost and benefit of IFRS have an impact on the way your clients use IFRS (i.e. 
for internal and external reporting)? 
14. Do your clients have capable hands in using IFRS? 
15. Do you assist your clients in preparing IFRS-based financial statements? 
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Appendix II: Questionnaire 
 
Department of Accountancy, Economics and Finance,     








The Chief Financial Officer or 
The Head of Accounting or 
The Accountant/Internal Auditor 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
Re: The Institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria 
 
I am a PhD student in the Department of Accountancy and Finance, Heriot-Watt 
University in Edinburgh, UK. I am carrying out a research on the degree of integration of 
IFRS into organisational processes and the factors perceived as enhancing or inhibiting 
this integration. 
 
I would appreciate if you could make out time to respond and complete the questionnaire. 
The information will be used for research purposes only. I would be most grateful to 
receive any additional comments. Any of the above addressees can complete the 
questionnaire. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me on the above contact details if you have any questions. 
The researcher hereby assures all respondents that any information supplied will be 
treated with utmost confidentiality and no part therefrom will be divulged to a third party. 
 
Please find enclosed a self-addressed envelope for returning the questionnaire. You may 
as well return it through my email given in address above. I would appreciate that the 
questionnaire is returned within 2 weeks following receipt to facilitate timely conduct of 
the research. 
 
Thank you for your understanding and cooperation. 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
           _  
Abdul-Baki, Zayyad             Prof. Ros Haniffa 
Doctoral Researcher          Supervisor 
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The Institutionalisation of IFRS in Nigeria 
 
Instructions on completing this section 
Please complete the questions below by filling the blank space or by ticking the 
appropriate box. 
 
Section A: Personal Background  
1) What is your current position in this company?   
………………………………………………………………………………..  
2) How long have you been in this position in this company?   
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3) How long have you been working for this company?   
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
4) How many companies have you worked for before your current company?  
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
5) What was the last position held in the last company before this one? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
6) What is your highest level of education?  
OND   BSc/HND  MSc   PhD   Professional 
Certificate  
7) Which of the following professional accountancy bodies do you belong to? 
ANAN  ICAN  ACCA  CIMA   
Others  please specify……………………………………………………… 
 
Section B: Company Background  
8) How long has your company been listed on the Nigerian stock Exchange?  
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
9) On which other stock exchange is your company listed? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
10) Does your company have any plans to list on another stock exchange?  
Yes   No  
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If yes, what is/are the name(s) of this/these stock exchange(s)? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
11)  What percentage of your company’s shares is owned by foreign investors? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
12)  How many accountants with professional accountancy qualification do you have 
in your company? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
13) How many accountants has your company recruited since 2012? 
  ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section C:  Institutionalisation of IFRS  
In this section, please read each statement and circle the number which best 
represents the practice in your company using the following scale:  
1     2      3     4   5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree  Strongly agree 
14) My company uses IFRS in preparing audited/published accounts 
1  2  3  4  5 
15) IFRS gives very different results from Nigerian SAS when used in preparing financial 
statements 
1  2  3  4  5 
 If you chose 4 or 5, to what extent? 
 Minimal   Moderate   Substantive  
16) My company prepares internal reports to management using IFRS 
1  2  3  4  5 
If you chose 4 or 5, state which year your company started preparing internal 
reports using IFRS? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
17) My company’s external auditors will qualify my company’s published accounts if 
they do not comply with IFRS.  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
   
197 
 
18) My company’s external auditors will qualify my company’s published accounts if 
internal reports to the management do not comply with IFRS.  
1  2  3  4  5 
19) My company’s external auditors require that internal reports to the management 
comply with IFRS.  
1  2  3  4  5 
20) The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria monitors my company’s compliance with 
IFRS. 
 1  2  3  4  5 
If you chose 4 or 5, what is the nature of this monitoring?  
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
21) The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria imposes a strict penalty on my company 
if my company’s published accounts do not comply with IFRS.  
1  2  3  4  5 
If you chose 4 or 5, what are the kinds of penalty?  
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
22) The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria requires that my company’s internal 
reports to the management comply with IFRS.  
1  2  3  4  5 
23) My company benefits from IFRS adoption. 
1  2  3  4  5 
 If you chose 4 or 5, please list this/these benefit(s) to your company 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
24) My company incurs higher costs for IFRS adoption  
1  2  3  4  5 
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25) The cost of preparing published accounts using IFRS is more than its benefits. 
  
1  2  3  4  5 
26) The cost of preparing internal reports to management using IFRS is more than the 
benefits. 
 1  2  3  4  5 
27) My company provides IFRS training to its accounting staff.  
1  2  3  4  5 
If you chose 4 or 5, by what means are these trainings conducted? 
In house   Staff go on outside training programmes  
28) Newly recruited chartered accountants in my company are able to use IFRS in 
preparing financial statements.  
1  2  3  4  5 
29) Newly recruited accounting graduates in my company have a good knowledge of 
IFRS. 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Thank you so much for your time in completing this survey. Your responses will 
certainly benefit this study.  
Would you like to receive a summary of the questionnaire results when it becomes 
available?   
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Appendix III: Analysis of Responses to Questionnaire 
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The FRCN does 
not require that 
internal reports 
comply with IFRS 
hardware for 
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